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ABSTRACT
Authentication is a vital part of establishing secure, online transactions and Public key
Infrastructure (PKI) plays a crucial role in this process for a relying party. A PKI
certificate provides proof of identity for a subject and it inherits its trustworthiness
from the fact that its issuer is a known (trusted) Certification Authority (CA) that
vouches for the binding between a public key and a subject's identity.
Certificate Policies (CPs) are the regulations recognized by PKI participants and they
are used as a basis for the evaluation of the trust embodied in PKI certificates.
However, CPs are written in natural language which can lead to ambiguities, spelling
errors, and a lack of consistency when describing the policies. This makes it difficult
to perform comparison between different CPs.
This thesis offers a solution to the problems that arise when there is not a trusted CA
to vouch for the trust embodied in a certificate. With the worldwide, increasing
number of online transactions over Internet, it has highly desirable to find a method
for authenticating subjects in untrusted domains.
The process of formalisation for CPs described in this thesis allows their semantics to
be described. The formalisation relies on the XML language for describing the
structure of the CP and the formalization process passes through three stages with the
outcome of the last stage being 27 applicable criteria. These criteria become a tool
assisting a relying party to decide the level of trust that he/she can place on a subject
certificate. The criteria are applied to the CP of the issuer of the subject certificate.
To test their validity, the criteria developed have been examined against the
UNCITRAL Model Law for Electronic Signatures and they are able to handle the
articles of the UNCITRAL law.
Finally, a case study is conducted in order to show the applicability of the criteria. A
real CPs have been used to prove their applicability and convergence. This shows that
the criteria can handle the correspondence activities defined in a real CPs adequately.
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CHAPTER!
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Electronic information appears in our daily life in different forms, and we know how
important it is in making our lives more convenient and manageable. Both individuals
and organizations have benefited from the presence of electronic information and it
plays a role in developing different ways of communicating between people,
organizations and government sectors. The Internet is a prime example of the
electronic information revolution and today its cover extends globally with around
300 million people accessing it. However, it is an open environment and insecure [1].
Certainly, the Internet can be considered as a revolution in computing and
communication. It assists in opening private networks to the world and allows access
by anonymous users. A number of factors have helped to make the Internet popular,
perhaps the most important being the availability of tools that support accessing and
obtaining services across it (e.g. web browsers). The Internet offers its many services
twenty four hours a day, seven days a week and wide accessibility, ease of use,
affordability and availability help in allowing people to adapt to this revolutionary
technology. Nowadays people depend on the Internet to accomplish their work in
areas such as:
• Finding news and information.
• Buying and selling goods.
• Arranging meetings.
• Sending documentation and other files.
• Publishing information.
The Internet is medium for collaboration between different entities and this new
paradigm for the Internet highlights the necessity for security. The Merriam-Webster
Dictionary [2] defines security as "the quality or state of being secure" or "freedom
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from fear or anxiety". Any secure system should preserve integrity, confidentiality
and availability [3].
• Integrity: prevention of undetected unauthorized modification of information.
• Confidentiality: prevention of unauthorized disclosure or compromise of
information.
• Availability: prevention of unauthorised withholding of information or
resources.
Any deficiencies in the security of a system can increase exposure to security threats,
such as security breaches. A threat is any potential danger to an information system
that exploits a vulnerability to cause harm to personnel and/or network resources in
the form of destruction, disclosure, modification of data, denial of service, and/or
fraud, waste, and abuse [4]. The best known security threats are impersonating a user
or system, eavesdropping, denial of service, packet replay and packet amendment. In
the following we, briefly summarize definitions of these threats:
• Impersonating a user (or system) is where a malicious user pretends to be
another, legitimate network user.
• Eavesdropping is the interception of network activity to gain sensitive
information such as passwords or procedures for performing functions and
data.
• Denial of service is where an attacker disables systems on a network to
prevent legitimate users from using them.
• Packet replay is where an attacker replies with an authentication sequence
to gain access to a system after the intruder records and re-transmits
message packets on the network.
• Packet modification involves an attacker intercepting and modifying
packet contents before transmitting them to their original destination.
Threats to security are increasing, as every day we hear new fraud stories, and the
majority of these frauds take place using the Internet. In the 2003 Survey of Fortune
1000 Companies, it was shown that Internet/Intranet security occupies third place
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amongst all threats facing corporate America. Internet/Intranet fraud has moved in
ranking from number lOin 1997 to number 3 in 2003 [5]. Moreover, the Harris
Interactive Survey of Fortune 1000 Companies reveals serious deficiencies in disaster
preparation, where 36% of C-suite executives consider that hackers are the biggest
threat to business-critical information [6].
A survey of UK businesses, Information Security Breaches Survey 2006, [7] shows
that security threats are still a major worry for UK companies despite the number of
companies that have actually experienced security incidents in 2006 coming down to
62% from 74% two years ago. The survey shows that the number of UK businesses
using the Internet increased to 97% in 2006 from 93% in 2004. One of the survey's
surprises was that despite all this information, two fifths of business are still
allocating less than 1% of their IT budget to information security whilst the average
cost associated with a security incident was £10,000 in 2004 but has increased in
2006 to £12,000.
The following quotation outlines the major problem of Internet vulnerabilities:
"The tremendous risk exposure resulting from successful attacks and the
globalization of threats continue to make cyber security a boardroom-level
issue. More than ever, organizations are relying on their technology
infrastructure to conduct business. The complexity of the IT infrastructure
and the lack of integration between security technologies continue to result
in major vulnerabilities for organizations worldwide. It is only through
sound security management that companies will successfully face the cyber
risk in the sr century." Russ Artzt, Executive Vice-President, eTrust
Security Solutions, Computer Associates.
Finally, it is generally accepted that security is necessary for applications operating in
distributed and open environments such as the Internet where its aim is to provide
protection against threats to the communication of information.
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1.2 Security Concepts
As we have just stated, security is a core requirement for any transaction over the
Internet where parties who were previously unknown to each other can establish
connections between themselves. All participants are therefore looking for some kind
of assurance and have concerns about the trustworthiness of the other party. In fact,
they are looking for some kind of evaluation of the other's trustworthiness. Finding a
way to demonstrate trustworthiness to each other is considered a primary goal in an
open environment such as the Internet. Trustworthiness becomes strengthened when
essential security properties, integrity, confidentiality and authentication are satisfied
[8]. Authentication is important in the age of faceless e-commerce, authentication
assists the receiver of a digital message to be confident in both the identity of the
subject and the integrity of the message [9]. Authentication is usually achieved using
encryption where encryption of data enables the identity of both the sender and the
receiver to be established. Of course, encryption satisfies the confidentiality property
by preventing unauthorized access to data.
1.2.1 Encryption
Encryption of data that travels over the Internet is considered an adequate solution to
protecting its privacy, i.e. it prevents the data from being intercepted during the
transaction process. Encryption is defined in [10] as:
Any procedure used in cryptography to convert plaintext into ciphertext (an
encrypted message) in order to prevent any but the intended recipient from
reading that data.
As the definition states, encryption is a part of the field of cryptography.
1.2.2 Cryptography
Cryptography consists of encryption and decryption: converting ciphertext to
plaintext ("original data"). The art behind cryptography is rendering data impossible
to read without the knowledge of some secret key. This secret key is given with the
4
plaintext to an algorithm to produce the ciphertext. There are two types of
cryptography depending on the key, or secret key: symmetric and asymmetric.
1.2.2.1 Symmetric Cryptography
Symmetric cryptography, also called secret key cryptography, is based on the pre-
agreement of a shared secret key between the communicating parties. Once this
agreement has been reached, the parties can start to communicate. The success of this
kind of cryptography is dependant on the key remaining secret to everyone except the
communicating parties, and for this reason, using a secure channel for establishing the
shared secret key is essential [11]. The secret key is only to be used in the encryption
and decryption of messages. Symmetric cryptography was commonly used until 1970
[11] and is still used today when appropriate.
1.2.2.2 Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography eliminates the need to use a shared secret key and replaces
it with the use of two keys, one called the "private key" and the other called the
"public key". The relationship between them appears as a completion role. Messages
that have been encrypted with the public key will not decrypt unless the related
private key is used. Only the private key needs to be kept secret by its owner and is
not shared with others. Because of the design of the methods, it is impractical to
compute the private key from the public key [11]. The public key is published freely,
and is needed to communicate securely with its owner. Therefore, there is no need for
a secure communication channel for the purpose of exchanging keys [11].
Asymmetric cryptography is also called Public-key cryptography.
1.2.3 Public-key Cryptography
The idea of using a public key to eliminate the need for secure key exchange has
allowed Public-key cryptography to gain much publicity. Moreover, within a Public
key Infrastructure, Public-key cryptography is also used to perform authentication
and to create digital signatures as well as for encryption [11].
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1.3 Public key Infrastructure
In [12] a Public key Infrastructure (PKI) is defined as:
a system that facilitates the distribution of public keys for Public-key
cryptography. It is an infrastructure to provide a secured environment to
transfer data from one point to another, with allowed and verifiable identity.
As there are many security infrastructures available, PKI provides us with a
cohesive set of procedures and services to conduct a secured transaction.
The PKI provides a complete life cycle management system in handling keys
and certificates.
As this definition states, PKI is a complete solution for handling transactions in a
secure way, including the ability to verify the identity of the participants. It provides
authentication, integrity and confidentiality for participants who are exchanging data
through the Internet. Public and private keys are linked to the owner's identity
through the public key certificate (most commonly an X.S09 certificate), hereafter
referred to simply as a certificate. Figure 1-1 shows an example of a certificate .
.. EnsurM the identity of a r.mote computet
Issued to: swsl.ncl.ac.uk
Issued by: Thawte Server CA 'i' J .. ue:d by: The......t;eServer CA
Figure 1-1 X.509 Certificate
A certificate is a proof of identity or a letter of authorization signed by an
authoritative entity (the certificate issuer). The issuer of the public key certificate, the
Certification Authority (CA), vouches for this identity after a Registration Authority
(RA) verifies the subject's identity. A certificate could be issued to an end-user, a
6
device, Web server, process, or another CA. Figure 1-2 shows the major elements of a
PKI.
s Certificate Request
IIGJ' ..,_,.-,---. .~"'l-
'..:.;;. I'-- ._,
~ ..}Subject Re ~ stration
Authority
Certification
Authority
Figure 1-2 PKI Elements
The PKI lets companies take advantage of the speed, versatility, availability,
immediacy and global access of the Internet whilst helping protect critical information
from interception, tampering, and unauthorized access. The PKI assures the
trustworthiness of public key-based security mechanisms : the confidentiality of
private keys and the integrity of public keys [13].
1.4 Trust
A measure of trust is what we are looking for when we want to rely on someone, and
in electronic commerce trust is necessary to establish confidence. It is important to
clarify what is meant by trust in this context because different definitions of trust have
been adopted by different people. Trust is defined in the ITU-T Recommendation
X.S09 specification [XS09-00, Section 3.3.54] as:
Generally, an entity can be said to "trust" a second entity when it (the first
entity) makes the assumption that the second entity will behave exactly as the
first entity expects.
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Trust in the PKI is the result of the interplay of three major concepts: authentication,
encryption and a CA [9].
A CA provides a level of assurance that the public key contained in a certificate does
indeed belong to the subject whose identity is being associated with that key. The CA
signs the public key certificate of the subject to provide the cryptographic binding
between the subject's public key, her name, and other information in the certificate.
When a recipient of a public key wants to determine whether a legitimate CA issued a
certificate, he has to verify the issuing CA's signature on the certificate [9].
A PKI certificate enables Secure Socket Layer (SSL) technology, which allows the
establishment of secure channels between a seller's server and a customer's browser.
SSL provides the following secure online transactions [9]:
• Authentication - Customers can verify that the site belongs to the seller
and not to anyone else. This assurance will boost their confidence when
disclosing confidential information.
• Message privacy - All information exchanged between the seller's web
server and a customer is encrypted and cannot be read, deciphered or
decrypted by a third party that taps into the data being exchanged after the
connection has been established.
• Message integrity - SSL uses a message digest mechanism to detect
when the contents of a message have been tampered with, which ensures
both parties involved in the transaction know that what they are seeing is
exactly what the other party sent.
When SSL encryption technology is activated, a small lock (Ii) is displayed in the
status bar of most web browsers. Additionally, the URL in the address box begins
with "https:/f' instead of just ''http:// ". Figure 1-3 depicts this technique.
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Figure 1-3 Secure Website
Every CA adheres to a policy, called the Certificate Policy (CP) which defines issues
related to certificates such as the certificate community, applicability, liability,
entities, etc. The CA is always the validator for the certificate if a relying party'
wishes to check if a certificate is valid or not. This process is called certificate
validation.
In [15], certificate validation is defined as:
the process of ensuring that a certificate was valid at a given time, including
possibly the construction and processing of a certification path, and
ensuring that all certificates in that path were valid (i.e. were not expired or
revoked) at that given time.
A certification path is built from a trusted anchor, a CA trusted by the relying party, to
the subject certificate. When processing a certification path, a CP that is acceptable to
the relying party application must be present in every certificate in the path. The PKI
model is based on trust: trust that certificates are issued by a trusted third party (CA),
trust that a certificate represents a valid binding of a subject's identity, trust that
private keys are kept safely, and trust that invalid certificates have been properly
invalidated or revoked [16]. The trust anchor is trusted by the relying party, which
leads to the fact that the relying party trusts any certificates the trust anchor issues
I As defined in 14. A. Arsenault and S. Turner. Internet X509 Public Key Infrastructure: Roadmap. 2002 July
[cited; 57]. HA user or agent that relies on the data in a certificate in making decisions".
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[17]. A CA issues certificates to entities which adhere to its CP and they have some
kind of connection between them. A domain is defined in [18] as the environment that
connects nodes (CAs and end-entities) together. This leads us to conclude that the
issuer CA simply creates a domain that includes all its certificates. Ifwe apply this to
the trust anchor, we see that the trust anchor really creates only a single trust domain
for its relying parties. Moreover, the trust anchor could expand the trust to another CA
domain by certifying it, we call this a "joined trust domain".
1.4.1 Single Trust Domain
A single trust domain is where PKI entities operate under the same CP; therefore, the
relying party and the subject are in the same domain, as shown in figure 1-4:
Trust Anchor
Relying p arty
Figure 1-4 Relying Party and the Subject in the Same Domain
1.4.2 Joined Trust Domains
Here, two or more trust domains are joined together. In this case we could find that
there is more than one CP operating. This issue has been sorted out by the CAs'
acceptance of each others CP. Therefore, it is possible for the relying party to be in
one domain and the subject in another. Figure 1-5 shows this case:
10
~'
Subject
Figure 1-5 Relying Party and the Subject in Different Domains
Joining of domains is done by cross-certification, where each CA issues a certificate
to the CA in the other domain, or by using the bridge technique where a mediator CA,
or bridge CA, introduces each domain to another. This is accomplished through cross-
certification between the bridge CA and each domain individually [11].
1.5 Motivation
The Internet reaches all over the world and provides valuable services. There are no
barriers between information: it all looks alike, and the only difference sometimes is
in the written language. This paradigm allows for powerful, easy and attractive
services. The Internet has become essential to our daily life and there are many goods
produced in different countries with low prices that we can purchase over the Internet.
To buy these goods is an easy task which only requires you to provide the company's
site with your credit card number. But before we do this we need to verify the site's
trustworthiness in order to decide how much trust we can place on it and the
company.
Each web browser has been initialised with predefined lists of CAs, and users can add
or remove CAs from these lists. Note that [19] asserts that the built-in lists of CAs in
Netscape and Microsoft browsers are not reliable although they have commonly been
accepted as dependable. The user will be notified if the browser receives a certificate
issued by a CA that is not in the browser's list and will be asked if the new CA should
be added to the list.
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Cross-certification is a solution that could be applied easily, however most of the
leading CA companies do not like to provide this service because of the legal
implications of cross-certification [20]. This fact causes the various public key
infrastructures that currently exist to be incompatible and therefore certificates are not
always interoperable across services and countries. There are two reasons for a
subject's identity to be impossible to authenticate. First, if the subject certificate is in
an untrusted domain due to the absence of trust anchor, and second, because of the
use of a new type of SSL certificate, known as lower-assurance SSL certificates. This
type of certificate helps provide data confidentiality and integrity, but not
authentication of the subject. These certificates are created at reduced cost and with
rapid order fulfilment [21]. A deficiency in a subject's authenticity will cause the
relying party to incur a higher degree of risk. The following risks could be met [21]:
• A malicious subject could deceive a relying party into believing that the
malicious subject's website is operating as part of a known organization
whose name is included in the site's SSL certificate.
• A malicious subject could present its website as a specific organization
even though no such organization exists.
• A malicious subject could claim to be acting on behalf of an organization
to request an SSL certificate.
The Internet provides cheap, easy, and quick access; therefore, it should not be
segregated into trusted and untrusted domains. It is important to find an appropriate
solution for relying parties to be confident that they can evaluate a subject's
trustworthiness. This thesis will try to tackle the issue of authenticating a subject's
identity in the presence of an untrusted domain using the trust that is articulated in the
subject's CP. The outcomes of this thesis will be a way of making the online
environment safer.
1.6 Our Approach
The main contribution of this thesis is defining a process to assist in evaluating the
level of trust that can be placed on a subject's certificate in the case that no trust
anchor accepted by the relying party can be found. As stated in Section 1.4, certificate
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validation involves the construction and processing of a certification path between a
trusted anchor and a subject certificate to ensure that all the certificates in the path are
valid.
We intend to propose criteria that embody the semantics of the relevant CP to
evaluate the subject's trustworthiness. These criteria were developed by considering
what makes a good balance between technical and legal requirements, and by the
empirical study of several certification authorities. These criteria have been developed
in three stages and each stage has been thoroughly tested and analysed in order to
evaluate its applicability.
The overall objective of the criteria developed is to provide an extra level of assurance
about the subject's certificate in addition to the assurance of the CA that vouches for
the identity of the subject to whom it has issued a certificate. The ultimate goal of our .
approach is to allow the relying party to examine the CP of a subject's certificate, and
to try to decide the extent to which the policy of the subject's CA matches with what
has been defined in our criteria, and based upon that, the relying party will be able to
decide the degree of trust that can put in the subject's certificate.
Our approach to validating a subject's certificate in the absence of a trusted anchor
could be interpreted as the construction of a certification path that is a direct path
(criteria path) between the subject's certificate CP and the relying party, as shown in
the following figure:
Criteria path
Subject Re lying Party
Figure 1-6 Criteria path
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A CP, besides creating what we called a domain, is also important when evaluating
trustworthiness because it states the obligations of all participants and their liabilities
in case of disputes. Cross-certification is based on the degree of trust one domain can
place in another, the level of trust is usually what has been written into a CP or a
Certification Practices Statement (CPS) [22], see Chapter 3 for more details.
Therefore, in our approach we will work with the CP to evaluate the level of trust,
making the following important assumption:
We believe that the CP that operates the CP of a subject's certificate
which we use to evaluate the level of trust is a genuine CP and is not
fabricated.
CPs are written in natural language and so are hard to process automatically. To get
round this, we will use the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) language to create a
representation for the criteria to ease the process of comparison when evaluating the
trustworthiness of participant policies.
1.7 Related Work
The proposed solution uses the CP as a basis for the relying party to decide whether or
not to trust the subject's certificate. Our proposed work initially consisted of two
concepts: formalisation and comparison. The related work we discuss next also uses
the CP to assist comparison.
1.7.1 Formalisation
Klobucar and Jerman-Blazic proposed an approach to formalising a CP in their paper
"A formalisation and evaluation of certificate policies" [23] and they selected
Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.I) as a notation for their formalisation. The
elements of the CP are presented in a mixture of their relation to a subject type (CA,
RA, end entity), or as a sequence of policy elements according to a corresponding
framework. The main characteristics of the formalisation of the policy elements are
structural, non-structural, comparable, and non-comparable elements. The ultimate
goal of this work was to make CPs easily readable and understandable which could
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then help users to evaluate the binding of a public key and a subject's identity and to
decide whether to trust the subject's certificate. The formalisation process is mainly a
transformation of the contents of CP from natural language to ASN.l notation. The
proposed approach simplifies the presentation of the CP based on a systematic
franslation from natural language. However, it does not consider the semantic
relationships between CP elements and the keywords (such as "MUST", "MUST
NOT", etc.) which emphasise requirement levels. Moreover, it also does not handle
the constraints relating to the applicability of CP elements.
Bourka et al's ultimate objective of formalising and comparing CPs is different from
the previous one. Their target was to facilitate an on-line automated cross-certification
service by formalising and comparing CPs [24]. Their method of formalisation
depends on extracting a list of possible content values for each CP paragraph to be
formalised in XML. This process is combined with assigning weights and scorings fot
each paragraph in the CP. Weight indicates the importance of the paragraph within the
overall CP, and the scorings are assigned to all identified values of each paragraph.
Two different XML document types are produced out by the formalisation of the
identified elements of the CP: the Extended CP and the Basic CP. The Extended CP
and Basic CP both contain identified content values formalised in XML but the
Extended CP also contains the weights and scorings and is considered as a private
document which can be used internally for compatibility assessment of external CPs.
The Basic CP is publicly published so it can be used for comparison by other
organizations. There is no detailed formalisation of their method of specifying the
importance of particular CP paragraphs, and there is also no information about the
weights and scoring system they used in their formalisation.
1.7.2 Comparison
Comparison in [23] is based on the comparable elements of the formalised CP, e.g.
forbidden applications, required minimal length of signature keys, private key
protection methods, pieces of identification, or verification methods of private key
possession. It uses an order relation value to define the relationship between the CPs
being compared. Unfortunately, the proposed approach does not describe the
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algorithm which it uses to define the value of the order relation. A partial order rather
than a total order results from depending on the comparable elements only.
As we know, the comparable elements do not exemplify the whole CP; therefore, CPs
participating in the comparison process should have the same interest, meaning that
they offer the same or equivalent services. In addition, they must target the same level
of applicants (either CAs or end-entities). CPs that differ in interest, will have non-
"
equivalent descriptions in their CP sections. We conclude that the expected result of
comparing non-equivalent CPs will not be accurate because of this.
The assessment of compatibility in [24] is accomplished by comparing the Basic CP
of the external organization with the Extended CP of the known organization. The
assessment is based on the weights and scores set by the known organization in its
Extended CP. A mathematical method was developed for CP comparison and it
outputs the final result of the compatibility as an integer that results from the addition
of weights and scores. As we mention in the preceding section, there is no detailed
information about the scoring system used but they do mention that the weights and
scoring system are dynamically assigned which means the known organization has
control over the specification of its weights and scorings. We think this type of
scoring system is suitable when establishing interoperability between organizations
(cross-certification) but not for purposes of authentication.
1.8 Thesis Structure
The objective of this thesis is to develop mechanisms to support a comparison
mechanism that supports assessment and judgement of a subject's trustworthiness.
The thesis consists of 8 chapters and the rest is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 discusses the Public Key Infrastructure more extensively; different
standards of PKI are presented with explanations of the basic functions and the
components of a PKI system. Certificates are introduced providing an overview of the
most common terminologies that relate to them. We discuss certificate validation,
presenting the problems that might be encountered when constructing a certification
path. The chapter looks at existing proposed solutions for constructing certification
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paths, and then describes our approach to constructing the certification path which we
called "ATV".
In Chapter 3, we focus on the background material for implementing our proposed
approach; this chapter emphasises the importance of the CP and will explore the
obligations that are articulated in a CP for the different PKI elements. We describe
the major functions that are necessary through the Life Cycle of a certificate. Also
covered are CP issues that relate to security.
Chapter 4 presents the process that has been developed to formalise a CP in XML and
shows the different stages that the formalisation went through. In this chapter we
define a number of conventions for producing identical formalisations. Each stage of
the formalisation has been thoroughly tested and analysed to evaluate its ability to
satisfy our needs. The reasons behind needing a new version of the formalisation are
shown. Chapter 4 also describes the filtering process that we used to remove unrelated
criteria from the first version of the formalism. Finally, we present the final version of
our criteria.
Chapter 5 discusses the semantics behind the criteria we have developed. The XML
representation for each criterion is also constructed in this chapter. Then we present
the numerical evaluation system that has been developed to assign a weight to each
criterion. Finally, we explain the comparison results that will come out of the
comparison process.
The experimental stage is explained in chapter 6. The criteria are examined against
the requirements that are specified in the UNCITRAL law. We conclude that the
developed criteria have been defined adequately, and they demonstrate significant
potential for estimating a subject's trustworthiness.
In chapter 7, we study the applicability of the developed criteria. By investigating the
developed criteria against a real life cases, we demonstrate the applicability and the
coverage. We conclude that the case studies show that the criteria developed handle
the correspondence activities that are defined in a real CPs effectively.
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Finally, in chapter 8 we conclude by reviewing the work that has been done, and then
identifying the directions in which this work can be extended.
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CHAPTER2
SECURING TRANSACTIONS ON THE INTERNET
2.1 Introduction
Enciphering information before it is transmitted over public networks is the only way
to build secure communications. An organization can improve its security on the
Internet by extending its applications or network security to use public-key encryption
for enciphering its information, A PKI provides a comprehensive set of security
technologies that meet the needs of business, developers, and users for the secure
exchange of information across public networks using private and public keys
(Public-key cryptography). In addition to encryption, Public-key cryptography can be
used to support authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. These
services allow the establishment of secure communications between two parties
without prior contact between them.
This chapter is about understanding PKI. The first step towards this involves knowing
the concepts behind PKI. We then present the standards that regulate PKI functions.
We follow this by introducing the basic functions and components of a PKI system
and then tum our focus to the inside of a PKI architecture to see how connections are
established between PKI entities. Repositories and certificates are identified providing
an overview of the most common terminologies related to them. The certificate
validation procedure is discussed, presenting the problems encountered when
constructing the certification path. This chapter looks at five different methods of
certificate path construction, and we then propose our approach to constructing the
certification path which we call "ATV".
2.2 Public Key Infrastructure
PKI is, as stated in [15] "The set of hardware, software, people, policies and
procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and revoke Public-Key
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Certificates (PKCs) based on Public-key cryptography". Public-key cryptography
fulfils the requirements for securing communications and transaction processing over
the Internet. In public-key cryptosystems, each entity holds a pair of related keys,
public and private. Anything encrypted with its private key can be decrypted only by
its corresponding public key. A PKI is a co-operation between different entities whose
ultimate goal is to establish a trust relationship between the parties involved. Services
supported by PKI are based on the proper use of public/private key pairs [25]. A PKC
is used to verify a digital signature, encrypt data, or both, thus supporting security-
related services, including data confidentiality, data integrity, and end-entity
authentication. There are several PKI algorithms including, RSA, EIGamal, and DSA,
and there are many protocols that use public key techniques, including IPSec,
SIMIME, and TLS [26]. These are common industry abbreviations for PKI systems
are more concerned with security in establishing keys, which must be kept high to
guarantee data integrity.
In order to solve the key management problems of symmetric cryptography, where
keys are shared, Diffie and Hellman introduced a new concept in their 1976 paper,
"New directions in Cryptography" [27]. They introduced public-key cryptography and
claimed that the key management problem was solved; they modified a telephone
directory to contain entries with name, number, address and phone number that they
called the Public File. Anyone wanting to send an encrypted message should find the
recipient's public key first and then encrypt the message with that public key before
sending it to the recipient. At the other end, only a recipient who holds the
corresponding private key can decrypt the message. In this sense, Public-key
(asymmetric) cryptography uses a key pair, the public key which needs to be
published openly and a private key which should be kept secret.
The notion of a "digital certificate" was introduced by Kohnfelder in his 1978 MIT
bachelor's thesis by digitally signing each name and public key entry of the Public
File. The idea was that a certificate is a digitally signed statement binding the key-
holder's name to a public key. These certificates could be publicly accessible to
anyone who wanted them [11].
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The idea of the Diffie and Hellman directory was taken forward by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) in the 1980s and this work resulted in a standard,
known as X.SOO,which defines all the characteristics of such a directory.
2.3 PKI Standards
Specifications of PKl policies have been clarified in various standards and PKI
standardisation has been carried out by a number of different bodies. Currently, there
are two open PKI standards: ITU-T Recommendation X.S09 V3 and the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) Public Key Infrastructure X.S09 (PKIX) [28]. There
are other standards but they either for internal use, such as the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) [29], or where development of the standard has
ceased, such as the Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKl). X.S09 and PKIX are
briefly discussed below.
2.3.1 X.S09
Recommendation X.S09 defines a framework for a Public key Infrastructure (PKI),
including PKCs and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [IS]. It defines the data
objects that represent these certificates and a framework for attribute certificates
which includes definitions of the information objects for the Privilege Management
Infrastructure (PMI), attribute certificates and the Attribute Revocation List. X.S09
also provides a framework for issuing, managing, using and revoking certificates.
Certificate extensions have been defined, and also a scheme for storing the PKI and
PMI objects in a directory. Directories play an important role in PKI and make use of
PKCs and their attributes. Therefore, X.S09 defines the methods for using a directory
and for enabling strong authentication. The X.S09 standard describes two levels of
authentication: simple (using username and password) and strong (using public-key
cryptography). When providing secure services, only strong authentication should be
used.
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2.3.2 PKIX
The PKIX Working Group was established in the fall of 1995 as part of the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF). The PKIX standard was proposed in [30] as an
improvement on X.509, but when this goal was achieved, the PKIX work expanded
beyond its original goal and has developed new standards for using X.509 on the
Internet. A full list of these standards can be found on the PKIX website:
http://www.ietf.orglhtml.charters/pkix-charter.html.PKIX has the same functions as
X.509 which supports identification, authentication, access control and authorization
functions on the Internet. PKIX also defines a profile for the certificate and CRL
protocols. In order to improve interoperability, the PKIX standard applies more
restrictions on communicating PKI clients [28]. Because PKIX does not require the
use of an X.500 directory system [28], the PKIX uses LDAP attributes integrated with
certificates and CRLs for revocation use.
2.4 PKI Services
This section presents those PKI services that provide core security services. The
X.509 Recommendation defines PKI functionally as "The infrastructure able to
support the management of public keys able to support authentication. encryption.
integrity or non-repudiation services." [15]. Therefore, PKI provides non-repudiation,
encryption, authentication, and integrity for electronic business. A PKI is generally
considered to be associated with the following services:
2.4.1 Authentication
Authentication is defined in [22] as:
"the verification of an individual's identity and/or the verification of data
origin."
In the PKI this is done by the use of PKCs and digital signature envelopes.
Authentication assures the relying party that the authenticating entity is the owner of
the private-public key, and this authentication is accomplished when the relying party
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uses the authenticating entity's public key to decrypt the message that was digitally
signed by the corresponding private key. In fact, the primary goal of authentication in
a PKI is to support communication between two parties without any prior contact
between them by supporting remote and unambiguous authentication, using PKCs and
a trusted CA [31].
2.4.2 Encryption
Public-key cryptography can be used to provide the cryptographic functions for the
protection of message confidentiality in a computer network. As we have seen above,
key distribution with asymmetric cryptography is easier than with symmetric
cryptography [11].
2.4.3 Integrity
Integrity means ensuring the integrity of data end-to-end by preventing unauthorised
creation, alteration, or destruction of data during the transaction. PKI assists the
recipient who should be able to determine if the message has been altered during
transmission.
2.4.4 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation services ensure that a given action is undeniable; repudiation occurs
when an individual denies involvement in a prior transaction (i.e. agreements and
procedures). Thus, non-repudiation means that an individual cannot successfully deny
involvement in a legitimate transaction. The most basic requirement for non-
repudiation is that a private key owner must be the only person in control of it, and
that it should be stored securely [15].
2.S PKI Architecture
Architecture is defined as "the structure of components. their relationships. and the
principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution over time" [32]. In this
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section, we aim give more details about the relationship between the different entities
of a PKI, especially the relationship between the CA and the end-entities. Different
logical architectures have been formed based on the interrelation between these, and
CP and CPS basically playa role in governing all the behaviours in these different
architectures. PKI architectures are of three different types:
2.5.1 Hierarchical Architecture
A hierarchical architecture consists of a top level "root" CA that issues certificates to
subordinate CAs. These CAs certify their descendants who are either CAs below them
in the hierarchy, or to end-entities, and so on. Every entity in the community holds a
copy of the public key of the root CA [33]. All end-entities base their trust on the
public key of the "root" CA which is the trust anchor, and this principle enables end-
entities to validate any certificate by verifying the certification path of certificates
from the trust anchor CA. For example, Alice verifies Bob's certificate, issued by CA
4, then CA 4's certificate, issued by CA 2, and then CA 2's certificate issued by CA
1, the root, whose public key Alice knows. Figure 2-1 illustrates this example.
Bob
Figure 2-1 Hierarchical Architecture
2.5.2 Mesh Architecture
In a mesh architecture there is no single root CA but more than one root CAs and each
CA issues certificates to the others (cross certification) [33]. The relying party bases
path validations on the public key of a nearby CA, as a trust anchor, generally the one
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that issues his/her certificate because the relying party knows the public key of that
trusted CA. So, for example, Alice knows the public key of CA 3, while Bob knows
the public key of CA 4. There are several certification paths that lead from Bob to
Alice. The shortest requires Alice to verify Bob's certificate, issued by CA 4, then CA
4's certificate issued by CA 2 and finally CA 2's certificate, issued by CA 3. CA 3 is
Alice's CA and she knows the public key of trust anchor CA 3. Figure 2-2 explains
mesh architecture.
Bob
Figure 2-2 Mesh Architecture
2.5.3 Single Architecture
A single architecture is formed when there is only one CA providing all the
certificates for end-entities. This architecture is the most basic and the simplest model
for a PKI. It is similar to a hierarchical architecture where every entity in the
community obtains the root CA's public key but differs in the sense that the
maximum depth of the tree is two [34]. The relying party needs only to check the
revocation status of any certificate to validate it. Figure 2-3 shows a single
architecture system.
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Subject Relying Party
Figure 1-3 Single Architecture
2.6 Connecting Architectures
In the previous section we discussed different architectures from which PKI can be
logically formed based on the relationship that exists between trust anchors and
relying parties where the relationship is managed by the same CP. Increasingly, PKI
can be implemented in a distributed fashion: instead of using a single CA architecture,
it could join with other architectures that operate different CPs allowing end-entities
to use a CA based on their particular needs. In this section we emphasize the bindings
that exist between PKI architectures.
2.6.1 Cross-certification
Cross-certification is the act of providing a CA with a certificate signed by another
CA in another hierarchy. The cross domains agree to trust and rely upon each other's
PKCs, keys and policies in order that each domain can vouch for each other's
certificates which results in extending the trust relationship of a CA. A certificate in
cross-certification is called a cross-certificate. The subject of the certificate is called
the subject certification authority. The issuer of the cross-certificate is called an
intermediate certification authority [15].
2.6.2 Bridge CA
Bridge CAs do not cross-certify each other. In addition, Bridge CAs are not intended
to be used as trust points by the users of the PKI, unlike intermediate CAs in Cross-
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certification; instead, a Bridge CA acts as a mediator, that it introduces one
organization to another. Each root CA enters cross-certification with the Bridge CA
whose job is to facilitate the communication under one or more certificate policies
[11].
2.7 PKI Components
As stated previously, a PKI is a framework of people, processes, policies, protocols,
hardware, and software used to generate, manage, store, deploy, and revoke PKCs. In
the following we discuss these components further:
2.7.1 Certification Authority
The CA plays a critical role because it is the primary component of a PKI. According
to the ITU-T Recommendation X.S09, a CA is "an authority trusted by one or more
users to create and assign public-key certificates." [15]. The main task of a CA is to
confirm the identity of an end entity. The process begins with an entity providing the
CA with sufficient proof of his/her identity. After satisfactory verification of the
identity credentials supplied, the CA generates a public-private key pair for the entity,
and creates a certificate for the generated public key which it cryptographically signs.
The policies and procedures the CA has established to confirm the user's identity will
decide the level of acceptance that other entities have of that CA [31].
The CA must distribute its public keys to all entities that trust the CA's certificates.
The PKI will generally have a root CA, which is at the top of the CA hierarchy and
has no superior CA to vouch for it. This CA issues certificates to other CAs and its
public keys are distributed as self-signed certificates. The CA's daily tasks are to
issue, maintain, verify, and revoke certificates. A CA operates under a policy known
as a CP and functions operationally according to a cps. The CP and cps are
discussed in Chapter 3.
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2.7.2 Registration Authority
The RA does not itself issue certificates and is an optional but common component of
a PKI, The primary purpose of an RA is to register and verify an end entity's identity,
with a valid photo-id and/or valid official documents, and to determine if an end-
entity is entitled to have a CA issue a PKC [31], An RA must make sure that all
procedures and processes are followed properly as defined in the CA's CP and CPS,
2.7.3 End-entity (Subscriber)
An end-entity or subscriber is defined in the Internet Certificate and CRL Profile as a
"user of PKl certificates and/or end user system that is the subject of a certificate",
End-entities use certificates to identify themselves and must be able to generate a
public/private key pair and securely store and use the private key [31].
Starting in Chapter 4 we will use "subject" to refer to end-entities; we prefer this term
as it complies with the authentication process that is performed on an end entity's
identity,
2.7.4 Relying Party
Defined in [20] as "The entity that uses certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists in
order to rely on the digital signature of the sender of a signed message, or the public
key",
2.7.5 Repository
The majority of PKI vendors use repositories for storing and retrieving certificates
[25], The term repository is defined in [20] as "An online system maintained by a CA
for storing and retrieving certificates and CRL", Publishing and distributing valid
certificates and the CRL is one of the duties of a CA, Each CA has one or more
Certificate/CRL Repositories used to distribute certificates and CRLs using common
protocols such as LDAP, HTTP and FTP [20], We will look at the two main forms of
repository: certificate and CRL repositories,
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2.7.5.1 Certificate Repository
The Internet is the largest distributed system; and therefore, to integrate certificate
services with Internet users, certificates should be available to all system users on the
Internet. For this reason, the idea of distributed repositories (directory) had been
introduced and certificate repositories store all the certificates ever issued by a CA.
X.SOOis a standard for directory services issued by the International Union (ITU). It
specifies both the structure of the directory information and of the protocols needed to
access the information [3S]. X.SOOalso provides a specification for a distributed
directory based on hierarchically named information objects (directory entries) [35].
Each entry belongs to one or more object class (e.g. country, person, organization).
Each entity contains a set of attributes which holds the object information, and at least
one attribute's value specifies a name for an entry [20]. This name is known as a
distinguished name (DN) which is a unique identification. X.SOOsupports replication,
access control and search mechanisms.
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) was designed to simplify access
to X.SOOand to make the directory available to all clients (machines and applications)
[20]. LDAP is subset of X.SOO,but LDAP goes beyond the original purpose and
attempts to position itself as the only directory protocol required, and hence implies
that the full X.SOOprotocols are unnecessary [3S]. Using LDAP with X.SOOis
inefficient; the reason being the heavyweight nature of X.SOO.A site, holding only
local data, has to bring up a full X.SOOservice before the user can use LDAP to access
these data. A new protocol has been developed called "slapd", a stand-alone LDAP
server which has its own local database [20]. X.S09 tries to simplify the use of a
directory by defining specific directory attributes for storing the certificates of the CA
and end-entities. All the directory attributes are listed in the table 2-1 with their
definitions as specified in [IS]:
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Directory
Function
Attributes
User certificate A user could have more than one public-key certificate from one or more
attribute
CAs. The userCertificate attribute type contains the public-key certificates a
user has.
A CA stores its self-issued certificates and certificates issued to this CA by
other CAs in the same realm as this CA in the cACertificate attribute of a
CA certificate attribute CA's directory entry.
In the case of v3 certificates, a basicConstraints extension with the cA value
set to TRUE should be included in these certificates (see section 2.7.6.1).
Any certificates issued to this CA by other CAs should be stored in the
issuedToThisCA elements of the crossCertificatePair attribute of a CA's
directory entry. Optionally, any certificates issued by this CA to other CAs
can be contained in the issuedByThisCA elements of the crossCertificatePair
attribute. The certificate issuer shall store a certificate in the issuedByThisCA
Cross certificate pair element of the crossCertificatePair attribute of its own directory entry if the
attribute
certificate has been issued to a subject CA which is not a subordinate in a
hierarchy. If a single attribute value contains both the issuedToThisCA and
the issuedByThisCA, the issuer name in one certificate shall match the
subject name in the other and vice versa.
In the case ofv3 certificates, a basicConstraints extension with the cA value
set to TRUE should be included in these certificates (see section 2.7.6.1).
Certificate revocation
list attribute
A list of revoked certificates will be contained in this attributed.
Authority revocation
list attribute
This attribute contains a list of revoked authority certificates.
Delta revocation list
attribute
This attribute type will contain a delta CRL in a directory entry.
Supported algorithms In the case that there is communication with a remote entity using certificates
attribute
as defined in this Directory Specification, this attribute will support the
selection of an alzorithm to be used in this communication.
Certification practice The certificationPracticeStmt attribute will hold information about an
statement attribute authority's certification practice statement.
Certificate policy
attribute
The certificatePolicy attribute holds information about a certificate policy.
PKI path attribute The PKI path attribute contains certification paths, each consisting of a
sequence of cross-certificates.
Table 2-1 Directory Attributes
A Note Regarding Directory Attributes
The directory attributes are defined to play an important role in simplifying access to
stored certificates and to help in performing the verification process which in tum
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supports the certification process. However, [25] includes a number of notes about the
directory attributes and their usefulness for finding the right certificate.
First, it is expected that the CA should make the cACertificate attribute available for
.its own directory with its self-signed certificates as well as certificates issued by the
CA in support of CA key update.
Second, they may see the same certificates issued to a CA by other CAs in the same
realm stored in the cACertificate attribute of its own directory entry. The realm is
undefined and subject to interpretation, an example of this is a single PKI domain
consisting of a hierarchy of CAs. The subordinate CAs will store the certificates
issued to them by their superior CA in the cACertificate attribute of their own
directory entry. However, we cannot be certain that all vendors will implement this
consistently.
Third, they would expect that certificates issued to this CA by other CAs contain the
issuedToThisCA elements of the cross-certificate pair. Consequently, both
cACertificate and issuedToThisCA may be populated when the issuing CA is in the
same realm as the CA to which it was issued.
Finally, in the case when a CA issues certificates to other CAs that do not belong to
the same hierarchy, they expect the issuedByThisCA attribute to be populated in the
issued certificates. They also expect to see certificates containing issuedByThisCA
issued to peer CAs in a distributed trust model. They note that we should not expect
that issuedByThisCA is always populated in a hierarchical domain.
[25] describes more expectations but as mandatory behaviour for CAs who conforms
to the 4th edition ofX.509:
1. The cACertificate attribute of the issuing CA's directory entry should store
all self-issued certificates.
2. The issuedToThisCA element of the cross-certificate pair attribute of the
CA's directory entry should store all certificates issued to a CA except for
self-issued certificates.
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3. The issuedByThisCA element of the cross-certificate pair attribute of the
issuing CA's directory entry should store all certificates issued by a CA to a
non-subordinate or peer CA.
[25] also states that although the pkiPath attribute has been defined to store partial or
complete certification paths in the 4th Edition ofX.509:
This attribute can be stored in the CA directory entry and would contain
some certification paths from that CA to other CAs. This attribute. if used.
enables more efficient retrieval of cross-certificates that form frequently
used certification paths. As such there are no specific requirements for this
attribute to be used and the set of values that are stored in the attribute will
likely not represent the complete set of forward certification paths for any
given CA.
But they state that there are no existing implementations that use the pkiPath attribute
as so described. The reason for not using this attribute could be that it is optional.
2.7.5.2 Certificate Revocation List Repository
A CRL is a list of certificates, created by a CA, that have been revoked before their
scheduled expiration date. CRLs have to be digitally signed by CAs or, in general, by
CRL issuers which provides for the integrity and authenticity of the CRL [36]. A
certificate-using application can use the most recent CRL to check whether or not a
subject's certificate has been revoked for any reason. In 1988, version 1 (vl) of the
CRL was defined in the original X.509 specification. Unfortunately, a number of
drawbacks existed in vI, including [36]:
• The CRL size could easily grow beyond acceptable limits.
• Functionality limitations.
• The system was subject to CRL substitution attacks (maliciously substituting
one with another without detection).
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These problems were solved by Version 2 (v2) CRLs by introducing the notion of
extensions, much the same as the introduction of extensions to Version 3 X.509
PKCs.
·CRLs classify revoked certificates by their certificate serial numbers. In addition to
the serial number for the revoked certifications, the CRL also contains the reason for
revocation for each certificate and the time the certificate was revoked. CRL issuance
is performed periodically on a rotational basis of hourly, daily, or weekly [37]. At
every CRL update, new entries are added and they must not be removed from the
CRL until the revoked certificate expires [37]. Complete CRLs are suitable for small
CA domains particularly those in which the number of end-entities is relatively small,
but criticisms have been raised with respect to complete CRLs in CA domains with
large number of entities, and these are [36]:
1. The issue of scalability: given that revocation information must remain for
the life of a certificate, therefore, CRLs grow as time goes by and complete
CRLs can become large in some domains; which means that more and more
data must be searched and downloaded.
2. The timeliness of the posted certificate revocation information: as a result of
the inflated size of the CRLs, the download time will be large each time a
certificate is validated.
Various mechanisms are employed to split the CRLs into multiple lists which enhance
performance and capacity [20]. In the following we present these mechanisms along
with other relevant information:
Certification Authority Revocation Lists
CAs issue Certification Authority Revocation Lists (CARLs) exclusively to contain
the CAs revoked certificates. As its name implies, it is a CRL devoted exclusively to
revocation information associated with CAs. Thus, by definition, CARLs do not
contain end-user certificate revocation information. The issuer of a CARL is either a
superior CA (who revokes any subordinate CAs) or a CA engaged in cross-
certification (who revokes a cross-certificate that it has issued) [36].
33
End-entity Public-key Certificate Revocation Lists
An End-entity Public-key Certificate Revocation Lists (EPRL) is the opposite of the
CARL, and it contains certificates issued only to end-entities. Thus, by definition,
revocation information for CAs is not included in EPRLs [36].
CRL Distribution Points
CRL Distribution Points, also known as partitioned CRLs, allow revocation
information within a single CA domain to be stored in distributed CRLs. This scheme
gives CRL Distribution Points two significant benefits over complete CRLs:
1. CRLs are partitioned into more manageable pieces to avoid the proliferation
of large CRLs.
2. A relying party will be directed automatically to the location of the CRL
Distribution Point because certificates can point there.
The CRL Distribution Point offers a more scalable method of implementing a CRL as
compared to complete CRL postings; however, there are criticisms: that CRL
Distribution Points are static and cannot handle change when the organization or CA
changes, moreover, the issuing CA must have prior knowledge of the partitioning
structure [36]. A dynamic partitioning scheme is discussed next.
Redirect CRLs
Redirect CRLs were developed to overcome the drawbacks associated with the use of
CRL Distribution Points by allowing the CRL partition sizes and storage locations to
vary over time. Flexibility in CRLs can be accomplished by creating a dynamic CRL
partition based on a number of elements, including certificate serial number ranges,
revocation reasons, certificate types, name subtrees, or any other range criteria that
might apply to CRL information, and CRL partitioning also assists redirection of CRL
inquiries. The IETF PKIX working group introduced the notion of dynamic
partitioning in the 2000 version ofX.S09 [XS09-00] through the definition of the CRL
Scope and Status Referral extensions [36].
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The Redirect CRL uses a X.509 Version 3 Certificate extension, the CRL Distribution
Point Extension, and a X.509 Version 2 CRL extension, the Redirect Pointer, to
redirect a relying party to the appropriate CRL. This intermediate CRL is referred to
as a Redirect CRL. The Certificate CRL Distribution Point Extension points to a
"Redirect CRL which contains an X.509 Version 2 CRL with a valid Status Referral
extension. The Status Referral Extension in turn points to the correct, and possibly
dynamic, CRL partition.
Delta CRLs
Publishing complete (base) CRLs more frequently has positive and negative
consequences. Making relying parties aware of any revoked certificates instantly is a
positive consequence, however, this results in a negative outcome by increasing the
size of the base CRLs. This negative outcome leads to the following implications
[34]:
1. Increased network traffic due to the more frequent downloading of the
updated CRL.
2. Delaying relying parties who connect over slow connections due to the long
download time caused by the size of the updated CRLs.
The solution proposed is to use delta CRLs. The size of a delta CRL is much smaller
than a base CRL which means publishing delta CRLs frequently meets the
requirements of relying parties for timeliness and freshness of certificate revocation
information. Delta CRLs, defined in RFC 2459, address the problems of publishing a
base CRL frequently, by publishing changes to a base CRL in a smaller file known as
a delta CRL. With delta CRLs, a relying party can download a base CRL at longer
intervals, and then download smaller delta CRLs at shorter intervals to validate any
certificates presented. Publishing delta CRLs at short intervals, such as once an hour,
increases the confidence in the certificates being validated [34].
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Indirect CRLs
The Indirect CRL mechanism assists multiple CAs in publishing revocation
information in a single CRL and a relying party is therefore able to avoid the retrieval
of revocation information from multiple CRLs being issued by multiple CAs [36].
2.7.6 X.S09 Version 3 Certificate
The Internet Certificate and CRL Profile [37] defines certificates as "data structures
that bind public key values to subjects". Certificates afford confidence by offering a
binding to public key users which helps them ensure that the associated private key is
owned by the correct unknown subject (person or system) with which an encryption
or digital signature mechanism will be used. Moreover, a trusted CA digitally signs
each certificate (binding) which also increases the confidence in the subject's
certificate.
Digital certificates in this sense act as an electronic identification used to verify the
identities of communicating parties in on-line transactions. The certificate is a form of
a credential such as driving license, birth certificate, or passport. In a face-to-face
transaction, the signature is one of these credentials when compared to the signature
sample and the face of the person compared to the picture on the credential to ensure
that it truly belonged to the person providing the signature and the face. The digital
certificate would be used to perform these functions in the case of an electronic
transaction [38].
The first standard issued which defined certificate formats was in 1988, ITU-T X.509
(formerly CCITT X.509) or ISO/IEC 9594-8, and it is called the version 1 (vl) format
[37]. VI was developed as part of the development of the X.500 Directory
recommendations. In 1993 X.500 was revised which result in two more fields being
added to vI to produce version 2 (v2) format.
The deployment process of the Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail
[RFC 1422] has shown that there were deficiencies in vI and v2 in several respects
and that improvements to these formats needed to be carried out [37]. In 1998 a new
standard was proposed by ISO/IEC, ITU-T and ANSI X9 to meet these new
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requirements called the X.509 version 3 (v3) certificate format which extends the v2
format by adding extension fields [37]. This version became popular because it was
used by most enterprise and government deployments, moreover, the version 3
certificate extensions also helped in controlling business relationships within and
across PKI domains [25].
2.7.6.1 Types of Certificates
There are two major types of digital certificates: CA certificates and end-entity
certificates [15]. Certificates issued to CAs are known as CA certificates, and
certificates issued to end-entities are referred to as end-entity certificates. In the
certificate there is an extension called Basic Constraints (basicConstraints) which
helps to differentiate between CA certificates and end-entity certificates [25]. The
following further explains these types:
CA Certificates
CA certificates can be classified into three different types:
1. Cross-certificates are CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are
different entities. Cross-certificates are used to establish trust relationship
between the two CAs [15].
2. Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which the CA issues the CA
certificate to itself. Self-issued certificates are generated to support changes
in policy or during a key rollover operation [15].
3. Self-signed certificates are CA certificates that are used to validate all
certificates issued by that CA and the digital signature may be verified by
the public key bound into the certificate [15].
End-entity Certificates
End entity certificates are used to verify the identity of a specific entity which is not
authorized to issue certificates, these certificates are known as end-entity certificates,
identity certificates, or personal certificates [39].
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2.7.6.2 Certificate Fields
A certificate binds the public key to the owner's identity, and consists of three
required fields [20]:
1. tbsCertificate
This field contains information about the subject such as the subject name,
or the subject's public key. It also includes the certificate issuer name, a
validity period, a version number, a serial number, and unique identifier
fields. It also usually includes extensions [37].
2. Signature Algorithm
The signature algorithm field identifies the cryptographic algorithm used by
the CA to sign the subject certificate [37].
3. Signature Value
This field contains the CA's digital signature. The signature means that the
CA certifies the validity of the information in the tbsCertificate field [37].
The basic certificate fields of a v3 certificate are the same as that of a v2
certificate apart from the new extensions field. Figure 2-4 shows all fields and
a description of each field of the X.509 v3 certificate basic follows.
Certificate Version
Certificate Serial Nmlber
Si gnature Algorithm Identifier
Issuer X.500 Name
Veliditv Period
Subiect X. 500 Name
Subject Public Key Informati on
Issuer Unicue Identifier
Subject Unique Identifier
Extensions
Issuer Digi tal Signature
Figure 2-4 X.S09 Certificate Format
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Version
An indicator of the X.509 certificate version number, it can be 1, 2, or 3. If extensions
are omitted, the version of the certificate should be 1. If extensions are used, the
version must be 3. If either the issuerUniqueIdentifier or subjectUniqueIdentifier
fields are present with the absence of extensions fields, the version must be version 2.
Serial Number
The certificate serial number is a unique numerical identifier for each certificate
assigned by the CA.
Signature
This field contains the identifier of the digital signature algorithm used to calculate
the digital signature on the certificate.
Issuer Name
The issuer name identifies the entity that has signed and issued the certificate. The
syntax of the issuer name is an X.500 distinguished name (DN).
Validity
This field defines the validity period of the certificate as dates and times for the start
date and the expiry date by using the elements notBefore and notAfier. The validity
period is given in universal time encoding (UTC) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)
[37].
Subject Name
This field identifies the entity holding the private key corresponding to the public key
identified in the certificate. Subject name is specified in the X.500 DN. The subject
name can be found in the subject field and/or the subject alternative name extension.
If the subject name is present only in the subject alternative name extension, then the
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subject name must be an empty sequence and the subject alternative name extension
must be present [37].
Subject Public Key Information
Subject Public Key Information: specifies the value of the public key owned by the
subject, and specifies an algorithm identifier specifying both the public key algorithm
and the hashing function with which the public key is to be used.
Unique Identifiers
The issuer and subject unique identifier are used to offer the possibility of reuse of
subject andlor issuer names over time. The Internet Certificate and CRL Profile
recommend that names not be reused for different entities and that Internet certificates
not make use of unique identifiers. Furthermore CAs conforming to the Internet
Certificate and CRL Profile should not generate certificates with unique identifiers.
2.7.6.3 Certificate Extensions
As we have seen, extensions were first introduced in the X.S09 v3 standard and they
provide methods for associating additional fields with the certificate [37]. Certificate
extensions provide a means of expanding the original X.S09 certificate information
standards with any number of additional fields. The X.S09 v3 certificate extensions
assist in defining restrictions on certificate applicability, alternative subjects, and they
can carry information unique to special communities.
Each certificate extension is marked either critical or non-critical. If an extension is
marked as being non-critical, it means that if an application does not recognize or
understand the extension it can be ignored by the application and the certificate can
still be used. An application or system must reject a certificate with an extension
marked as critical if the application does not recognize the extension.
Each extension consists of three fields: Type, Value and Criticality.
• Type: contains an object identifier (e.g. text string, date ...etc).
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• Value: contains the actual data for the extension.
• Criticality: a bit flag that indicates if an associated extension value is critical
or non-critical.
Tables 2-2 and 2-3 show the two recommended types of extensions, standard
extensions and private Internet extensions as specified in [37]:
Extension
Function Criticality
Name
Authority The authority key identifier extension is an extension for
Key identifying the certificate authority's public key corresponding to Non-criticalthe private key used to sign the certificate.
Identifier
Subject Key The subject key identifier extension is an extension for identifying
Non-critical
Identifier the subject's certificate that contains a particular public key.
Key Usage
The key usage extension specifies the purposes for which a
Criticalcertificate can be used. (e.g., encipherment, signature, certificate
signing).
Private Key The private key usage period extension allows the certificate
Usage issuer to specify a different validity period for the private key than Non-criticalthe certificate.
Period
~ The certificate policies defmes one or more policies under whichZ
0 Certificate the certificate has been issued and the purposes for which the.. certificate may be used, defined by a of policy Either~ Policies sequenceZ information terms, each consisting of an object identifier (aID)row
t< and optional qualifiers.
row Policy The policy mappings extension is used in CA certificates only. It
~
lists one or more pairs of aIDs used to indicate that certain Non-critical
Mappings policies in its own domain can be considered equivalent to some
~ other policies in the subject certification authority's domain.
~ Subject
The subject alternative name extension is for allowing the binding
~ of additional identities to the subject of the certificate. It may be~ Alternative used in addition to the certificate's subject name or as a Either
Name
replacement for it. Defined name forms include Internet electronic
mail address, DNS name, JP address, and uniform resource
identifier (URI).
Issuer The issuer alternative name extension is used to associate Internet
Alternative style identities with the issuer of the certificate. Defmed options Non-criticalinclude Internet electronic mail address, a DNS name, an JP
Names address, and an URI.
Subject The subject directory extension is used to include additional
Directory attributes (e.g., nationality) for identifying the subject of a Non-criticalcertificate
Attributes
Basic The basic constraints extension is used to identify whether the
subject of the certificate is a CA and how deep a certification path CriticalConstraints may exist through that CA.
Name The name constraints extension is used to indicate a name space
within which all subject names in subsequent certificates in a CriticalConstraints certification path must be locate.
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Policy The policy constraints extension is used to restraint path validationin two ways. It can be used to indicate required acceptable policy Either
Constraints identifiers that each certificate in a path contain and/or prohibited
policy mappings.
Extended The extended key usage is a restriction method and indicates oneor more purposes for which a certificate can be used. These Either
Key Usage purposes may be in addition to or in place of the basic purposes
indicated in the key usage extension.
CRL The CRL distribution points extension indicates the location of the
Distribution CRL partition where revocation information associated with this Non-criticalcertificate resides.
Points "
Inhibit Any- The inhibit any-policy indicates that the special any-policy OlD,
Criticalwith the value 2 5 29 32 0, should not be considered a legitimatePolicy match for other policy identifiers.
Freshest The freshest CRL extension provides a pointer to the "freshest"
delta CRL information. The freshest CRL extension is placed in Non-criticalCRL the full CRL to indicate where to find latest delta CRL.
Table 1-1 Standard Extensions
C"I.l ExtensionZ
S Function Criticality
C"I.l Name
~ The authority information access extension indicates how
~ Authority information or services offered by the issuer of the certificate
Eo- Information can be obtained. Non-critical~
~ Access
~
~ The subject information access extension indicates how
~
Subject
information and services for the subject of the certificate in
~
Information
which the extension appears are accessed Non-critical
Access
Table 1-3 Private Internet Extensions
2.8 Certificate Issuance
A CA issues a certificate to another CA or to an end-entity (e.g., end-users,
devices, Web servers, processes) [25]. The following steps illustrate how the
CA creates a certificate:
1. An applicant needs first of all to have a key pair (public and private), that
could be generated in one of the following ways:
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• By using a public key algorithm, an applicant creates a public-
private key pair, and then encrypts the private key and keeps it
locally [40]. Here, the applicant needs to send its public key to a
CA.
• By using a third party which must release the private key in a
secure way to the applicant and destroy the keys and all
information that relates to the key pair [15].
• By the issuer of the certificate, who is trusted by the applicant
[15].
Afterwards the applicant submits a certificate request to an RA with
appropriate identity information, such as their name, address, telephone
number and e-mail address.
2. In accordance with the Certificate Practice Statement (CPS), the RA will
validate the identity information in order to make sure it belongs to the
applicant. The RA does this by checking mail, making phone calls, asking
for identification, etc. According to the results of this identity verification,
the RA may approve or reject the request.
3. If the request is approved, the RA directs it to the CA to issue a certificate
for the applicant.
4. The CA generates a certificate and signs it with its private key.
5. The RA sends a notification, containing the serial number of the certificate,
to the applicant, and then the applicant retrieves the certificate from a
repository by presenting the certificate's serial number to the RA Operator
[29].
2.9 Certificate Revocation
A certificate is issued with the expectation that it is used through its lifetime, which is
defined by the start and expiry date of its validity period. For example, a certificate's
validity period may be one day, thirty years, or even longer. Once a certificate is
issued, it becomes valid when its validity time has been reached until the certificate
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reaches its expiration data. Unfortunately, there are various circumstances that
invalidate a certificate prior to its expiration date [37]. Such circumstances include:
• The certificate is no longer used.
• The CA had issued a certificate improperly.
• Failure of the subject to adhere to policy.
• The details of the certificate have changed. For example the subject's
name or the subject's association with CA (when an employee terminates
employment with an organization).
• The private key has been lost or exposed, or there is suspicion that the
private key has been lost or compromised.
Under such circumstances, the CA needs to revoke the certificate and enter it on a
CRL.
2.10 The Certificate Validation Process
A certificate is a proof of identity on the Internet, so the user can claim that his public
key is reliable, and a CA can vouch for the identity of the user. If there is another
party (Bob) who wants to communicate with a user (Alice), Bob will ask Alice to
show him her certificate. Bob will trust Alice's certificate if he trusts its issuer and
Bob will start communicating with Alice. Alternatively, if Bob does not trust the
issuer of Alice's certificate, then Bob needs to get the public key of the CA that issued
Alice's certificate. Bob starts to extract information from Alice's certificate, uses it to
verify the other certificate, and Bob continues this process till he finds a trusted CA.
This type of validation is called certification path processing.
The certificate validation process consists of constructing a certificate path between a
trust anchor and a subject. The process of constructing consists of [25]:
• Path construction: constructing one or more candidate paths.
• Path validation: checking that all certificates on the path are valid and they
satisfy any constraints required for validation.
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The 4th Edition of X.509 and the Internet Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
Profile as defined in RFC3280 offers the latest guidelines for implementing
certification path validation. Despite the importance of the validation process there is
little published research into it. Neither [15] nor [37] say anything about the process
of constructing certification paths [25].
[25] states that building a certification path is a complex process based on trial and
error, moreover, there is a lack of standardization or harmonization of methods for
carrying it out.
2.10.1 Evaluating Certification Paths During Path Construction
The evaluation process has to be executed concurrently with the path construction
process especially in a complex, richly interconnected PKI environment otherwise we
will face problems which can lead to inefficiencies [25]. It is possible to apply certain
constraints in order to submit the best candidate certification to the path validation
logic to produce an acceptable path [25]. There are several criteria which could be
used during path construction which will assist in eliminating paths that would not
help in building the target certification path. We will achieve a good result when more
than one of the constraints can be used during the process of constructing the
certification path. These constraints are name and certificate policy constraints.
2.10.2 Direction of Path Construction
Generally, certificates are stored in directories which help the process of building,
constructing, discovering or developing the certification path connecting the trust
anchor and the subject. The build direction of the certification path is consequent on
the certificates' location in the directories [26]. There are two directions for
constructing a certification path, forwards (from subject to trust anchor) and
backwards (from trust anchor to subject).
2.10.2.1 Forward versus Backwards
As stated in [25] the forward way of working with a strict hierarchy is efficient
because we are always guaranteed to find certificates that have been issued to each
45
subordinate CA contain in the issuedToThisCA element of the cross-certificate pair
attribute. In addition, in the case of the strict hierarchy we always end up with a
limited number of possible certification paths and sometimes with only one, if a CA
has only one certificate.
In the case of a distributed environment, the reverse direction will be more efficient
for constructing a path, because we may encounter tens or even hundreds of forward
elements associated with a given CA, not just one or two. The cross-certificate pair
attribute element, issuedToThisCA, will not help here and will divert us from the path
we are seeking because we could encounter a large number of CAs who issued
certificates to this CA. Therefore working with the issuedByThisCA element of the
cross-certificate pair attribute will help in constructing a (partial) path starting from
the relying part's trust anchor since we are answering the question "to whom have you
issued certificates" [25].
2.10.3 Problems with Certification Path Construction
2.10.3.1 Loops
The 4th edition of X.509 states that each certificate in a certification path must be
unique and also declares that a certificate should not appear more than once in any
value of a certificate's attribute. We can apply the previous rule during the path
creation process by keeping track of all certificates that have been validated and if
any name appears twice, we can backtrack as necessary [25]. If the tracking is based
on checking the subject's DN, we could have duplicates because there is more than
one public key with the same DN. Thus, we need a tracking system that avoids a
certificate that appears more than once in the constructed certification path. This can
be accomplished through direct certificate comparison [25].
2.10.3.2 More Than One Branch Leads to the Candidate Path
We could end up with more than one candidate path linking the trusted anchor and the
subject certificate where they meet all of the certification path criteria equally. This
happens in the absence of any other criteria to prioritize one path over another.
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Therefore, it will be better to submit the shortest path rather than the longest one to
the path validation logic [25].
2.10.4 Related work in Validating Certificate
X.509 and the Certificate and Certificate Revocation List profile are silent when it
comes to the process of path construction; consequently, a proposal for finding a
method for building certification paths becomes necessary. A few proposed solutions
have been made for finding an algorithm for constructing certification paths:
Five proposals for validating a certificate follow:
1. Certificate chains
2. Hierarchy graphs
3. Certification path validation service
4. Modified LDAP server
5. Dynamic path determination
Finally, we demonstrate our method for validating the certificate which is called
"Ants traversal and validation".
2.10.4.1 Certificate Chains
A certificate chain is described in [28] as a structure that contains all the certificates,
from the CA immediately below the root CA to the user, signed and wrapped by the
root CA of the hierarchy. The client stores all self-signed root CA certificates that are
needed to authenticate subjects of different hierarchies. Path processing with
certificate chains is easy, because the determination process is performed at the time
of certificate-chain signing and wrapping, therefore, only the validation mechanism
needs to be applied.
2.10.4.2 Hierarchy Graphs
This method, discussed in [28], is a program that resides on the client computer which
checks and stores all the local CA hierarchy to which its user belongs before path
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construction begins. The hierarchy is a directed graph where the nodes represent CAs
and the arcs are the certificates that interconnect these CAs. Nodes are inserted into
the graph after the CA's integrity has been checked, starting with the CA who issued
the target certificate and the insertion process continues until a node intersecting with
the local hierarchy graph is found. After the determination task ends, path validation
is performed. The proposed algorithm is designed to find the shortest path among
multiple alternative paths.
2.10.4.3 Certification Path Validation Service
In [28], it is suggested that a Data Certification Server (DCS) could be responsible for
path processing with the DCS doing this by validating signatures and providing
updated certificate status information, For authentication, the client sends an
authentication request to the DCS, together with the subject certificate. The DCS will
do validation for the subject's certificate by retrieving all necessary certificates from
the distributed repositories. The DCS will determine and validate the path and send a
token to the client. This token will allow several transactions for a limited time,
without requiring the authentication process to be repeated. It is clear that the client
implementation would be simple because all processing is performed by the DCS.
2.10.4.4 Modified LDAP Server
A repository access server is described in [28] which will determine the path after it
receives a request from a client. It then sends the path to the client including all the
component certificates. The client is responsible for validating the received path. The
LDAP protocol is used for accessing the repository.
2.10.4.5 Dynamic Path Determination
Dynamic path determination, as described in [28], allows a root CA only to issue
cross-certificates to the root CAs of other hierarchies and no trust is to be transferred
between such root CAs; and therefore, only one certification path is possible. The
path is constructed by retrieving each certificate from a repository via LDAP, and a
local list, called a local trust chain, is stored in the client environment. The local list
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will assist in the process of certification path verification. It contains all the
certificates that make up the path between the user's issuing CA and its hierarchy root
CA, including the latter. After the path determination process is complete, the PKIX
path validation algorithm is applied.
2.10.4.6 Ants Traversal and Validation
Ants Traversal and Validation (ATV) is proposed as an efficient approach avoiding
complexity and trial and error when constructing a certification path. ATV has been
published under the title "ATV: An Efficient Method for Constructing a
Certification Path" in the 18th IFIP World Computer Congress conference [41], and
its method of operation is described next. The ATV solution for constructing a path
tries to simulate the method used by ants for finding food: a scout is sent to find food,
and the scout returns to the colony when it finds food and transmits the information to
foragers [28]. In this proposal, the ant model will be altered in order to extend the role
of the scout so that they can communicate with foragers. The extended method to be
applied as a basis for ATV solution is as follows:
1. The Scout starts the process of constructing the certification path by inspecting
the subject's certificate and extracting its information from the repository via
LDAP [35].
2. The information is validated to check the status of the subject's certificate:
If the certificate is invalid for any reason (such as having expired),
the ATV will end here and a message will be sent to the relying
party saying "no reliance can be placed on the target".
3. The DN attribute is extracted to determine the certificate's issuing CA.
4. The Scout moves to the CA's certificate.
5. Foragers move to the scout's previous position.
6. Foragers look to find any links that connect to their position:
a. If there are links, the foragers will also occupy other positions.
b. If there are no links, they will stay in their positions.
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7. The scout starts to communicate with foragers to detect a suitable path:
A suitable path will be defined using attributes, such as policy
constraint, that are defined before the process of construction takes
place.
8. If the current position of the scout is a suitable one (Le. there is an intersection
in attributes between the scout and one of the foragers), the following actions
are executed:
a. The scout's certificate will be checked to see if it is self-signed or
not.
b. If self-signed, then a message will be sent to the relying party
saying that "the subject certificate is valid".
c. The certificate will be added to the path.
d. The ATV will stop.
9. If the scout position is not suitable, then the scout will move to a suitable
position which is held by one of the foragers.
10. The path will be modified to include the new certificate and the process begins
again at step 3.
2.10.5 Constructing Certification Paths with ATV
In this section we will show how the ATV method is used to construct the certificate
path. The following certificate extensions help in building the certification path [1]:
• Certificate policies
• Basic constraints
• Narne constraints
• Policy constraints
These extensions have been defined in version 3 of PKI [15, 25], see to table 2-2 for
details. We explain how the ATV constructs the certificate path by using name
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constraints and certificate policy extensions. We illustrate this by using two examples
which explain how ATV constructs the certification path using these constraints.
2.10.5.1 Name Constraints
The name constraints extension (Ne) assists in filtering out certificates during the
process of constructing the certificate path because each certificate points to its
subsequent and preceding certificates. Figure 2-5 shows how the ATV is applied with
the name constraints extension, and let us assume that Alice asks to validate
certificate 6. As stated previously, ATV has the ability to construct the certification
path either forwards or in reverse; the reverse direction is best when constructing
certification paths with regard to processing name constraints [26]. To demonstrate
the effectiveness of ATV, the following example shows how the algorithm can be
applied to the construction of the certification path in a forward direction using the
name constraints extension. To simplify this example we have used DNS names and
Ne to refer to the name constraints extension, as used in [26].
Figure 2-5 Name Constraints Scenario
The scout starts by validating the subject certificate (certificate 6), and after it has
retrieved certificate 6's information, the scout moves to certificate 5 and the foragers
will land on certificates 6 and 4. When the scout checks the name constraints
extension (Ne) for certificate 5, it discovers that it is able to reach certificate 6. On
the other hand, the forager at certificate 4 also finds that the Ne leads to certificate 6.
Therefore, the scout and forager at certificate 4 move up one level; the scout then
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finds that the NC for certificate 3 does not allow certificate 6 to be reached. Because
certificate 2's NC does allow the target certificate to be reached, the scout places itself
at certificate 2, and the forager at this certificate will leave certificate 5 because there
is no candidate path in the right leg. Finally, the scout moves to certificate 1 which is
self-signed and the process of constructing the certification path terminates. The
trusted path consists of these certificates: certificate 6 > certificate 4 > certificate 2 >
certificate 1.
2.10.5.2 Policy Processing
The certificate policy extension is also used to filter out certificates that do not meet
path criteria while in the process of constructing the certificate path. The certificate
policy in the subject certificate extension defined by the certificate issuer explains
what policies have been followed when issuing the certificate and for what purposes
the certificate is suitable. For a CA certificate, the certificate policy extension is used
by the issuer to place limitations on the policies that are acceptable in a certification
path [26]. How much care the issuer used to authenticate the subject before he issued
his certificate is an example of a certificate policy, and (in this example) the level in
the certificate policies can be HIGH, MEDIUM or LOW [26].
Figure 2-6 illustrates the use of ATV for constructing a certificate path using
certificate policy constraints.
Figure 2-6 Polley Processing Scenario
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Let us assume that Alice (the relying party) asks to validate a subject's certificate:
certificate 5. The relying party could specify a set of initial policies that she finds
acceptable, after a valid path has been built. All the certificates on the valid path must
contain these policies. The relying party defines these policies in the policy constraint
attribute [26]. In this example the policy constraint attribute is set to HIGH. The scout
starts the process of extracting and validating the data of certificate 5. After the scout
determines that certificate 5's data is valid, the DN attribute is extracted and the scout
moves to certificate 2. Let us assume that certificate 5 has different public keys but
the same DN. The foragers now move to certificate 5, and they discover that
certificate 5 has three links; because the link toward certificate 2 is being held by a
scout, the foragers will move to certificates 4 and 6. The scout starts to communicate
with the foragers to determine from the certificate if its CP intersects with the policy
constraint attribute. The scout finds that certificate 2 is not the appropriate certificate
because TOP-SECRET has no intersection with the policy constraint attribute.
Therefore, the scout moves to certificate 6, and finds that the certificate's CP contains
HIGH. Because certificate 6 is not self-signed, the scout then moves to certificate 3
and the partial valid path C5>C6 is considered. Certificate 3 is a self-signed
certificate, so the validated path is C5>C6>C3 and certificate 5 is considered
authenticated; therefore ATV stops.
2.11 Conclusion
The pnmary focus of this chapter has been Public Key Infrastructure and its
associated standards. PKI-enabled security services built on the core PKI services
become more useful as they allow secure communications and networking with a
broader, global community. The core services are based on the idea of a public-
private key pair, which provides support for authentication, encryption, integrity, and
non-repudiation. These services enable entities to prove that they are who they claim
to be, to secure data during transaction, and to be assured that important data has not
been altered in any way, and for no action that took place to be denied. The basis of
these security services, PKI architectures, have been discussed with their ways of
connecting with each other. This chapter described the PKI system components and
their fundamental natures. Certificates that confirm the identity of Internet users were
examined next, along with their related operations, issue, revocation, and validation.
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Finally, this chapter describes various existing certification path construction methods
and our proposed new method.
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CHAPTER3
CERTIFICATE POLICY TECHNIQUES FOR MEASURING TRUST
3.1 Introduction
This chapter explains the concepts behind the CP and CPS, and defines the roles,
functions and relationships between them. We mentioned in Chapter 2 that PKI
establishes trust and security in the Internet. Trust is represented by certificates that
are issued by a CA and they bind information that identifies an entity to a public key
and the corresponding private key that the entity controls. The private key is crucial
for PKI and must be kept secret. Digital signatures are created by using private key of
the sender, while the public key of the receiver is used for encryption. To do business
online, PKI users need to have confidence in the certificates that authenticate their
remote counterparts, so they need to have confidence that the CA has the proper
policies in place to protect users' transaction against unknown threats and
vulnerabilities associated with PKI.
The degree of confidence that a certificate user can place on the binding embodied in
a certificate depends on several factors [42]:
• CA operating policy, procedures, and security controls which a CA follows
when authenticating subscribers.
• Stated obligations and responsibilities of a subscriber such as protecting the
private key; and a CA's legal obligations such as warranties and limitations
on liability, towards other PKI entities.
Achieving confidence in a PKI is all about addressing the above factors. Stating the
obligations and liabilities of all parties involved in an electronic transaction will assist
in reducing disputes. PKI requires numerous policies and procedures to maintain the
desired level of confidence, for this reason PKI is 10 percent technology and 90
percent policies and procedures, and so is not easy to deploy and maintain [43].
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Therefore, confidence is what has been articulated in these policies and procedures,
more precisely, it is what is articulated in a CP or a CPS [22].
PKI security could be deficient as a result of a malformed CP and CPS. Organizations
that do not properly address security, liability, and obligation issues in their CP and
CPS will be excluded from participating in cross-certification by other PKIs. As a
consequence, these organizations will lose the ability to conduct secure global
transactions, and this will result in them losing subscribers' and relying parties' trust
[22].
A CP could be used by a certificate user or relying party as a measurement for
deciding whether the binding embodied in a subscriber certificate is trustworthy for a
particular application [42].
3.2 Certificate Policy
According to X.509, a CP is "a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a
certificate to a particular community and/or class of applications with common
security requirements". A CP is usually a document written in natural language.
Certificate policies extension may declare that one or more specific CPs apply to a
subscriber's certificate. Certificates that are applicable to different ranges of
applications or purposes are issued following different practices and procedures. For
example, a particular certificate policy might indicate applicability of a type of
certificate to the authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the
trading of goods within a given price range [15].
Besides the important role of the CP for the relying party, a CA could be audited,
accredited, or assessed using the CP. The following scenario makes this clearer:
when a subject CA requests a certificate from another CA, the issuer CA must first
assess the CPs by which it trusts the subject CA. If the issuer CA trusts the subject
CA's CPs, it issues a CA certificate to the subject CA and the subject CA's CPs is
indicated in the CA certificate. Afterward, the assessed CPs will be used in the
process of constructing certificate paths as accepted policies in certificate policies
extensions (see Chapter 2) [42].
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3.2.1 A Certificate Policy Example
The following example addresses the use of the CP in industry, and it is cited from
RFC3647 "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and
Certification Practices Framework":
Suppose that the International Air Transport Association (lATA) undertakes
to define some certificate policies for use throughout the airline industry, in
a PKI operated by lATA in combination with PKIs operated by individual
airlines. Two CPs are defined:
a. The lATA General-Purpose CP.
b. The lATA Commercial-Grade CP.
The lATA General-Purpose CP could be used by industry personnel for
protecting routine information (e.g., casual electronic mail) and for
authenticating connections from World Wide Web browsers to servers for
general information retrieval purposes. The key pairs may be generated,
stored, and managed using low-cost, software-based systems, such as
commercial browsers. Under this policy, a certificate may be automatically
issued to anybody listed as an employee in the corporate directory of lATA
or any member airline who submits a signed certificate request form to a
network administrator in his or her organization.
The lATA Commercial-Grade CP is used to protect financial transactions or
binding contractual exchanges between airlines. Under this policy, lATA
requires that certified key pairs be generated and stored in approved
cryptographic hardware tokens. Certificates and tokens are provided to
airline employees with disbursement authority. These authorized
individuals are required to present themselves to the corporate security
office, show a valid identification badge, and sign a subscriber agreement
requiring them to protect the token and use it only for authorized purposes,
as a condition of being issued a token and a certificate.
57
3.2.2 Object Identifiers
Each CP is assigned a globally unique Object Identifier (OID) which indicates which
CP any given certificate follows and which is recognized by both the issuing CA and
the relying party. Registration of the Object Identifier is based on the procedures
specified in the ISO/IEC and lTV standards. The register also publishes a textual
specification of the CP which is used by a relying party when examining the CP. In
the case that there is more than one OlD in a certificate, the CA informs the certificate
user that the certificate is issued in compliance with the asserted policies [22].
3.3 X.S09 Certificate Fields
The following extension fields in an X.509 certificate are used to support CPs (see
Chapter 2 for more information):
• Certificate policies extension,
• Policy mappings extension,
• Policy constraints extension.
3.3.1 Certificate Policies Extension
The CA lists all the applicable CPs for the certificate in this extension. In the above
example, the certificate for regular airline employees, the certificate policies fields
contain the object identifier for the General-Purpose policy. However, the certificates
of the employees with disbursement authority contain two OIDs (the General-Purpose
policy and the Commercial-Grade policy). Two OIDs imply that the certificates are
appropriate for either the General-Purpose or the Commercial-Grade policy [42].
3.3.2 Policy Mappings Extension
The Policy Mappings extension provides assurance to a relying party that CPs in other
domains will provide equivalent warranties and obligations as the ones in its domain.
For example, the ACE Corporation wants to facilitate interoperabiIity and secure their
business-to-business exchange with ABC Corporation by cross certification. For this
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reason they cross-certify each other's public keys. Both companies have financial
transaction protection policies called ace-e-commerce and abc-e-commerce,
respectively. To easy the interoperability between the two companies' applications,
the policy mapping field could be used in the cross-certificate for the ABC
Corporation CA issued by the ACE Corporation CA. This mapping provides a
statement that ABC's financial transaction protection policy (i.e., abc-e-commerce) is
equivalent to that of the ACE Corporation (i.e., ace-e-commerce), Relying party
applications in the ACE domain will accept and rely on certificates issued by the ABC
CA [42].
3.3.3 Policy Constraints Extension
The policy constraints extension can be used in certificates issued to CAs and it
constraints path validation either by requiring that each certificate in a path contains
an acceptable policy identifier or by prohibiting policy mapping [42].
3.4 Certification Practice Statement
The term "certification practice statement" (CPS) is defined by the American Bar
Association (ABA) Guidelines as: "A statement of the practices which a certification
authority employs in issuing certificates." [44]. As stated above, a CPS focuses on the
practice that a CA follows when issuing and managing certificates, including
publication and archiving, revocation, and renewal or re-keying [42]. The ABA
expands this definition in the Digital Signature Guidelines (DSG) with the following
comments [45]:
A certification practice statement may take the form of a declaration by the
certification authority of the details of its trustworthy system and the
practices it employs in its operations and in support of issuance of a
certificate, or it may be a statute or regulation applicable to the certification
authority and covering similar subject matter. It may also be part of the
contract between the certification authority and the subscriber. A
certification practice statement may also be comprised of multiple
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documents, a combination of public law, private contract, and/or
declaration.
There are cases where a CPS is not needed and could be replaced with a subscriber
agreement, relying party agreement, or agreement combining both subscriber and
relying party terms, depending on the role of the different PKI participants. [42]:
1 In the case that a CA becomes a relying party, the CA is already familiar
with the nature and trustworthiness of its services.
2 In the case that the issued certificates provide a low level of assurance
because the applications are secured and the possibility of compromise may
cause marginal risks.
Publishing a full CPS which may address sensitive issues related to the PKI system in
addition to provisions that are relevant to the participants in the PKI, could assist an
attacker, therefore, the solution is to publish a CPS with only those provisions that are
relevant to the participants. This form of CPS is called a "CPS Summary" [42].
3.5 The Relationship between CP and CPS
The CP and CPS are developed to cover different provisions but they address the
same topics that interest a relying party when identifying the level of trustworthiness
of a public key certificate [42]. A CP is expected to be a higher-level statement than a
CPS and it specifies the requirements and standards imposed by the PKI with respect
to various topics. It is typically concerned with what participants must do rather than
how the participants perform their functions and implement controls. Conversely, a
CPS is expected to be an extremely detailed and sensitive document that addresses the
internal operating procedures of the CA and/or PKI in addition to the detailed
procedures for the life-cycle management of certificates [36].
As the nature of a CP is a statement of requirements, it is suitable as a basis for
interoperability between the PKIs of different organizations. A CP in this sense serves
as a vehicle for defining the minimum guidelines that must be met by interoperating
organizations. Therefore, a CP is able to represent multiple CAs, multiple
organizations, or multiple domains. On the other hand, a CPS applies only to a single
CA organization and cannot support interoperability. With a single CPS, a CA may
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support multiple CPs. A single CP could also be supported by multiple CAs with
different CPS [42].
RFC 3647 [42] summarizes the differences between CPs and CPSs in the following:
1. A PKI uses a CP to establish requirements that state what participants
within it must do. A single CA or organization can use a CPS to
disclose how it meets the requirements of a CP or how it implements its
practices and controls.
2. A CP facilitates interoperation through cross-certification, unilateral
certification, or other means. Therefore, it is intended to cover multiple
CAs. By contrast, a CPS is a statement of a single CA or organization.
Its purpose is not to facilitate interoperation (since doing so is the
function of a CP),
3. A CPS is generally more detailed than a CP and specifies how the CA
meets the requirements specified in the one or more CPs under which it
issues certificates.
3.6 Certificate Policy Framework
A Certificate Policy Framework is a "Template" for developing certificate policies; it
describes what to include in a CP and/or a CPS. The ultimate goal of the certificate
policy framework is to assist writers of CPs and/or CPSs to ensure they cover all areas
of technical or legal importance. Moreover, it helps in promoting consistent,
comparable certificate policies to assist in cross-certification and policy-mapping
decisions [46].
The first document published to assist writers of CPs or CPSs appeared in March
1999 and came from the IETF (the Internet standards body). Amendments to that
document were proposed with a comprehensive list of topics in the "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework".
This document is labelled RFC 2527 and was formalised in April 1998. Since that
time this framework has been used by many individuals and organizations
representing a variety of different communities developing CPs and CPSs [47].
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A new framework, RFC 3647, has been published to replace RFC 2527 and contains
incremental improvements. Wide acceptance of RFC 2527 in CP and CPS documents
has benefited the development of the new framework. All the improvements that are
embedded in the new framework are listed in RFC 3647 under the section
"Comparison to RFC 2527".
3.7 Contents of CP or CPS
The Framework lists all topics that must be covered in a CP definition or a CPS. At
the highest level, the topics to be considered include:
1. INTRODUCTION
2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES
3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS
6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES
8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS.
9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS
These nine primary components can be used to create a simple CP or CPS. Moreover,
they can also be used by a CA to write a subscriber agreement, relying party
agreement, or agreement containing subscriber and relying party terms.
Components can be further divided into sub-components, and a sub-component may
contain multiple elements. In the case that a component, sub-component, or element
has no requirements, a CP or CPS may state "no stipulation". Therefore it is
recommended that all components and sub-components are included in a CP or CPS
even if their value is "no stipulation" [42]. Table 3-1 shows the nine components and
their subcomponents in accordance with RFC 3647:
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Main Components Subcomponents
1. Overview 4. Certificate usage
INTRODUCTION
2. Document name and 5. Policy administration
identification 6. Definitions and acronyms
3. PKI participants
1. Repositories 3. Time or frequency of
PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY 2. Publication of certification publication
RESPONSmILITIES information 4. Access controls on
repositories
IDENTIFICATION AND 1. Naming
AUTHENTICATION 2. Initial identity validation
3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests
1. Certificate Application 7. Certificate re-key
2. Certificate application 8. Certificate modification
CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE processing 9. Certificate revocation and
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 3. Certificate issuance
suspension
4. Certificate acceptance 10.Certificate status services
5. Key pair and certificate II.End of subscription
usage 12.Key escrow and recovery
6. Certificate renewal
1. Physical controls 5. Records archival
FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND 2. Procedural controls 6. Key changeover
OPERATIONAL CONTROLS 3. Personnel controls 7. Compromise and disaster
4. Audit logging procedures recovery
8. CA or RA termination
1. Key pair generation and 5. Computer security controls
installation 6. Life cycle technical controls
2. Private Key Protection and 7. Network security controls
TECHNICAL SECURITY Cryptographic Module 8. Time-stamping
CONTROLS Engineering Controls
3. Other aspects of key pair
management
4. Activation data
CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP 1. Certificate profile
PROFILES 2. CRL profile
3. OCSP profile
I. Frequency or circumstances of 4. Topics covered by
COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND assessment assessment
OTHER ASSESSMENTS 2. Identity/qualifications of 5. Actions taken as a result ofassessor deficiency
3. Assessor's relationship to 6. Communication of results
assessed entitv
OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL 1. Fees 10. Term and termination
MATTERS 2. Financial responsibility 11. Individual notices and
3. Confidentiality of business communications with
information participants
4. Privacy of personal 12. Amendments
information 13. Dispute resolution
5. Intellectual property rights provisions
6. Representations and 14. Governing law
warranties 15. Compliance with applicable
7. Disclaimers of warranties law
8. Limitations ofliability 16. Miscellaneous provisions
9. Indemnities 17. Other provisions
Table 3-1 Nine Components with Their Subcomponents
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3.8 Major considerations
[22] emphasized that all the required elements of the sub-components listed above are
not of equal importance, and it listed topics that to which special attention should be
paid during the writing of a CP or CPS. These topics are [22]:
• Obligations of the various parties, including the CA, RA, subscribers,
and the relying party.
• Limitations on liability.
• Subscriber authentication requirements during initial registration.
• Revocation notification procedures (to the relying parties)
• Secure audit and secure archive requirements.
• Physical, procedural, and personnel security controls at the CA and at
theRA.
• Technical security controls at the CA, RA, subscribers, especially in the
areas of cryptographic module, computer security and network security, and
cryptographic token and private protection.
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed the important role of the CP as a factor tending to
increase a relying party's confidence. Confidence is increased in an open network
such as the Internet when it is known that a CA has employed proper CPs to
authenticate its remote counterparts. The CP specifies the requirements such as the
obligations and responsibilities of a subscriber (for example, protecting the private
key); and the CA's legal obligations (warranties and limitations on liability, etc.),
towards other PKI entities. We also discussed how a CP is suitable for supporting
interoperability between PKI organizations. The deficiencies of a malformed CP were
also described.
The CP applying to a given certificate is distinguished by a globally unique object
identifier and we discussed the possibility of certificates having more than one CP.
We also showed in this chapter how a CP could be used as the basis for an audit,
accreditation, or assessment of a CA. The Certificate extension was introduced in
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Chapter 2 but this chapter discusses them again with emphasis on the ones relating to
CPs with a concrete explanation of their role. Following this, we introduced the CPS
and its implementation, clarifying the relationship between the CP and the CPS. We
discuss briefly the framework used to develop CPs and identified the contents of a CP
or CPS. Finally, this chapter listed a number of considerations to be taken into
account during writing a CP or CPS.
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CHAPTER4
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORMALISATION METHOD
4.1 Our Approach
CPs are written in natural language, and provide richly detailed and descriptive data
scattered throughout the CP document. CPs of this kind are not helpful or efficient for
the extraction of data. We aim to formalise and structure the content of the CP to be
represented in a systematic way which will ease any process applied to it. We use
XML to describe the structure of the CP, as this allows the semantics of the policy to
be described: having a description of the CP will facilitate better comprehension of
the differences between the subject policy and a specified policy when using a
comparison process.
Our work in this chapter is mainly about formalising the CP, and to ensure that this
process produces the same formalisation for equivalent CPs. We define a number of
conventions to be followed as guidelines during the process. These conventions are:
1. We will use the framework defined in RFC 2527. This outlines the contents
of a set of provisions of the CP in the terms of eight primary components.
These components are:
1. Introduction;
11. General Provisions;
111. Identification and Authentication;
iv. Operational Requirements;
v. Physical, Procedural, and Personnel Security Controls;
vi. Technical Security Controls;
vii. Certificate and CRL Profile; and
viii. Specification Administration.
(a more comprehensive list is available in table 3-1)
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2. Where a phrase appears as a section heading, the XML tag consists of those
same words, without spaces, and with the first letter of each word (except
the first) being capitalised. Thus, for example, the phrase "Community and
Applicability" becomes "communityAndApplicability".
3. We use a fixed value for any expression clause. The value is in string
format, with spaces between words e.g. "the sections of EuroPKI-CP".
The formalisation technique that will be applied to encode a CP has developed
through three iterations to reach its current, final version. Each stage has been tested
and analysed in order to evaluate its applicability to our approach. The following
sections contain a more detailed explanation of how each stage was tested and
analysed and also illustrate the reasons for producing new versions of the
formalisation technique.
4.2 First Version of the Formalisation
At this stage, the process of formalisation has just started and there are several
unanswered questions. The most important one was how we were going to perform
the formalisation process, and what were the main characteristics of this version of the
formalisation? We defined three main guidelines to be followed when performing this
stage. These were:
1. The formalisation will be done on the "EuroPKI" Certificate Policy.
2. During the process of formalisation, we will follow the defined
conventions.
3. The formalisation will be on the basis of an exact mapping of the CP into
XML.
In the next paragraphs we address these concepts in more details:
EuroPKI Certificate Policy
The EuroPKI Certificate Policy has been selected as a model for applying the
formalisation technique for the following reasons:
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1. [48] states that the EuroPKI is a non-profit organization, and we think this
will be a positive point in favour of the CP. This will lead EuroPKI towards
developing a high quality of service rather than developing a service for
commerce.
2. The EuroPKI policy has been accepted as a Europe-wide standard CP. The
widespread of acceptance of EuroPKI encourages us to select it as a
reference CP.
Formalisation Conventions
Achieving consistency for the formalisation process requires us to follow the three
conventions that have been identified and listed in section 4.1.
Exact Interpretation
The formalisation at this stage was done on the basis of exact interpretation, and this
process was carried out by taking each section separately and encoding it in XML.
4.2.1 Applying the formalisation process
We used Stylus Studio 6 (Home Edition) to create the XML presentation, and also to
create the XML schema presentation which defines the structure of an XML
document through the use of predefined elements; these elements assist in defining
the range of valid values for attributes, and the number of times that an attribute can
occur. A parser was used to validate the XML documents by comparing them to the
XML schema, and if the XML document conforms to the rules of its schema, it is a
"valid" XML document [49]. In addition, an XML schema (XSD files) is considered
as a database schema which can define the tables, columns and data types for a
database; therefore, XSD files provide a model for an XML data document which
defines the arrangement of tags and text within all documents referencing the schema
[50]. Our target in using the schema was to build a template or framework to be used
when comparing it with other policies. The comparison will be done after formalising
the target policy in XML, and then applying the comparison process, figure 4-1.
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XML formalisation of
CP,•• ,to be compared
XML formalisation ofCP__
HtI
XML schema definition dCP__
HtI
Decision on the compatibility between CPtarget
_ePII_PIa
Figure 4-1 Using XML Schema To Perform Comparison
The outcomes of this process were as follows:
• Formalising the whole of the EuroPKI CP.
• Forty documents coded in XML representing the EuroPKI.
• Thirty seven documents in XML schema format (XSD).
The difference in the number of files arose because there are three sections of the
EuroPKI CP covering two actions that could be accomplished depending on the
circumstances of the decision that had been taken. These two different XML files for
the same section are represented by one XSD file that handles both actions (these files
are included in the attached CD).
We represented the words that show the requirement levels in our formalisation and
we interpreted them as described in RFC 2119 [51] (see Appendix A). These words
are:
"MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
"OPTIONAL".
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The following XML representation shows how we use these words represent the
requirement levels, emphasising the importance of the action which should be
accomplished (in bold text).
<interpretation.·of.="EuroPKI..:CP" accordingToCouritryLaw="where cOJllomung CAestablisbed";>'
<detailed InCPS="MUST"/> < c
<zinterpretation>
.
An example of the formalisation process, an XML and an XSD file, is given in the
next few paragraphs. The following is the XML representation for the EUfoPKI CP
section entitled "Confidentiality", and it is followed by the XSD definition:
<?xtni version=" 1.0"?>
<confidentiality Xtn1ns;xsi",,"bttp:/lwww.w3.org/2001!XM,LSchema-instimce" ... . . .. •.. .
. . . ... xsbloNatJlespaceSchemaLocation="file:ll1d:IXML-rCPicoUfidentiality."sa"> •
<CA-collects personaUnformatiolF"subscriber"> . .. . cc
<processed withPrivacyProtection;"MUST'I/>
<according To=" laws" whereCAls;;="estab)ished"/>
<lCAcollects> .
. <7intellectialPropeItyRights>
</cQnfidentiaIi:>
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This is the XSD definition for the above XML formalisation:
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd=''http://www.w3.orgl2001IXMLSchema''>
<xsd:element name="confidentiality">
<xsd:complexType>
<xsd.sequence>
<xsd.element name="CAcollects">
<xsd:complexType>
<xsd.sequence>
<xsd:element name="processed">
<xsd:complexType>
<xsd:attribute name="withPrivacyProtection" type="xsd:string" flxed="MUST"
use="required" />
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:elenient>
<xsd:element name="according">
<xsd.complex'Iype>
<xsd:attribute name="To" type="xsd:string" flxed="laws" use="required"/>
<xsd:attribute name="whereCAis" type="xsd:string" ftxed="established"
. use="required" />
<!xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element> .
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=vpersonallnformation'' type="xsd:string" fixed=rsubscriber"
use="required" I>
</xsd:complexType>
<lxsd:element>
<xsd.element name="SubscribersInformation">
<xsd.complexType>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd.element name="considered">
<xsd:complexType>
<xsd:attribute name=sconfidential" type="xsd:boolean" ftxed="true" use=vrequired"/>
</xsd:complexType>
<zxsd.element>
<xsd:element name="resleased">
<xsd.complex'Iype>
<xsd:attribute name="to" type="xsd:string" fixed=t'third parties" use="required"/>
<xsd:attribute name="withExplicitSubscriberAuthorization" type=l'xsd.string"
flXed="SHALL" use="required"/>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name="presntInCertiftcate" type="xsd:boolean" fixed=l'false" use="required"l>
<xsd.attribute name=l'presntlnf'Rl," type="xsd:boolean" fixed=tfalse" use=required'">
<xsd:attribute name=I'issuedlsy" type="xsd:string" flxed="conforming CA" use=vrequired'">
</xsd:complexType> .
</xsd:element>
<xsd:element name=" information">
<xsd.complex'Iype>
<xsd.sequence>
<xsd:element name="considered">
<xsd.complex'Iype>
<xsd:attribute name=t'confidential" type="xsd:boolean" ftxed="false" use="required"/>
</xsd:com lexT e>
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<zxsd.element> -
<lxsd:sequence>. . . .
<xsd:attribute name=\'includedlnCertificate" typ~"xsd:b()olean" fixed="tfUe" use="required"l>
<xsd.attnbute name="jncludedlnCRL" type="xsd:boolean" fixed="ttue" uStF"re.quited"7>
, <xsd:attribute name';:"issuedBy" type=lIxsd:string" tlxed="eoOfornlingCA"use=i"requitecl"/>
</xsd:complexType>' ' . 1
<!xsd:eIement> .
<xsd:element name"="confonningCA">
<xsd.cornplex'Iype>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd.element riame="ex:cept">
<xsd:complexType> .
. <xsd.attribute name=~'requitedBy': tYPe=:"x:sd;$~g"fixed"':"law enforc~meJlt o1licials" .....
use=l'required'' I>
<xsd:attrib\ltenatne"""exhibit" type="xsd:string" fixed;"Jregulat ..warranf"/>
</xsd;complexType>
<lxsd:element>'
<xsdtelement name=i'corifo~ngCAt I">
<xsd:complexT~>
<xsd.sequence> . /. ,.
<xsd.element name="except">
<xsd:complexType>. _
<xsd:attribute name=vrequiredlsy" type=t'xsd.string'' fixed=towner" use~"required"l>
<xsd.attribute name="with" type=rxsd.string" fixed=t'signed reqnest''r>
</xsd:com lex'I' e>
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</xsd:element>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=vdisclose" type="xsd:string" fixed="certificate certificate-related information"
use="required" />
<xsd:attribute name="toThlrdParty" type="xsd:boolean" fixed=rfalse" use="required"l>
</xsd:complexType>
- </xsd:element>
<xsd.element name="otherCircumstances" type="xsd:string" fixed="no stipulation">
</xsd:element>
<xsd:element name="intellectiaIPropertyRights">
<xsd.complex'Iype>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name="conformingCA">
<xsd:complexType>
<xsd.attribute name="calimAnyIPR" type="xsd:string" fixed="MUSTNOT" use="required"/>
<xsd:attribute name="onIssued" type="xsd:string" ftxed="certificates" use="required"/>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>
<xsd:element name=" anybody">
<xsd:complexType>
<xsd.attribute name=rallowed'' type="xsd:string" ftxed="to copy" use="required"/>
<xsd.attribute name="from" type=vxsd.string" flXed="EuroPKI-CPS or EuroPKI-CP"
use="required"/>
<xsd:attribute name="witbProviding" type="xsd:string" ftxed="a reference to the source"
use="required"/>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>
<rxsd.schema>
During the formalisation process we had a problem with repeating words (such as
entity name, verbs, section name, etc.) in the XML presentation which prevented the
validation of the XML documents. We altered our naming system by adding "-
number" in the case of repeating occurrences; for example, in the above XML
formalisation the word "confonningCA" occurs twice, so we named the subsequent
one "confonningCA -1".
To satisfy our goal of defining a framework or template by using the schema, we
constructed a single XSD file "EuroPKI-CP .xsd" that contains all the XSD files
(included on the attached CD).
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4.2.2 Testing the Formalisation
After finishing this first version of the formalisation, the general picture became much
clearer. We reviewed the whole formalisation process and especially its outcomes.
There are forty XML files representing the EuroPKI CP, and these files are an exact
representation of the EuroPKI text in XML. If we recall, our goal beyond establishing.
the formalisation was to represent the semantics contained in the textual
representation of the CP. After reviewing the outcomes, however, we found that we
had deviated from this main objective, and we decided that we needed to alter our
formalisation process to adapt the representation of the semantics. Therefore, first we
needed to define how we could represent the semantics in our presentation.
4.3 Second version of the formalisation
The ultimate aim of this stage is to develop our XML formalisation to be able to
represent the semantics articulated in the CP. And as we stated in above, it is
necessary first to define what it is that we will use to represent the semantics before a
new version of formalisation can be considered. The following section discussed this
issue.
4.3.1 Representing Semantics
Words that indicate requirement level (hereafter we call them obligation words) are
really a type of scale to emphasize the importance of the obligation stated in the CP,
and as is stated in [51]:
The force of these words is modified by the requirement level of the
document in which they are used.
In the first version of the formalisation, we formalised the whole EuroPKI
CP and we found that obligation words had been used to emphasize the level
of importance. Also, we realized that, in our case, the semantics are
represented by defining what is allowed and what is prohibited for the entity
to do in a compliance with the issuer's operating CP. This understanding
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matches completely the function of the obligation words that indicate
requirement level in the following sense: if the word indicating the
requirement level is "MUST" this means that the entity is allowed to
perform the obligation (indeed, it has to). On the other hand, if the code
indicating the requirement level is "MUST NOT" in this case the entity is
not allowed to perform this action. For this reason, we decided to base our
new formalisation on the obligation words, such that this new formalisation
would give the obligation words a significant role in showing the importance
of each obligation and also representing what is allowed and what is
prohibited for an entity.
4.3.2 Obligation Title
Having decided to use the obligation words to represent the semantics, it is necessary
to introduce a suitable way of representing them in XML. Accordingly, we have
introduced a tag corresponding to each of the obligation words as following:
1. REQUIREMENT: MUST, REQUIRED and SHALL.
2. PROHIBITION: MUST NOT and SHALL NOT.
3. PREFERRED: SHOULD and RECOMMENDED.
4. NOT PREFERRED: SHOULD NOT and NOT RECOMMEND.
5. POSSIBLE: MAY and OPTIONAL.
These five words will appear as main sub-sections under each section of the CP, and
we will call these words the obligation title. All the obligations will be listed in the
appropriate obligation title according to their importance as defined in the CP. For
example, the obligations section in EuroPKI CP has a sub-section called CA
obligations, and the XML representation of the obligations title in this section would
be as follows:
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<obligations>
<CAObligations>
<requirement>
</requirement>
<prohibition>
</prohibition>
<preferred>
</preferred>
<notPreferred>
</notPreferred>
<possible>
</possibIe>
</CAObligations>
</obli ations>
As illustrated, the internal sections headed by the obligation title show the obligations
upon the CA; therefore if there is a required action that should be taken by the CA, it
will be listed under the requirement section. Each obligation title contains a
description of what is required under this clause. The presentation of these obligations
will be in the following format:
<CP section title tag>
<Entity name tag>
<Obligation title tag>
<Descri tion of the obli ation>
The description section of the obligation will start with a verb which describes the
action to be taken to perform the obligation, which is then followed by operands and
other values. For example, one of the CA obligations states that "CA SHALL operate
a certification authority service" and the XML representation for this will be as the
following:
<obligations>
<CAObliglltions>
<requirement>
<operate>
<CertificationAuthorityService/>
</operate>
</requirement>
<lCAObligations>
</obli ations>
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We observe that the description section of the obligation starts with the verb "operate"
under requirement section, and the operand is "CertificationAuthorityService". In the
case where there is another obligation which acts as a constraint on the entity, we can
use the obligation tag as a sub-section under the verb. As an example, let us develop
the previous example where an obligation was put on the CA to operate a certification
authority service. There is a further obligation on this service that states:
Handle certificate request
This represents an additional obligation on the operation of the previously mentioned
certification authority service. This obligation will be written with the previous
representation, thus:
<obligations>
<CAobligations>
<requirement>
<operate>
<CertificationAuthorityService/>
<requirement>
<handle>
<certificateRequests/>
</handle>
<requirement>
</operate>
<zrequirement>
</CAobligations>
<zobligations>
We can continue using this technique to a greater depth if there are inner
obligations.
4.3.3 Formalisation Conventions
As we said in section 4.2, we want to achieve consistency in our formalisation process
and for this reason we defined the conventions that we use in our formalisation
process. In addition to the previously mentioned conventions, we will also add the
following seven new conventions to the current iteration of our formalisation:
1. The formalisation process will be applied to the obligations that have been
listed in the CP, and the process will exclude any type of definition.
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2. All obligations on an entity; i.e. Certification Authority; will be grouped
under the entity's name as a title. For example (in bold text):
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<create>
<certificates/>
<zcreate>
<lrequirement>
</CertificationAuthorit >
3. If the policy describes obligations for a different entity to the entity that
titles the section, all the obligations will be grouped under the different
entity's name, such as (different entity in bold text):
<operationalauthority>
<requirement>
<IUinoisDepartmentOfCentralManagementServiceI> .
<serve>
<asTheOperationalAuthority/>
</serve>
</lllinoisDepartmentOft:entralManagementServices>
<requirement>
<0 rationalAuthori />
4. Any text in the policy that does not fall in the previous rules will be encoded
as comments in the section that it refers to.
5. If there is an inner condition, it will be represented by an inner obligation
title followed by the entity's name (in bold text):
<use>
<oneOrMore representativesOrAgents=="to perform. its obligations"
under=" SOfIllinois-CP" />
<requirement>
<CA.>
6. Any obligation in the policy that does not include any of the obligation
words, will be treated as a fact which means that the obligations in the text
will be listed in the requirement section. Such an example is:
The assigned staff operate the CA functions on a best-effort basis only.
7. If there is a negative word in front of the verb, both of the words will be
combined together to form one word (in bold text):
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<possible>
<certificates>
<notBeUsed>
4.3.4 Tree Representation
The structure of the formalisation developed for the second version leads to a
hierarchical tree structure. The tree is be formed by laying down all the entities of the
XML representation. The tree root is the name of the CP (EuroPKI-CP in this
example - we add CP to distinguish it from a CPS), and the next level will be the CP
section names. The third level from top will be the obligation titles, followed by verb
tags. The rest of levels will be either the description of the obligation or sub-
obligation titles. The following diagram shows the tree presentation for the obligation
section of the CAobligations tag - Figure 4-2:
Figure 4-2 Tree Presentation of the CA Obligation Section
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We believe that the tree structure will simplify manual comparison when trying to
find similarities and differences between a relying party's CP and a subject's CP
because it represents clearly all the CP's attributes and their relationships to the
obligation title. The following is a tree representation of one obligation of a RA in two
different CP's. Figure 4-3:
CPA
Figure 4-3 Tree Presentation of the Two Different CPs
The above tree presentation show one obligation of the RA entity, and we can observe
the difference between the two presentations. CPAprohibits the RA from issuing
certificates; however, CPs could allow the RA to issue certificates.
The tree structure can also be used to perform automatic compression by encoding the
structure using a program. The comparison process could then be done by computer
and similarities and differences shown up as a result of this process.
4.3.5 Implementation
We adopted a slightly different scenario when applying the second version of the
formalisation. Instead of formalising the whole policy as we did in the first version,
we formalised only one section of the CP but for more than one CA. This method
helped the comparison of the implementation of the second version on different CPs,
and it helped us understand the applicability of this iteration of the formalisation. We
chose to apply the formalisation technique to the section called "Community and
applicability" of the following five organizations CPs:
1. EuroPKI is a top Level Certification Authority and it offers its services to
the members of the Europe Internet community for supporting borderless
network security. It offers public-key certification services to public and
private organization, as well as to individuals. It wants public-key
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certificates to be the main identity identification of individuals, network
nodes (e.g. IPsec hosts), and network services (e.g. web servers) [48].
2. DutchGrid as stated in [52] refers to "DutchGrid and NIKHEF medium-
security Certification Authority". This CA is operated by the Certification
Authorities group of the Dutch National Institute for Nuclear and High-
Energy Physics (NIKHEF) as a courtesy service to the DutchGrid
community.
3. CMS is abbreviation of "lllinois Department of Central Management
Services"; it is the CA operated by the State of Illinois for digital certificates
for encryption and digital signatures for use in providing electronic
identification of end-entities as required for conducting State business [53].
4. SwUPKI stands for "the Public Key Infrastructure for Swedish Universities
and University Colleges". It is the CA for the members of SwUPKI. The
SwUPKI only includes Swedish universities or university colleges
accredited by the Swedish government and related organisations complying
with SwUPKI's CP [54].
5. VeriSign, Inc. is a well-known company offering PKI services. Its services
are global and VeriSign Trust Network (VTN) is one of these services. It is a
global PKI that accommodates a large, public, and widely distributed
community of users with diverse needs for communications and information
security [55].
We based our selection of these five organizations on the thought that they will be
concerned about the need for a well-defined CP, and therefore important and crucial
issues ought to be covered in their CP. To justify our claim let us look closer at them
to study their role in the communities they serve.
1. EuroPKI, as we stated above, is a non-profit organization and its primary
purpose is to offer public-key certification services to the European Internet
community. As we said it will focus on the quality in its offering services to
secure the European network.
2. DutchGrid is also a non-profit organization and its service is dedicated to
DutchGrid's members. Therefore, DutchGrid will do its best to offer
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sophisticated services that respond to the needs of the DutchGrid's members
in providing them with assistance in securing their transactions.
3. CMS represents the State of Illinois government which is the regulator of
services for the State of Illinois government. One of these services is
offering public-key certification services. As part of the government which
is a non-profit organization it is concerned mainly with the quality of its
services. It wants to make sure of their effectiveness and especiallyin the
case of public-key certification services that maintain security for all users.
4. SwUPKI offers its services for the academic sector which include the
universities and colleges in Sweden. SwUPKI is considered a non-profit
organization because its services are bound to specific users, and
accordingly it will make sure that its services are adequate, efficient and
reliable to meet the needs for securing private individuals transactions.
5. VeriSign, Inc., it is the only commercial organization included because of its
good reputation. It is a leading provider of trusted infrastructure services to
websites, enterprises, electronic commerce service providers, and
individuals. It has its own PKI infrastructure known as the VeriSign Trust
Network ("VTN"). An organization with this solid background in PKI
services will want to maintain robust services.
This all makes it possible to have well-defined content for the CPs of each
organization. The formalisations of the section "Community and applicability" for the
organizations' CPs are presented in the paragraphs below.
First EuroPKI's CP:
<?xml version="l.O"?>
<EuroPKI-CP>
<community AndApplicability>
<conformingCA>
<requirement>
<respect>
<allLimition ImposedBy="the sections of EuroPKI-CP" />
</respect>
<lrequirement>
<prohibition>
<issue>
<certificatesToEntitY doNotBelong="to its community">
<certificatesToApplication haveNotBeen="carefully evaluated"/>
<zissue>
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</prohibition>
<preferred> .
<rpreferred>
:::;:notPreferrf,':d>
</notpreferred>
<possible>
<choose>
<for tbeirOertificates="tbe community and applicability")'>
. <requirement>
<specify>
<in CPS="tbe community and applicability"/>
<:;/specify>
<::/requirement>
<zchoose>
.</possible>
</conformingCA>
<CertificationAuiliority>
<requirement> .
<conformingCA> .
<take>
.··.<careWben decide="subordinate CA"/>
<requirement>
<making>
,<sure candidate=" organization or individual" perfonningJ\l1="controls and-checks detailed in
. . EuroPKI-CP"!>
<;making>
</requirement>
</take> - .
</confonnUlgCA> .
<subordinateCAs>
<sign>. .
<agreement with="certifying CA"/>·
<requirement>
<stating>
<obligation toAdhere'ifo="ihe agreed procedures'v>
<rstating>
<zrequirement>
<lsign>
</subordinateCAs>
<zrequtrement>
<prohibition>
</prohibiti(Jn>
<preferred>
«preferred>
.<notPreferred>
<lnotPreferred>
<possible> ...
·<c6nfonDlngCA>; ,
<use>.
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</perform>
<lrequirement>
</fulfiU>
</confonningCA>
</possible>
</CertificationAuthority>
<registrationAuthorities>
<requirement>
<perform>
<physical identificationAndAuthenticationOf=lentities"/>
</perform>
<sign>
<agreement with="certifying CA"/>
<requirement>
<stating>
<obligation toAdhereTo="the agreed procedures'">
</stating>
</requirement>
</sign>
</requirement>
<prohibition>
<issue>
<certificates/>
<lissue>
<zprohibition>
<preferred>
</preferred>
<notPreferred>
</notPreferred>
<possible>
</possible>
</registrationAuthorities>
<endEntities>
<requirement>
<perform>
<cryptographicOperations/>
</perform>
<conformingCA>
<detail>
<inCPS endEntities="that i&is willing to certify"/>
<ldetail>
</conformingCA>
</requirement>
<prohibition>
<lprohibition>
<preferred>
</preferred>
<notPreferred>
<lnotPreferred>
<possible>
<zpossible>
</endEntities>
<applicability>
<requirement>
<CA>
84
<support>
<S-MIME/>
<IPsec/>
<S,SL-TLS/>
</support>
<Ie.{\>
</requirement::>
<prohibition>
<use>
'<certificates inWay="prolllbited by law of countries" where="issuing CA is established'"> .
</use>
</prohibition>
<preferred>
</preferted>
<notPreferred>
</notPreferred>
<possible>
<zpossible>
, </applkabUity>
<:/communityAndApplicability>
<lEuroPKI-CP> .
DutchGrid's CP:
'<?xmlversion=,"l,O"?>
<:DutchGrld-CP>
<communityAndApp!icability>'
<Certificitic;n1AuUlorities> ,
<requirement>
'<!-- Certification Authorities are only persons. The current list of persons comprising the operational staff of
the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority is published inan on-line accessible repository.
The location of this list is stated, as part of the CPS in'seotion ,1.4.-..;>
<issue> < '
<certificates of="the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority"/>
<lissue> . ,'.." , " -
.' <assigned>
<staftMembers responsibleFor="the operational service of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification
,Authority" />
.<operate> "
, <thecAfunctions on=~'a best-effort basis only"I>
</operate>
<tassignedStaft>
<Irequirement>
<prohibition>
<issue>
'<certificate thrQJlgh="aulomated 1Vay!'/>
, '</issue> ". ,
.'<NIKHEFcollaboration>
<held> . ' .
<liable for=nany damages" resultUtgFrom="the operation or non-operation of the Dutc.hGrid medium-
. security Certification Authority"/>
~ ~- F -"":
-,,,</NIKHEFcollaboration>,-
. _ ,,<foundationFOM>.
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<!held>
<(NIKHEFpartners>
:;subordinateCettificatioPAuthorities>
. <allowed>
<underDutchGrid~CP [»:
<fallowed>
<possible>
</possible> .
«Certificatio.nAuthqrities>
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<involved>
~iniheResearchl> ~".
<deployment Of="multi-domain distributed computing infrastructure, intended for
crossorganisationalsharing of resources'z>
<!-- The focus of,theseorganisations should also be in research and/or education=->
</invQlved> "
</requirement>
<allThoseEntities associatedto="the DutchGrid platfoi'ni"I>
. <allOrganisations located="in the Wetenschappelijk CentrumWatergraafsmeer in Amsterdam that are run
entirely on a non-for-profit basis" I>
</include>
~requi,remen~
<prohibition>
<zprohibition>
.<preferred>
. _ </preferred>
<notl'referred>
, </notPreferred>
, <possible>\
</possible> '
</endEntities> .
- - . ~-
<applicability;>
,,"<requirement>=-
.</requirement>
<prohibition>
<rprohibition> .,
""preferred>
~pteferted> .
<notPrefeJTed>.
<InotPrefeJTed> ",
<possible>
. ~ertificates>
. <notBeUsed;>
<forFnancialTrat)Sactions/> "
</notBeUsed>.
"<Used>:
<forAnyApplication thatls=vsuitable for X.509 certifieates'">
. <prohibition>' " ".
,. <used>
<forFnapcialTransactionS/>
<zused>;
</prohibition>
,<!Used>
</certificates>
«possible>
<7applicability>
<!communityAitdAppticability>
<lDutchGrid-CP> .
CMS's CP:
<1xml version=" 1.0:'?>
.<SOflllinois-CP>
<roleldentification>,
<GertificatioilAuthorit :>
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· <!--,Where necessary, this Policy distinguishes the differellt users 31lcl roles a~cessmg thepAfwlctious. Where
this distinctiQn is not required, the term CAshatl refer'to 'thetoud CA entity; includh1g the softWare and 'IfS ""
operations. --> ' ,
<requirement>
<create>,
, ,<certificates/>
<lcreate>,
<sign>
<certificates/>
f/sign>
<distribute>
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<1-- Cross-certificates will be issued to other CAs where a crosscertification agreement has been
developed between the PA and the policy governing body of the other CA. Cross-certification will
be implemented according to the requirements defined in that agreement - ->
<!te.quirement> .
<lissue>
</possible>
<lCertificationAuth0rity'>
~PolicyAuthority>
<requirement>
<responsible>
> <forEnsuring thatlsoth=r'the policy and the practices that the CA employs in issuing certificates"
areConsistentWith="the policies described in SOflllinois·CP"t>
<lresponsible>
<consist>
<oflndividuals representing;="constitutional offices, state agencies. and local governments" .
. whichAreUtilizing="the State of Illinois public key inf'raStructure''7>
<zconsist>
<freqllirement>
. ~ptohibitiQn>
<Jprohibition>
<pteferred>
<tpteferred>
<notPreterred> .
</notP.refcm-ed>
<possible»
</possible>
</Pplicy Authority>
<operationalAuthority> .
<requirement>
<IllinoisDepartmentOfCentralManagem~ntSe~ces>
<serVe>'·>
<asTheOperationaIAuthority/>
. </serie>
·J'<:lIllinoisDepattmentOfCentralManagementSeryices>
<responsible> . '.
<for theOperationOf="the CA in accordance with SOflllinois-CP and the practices described in the CPS"/>
. '</responsible> > • • ¢ •
<make>
<aCopyof="SOflllinois-CP" available="to all End-Entities within its CA" I>
</make>:. ;
</requirenl~nt>
<prohibition>
</prohibition>
l<prefeiTed>
.</preferred>
<notP.referred>
<fnotPreferred> .
. <possible>
. </possible>
'. </operationalAuthoritY>
<registrationAuthorities>
.. <requirement>
·<StatePAA
<appoint>.
<atLeastOneRAl>
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</requirement>
<prohibition>
<iprohibition>
<preferred>
<zpreferred>
<notPreferred>
</notPreferred>
<possible>
<zpossible>
</registrationAuthorities>
<LocalRegistrationAuth~rit,jes>
<requirement>
</requirement>
<prohibition>
<rprohibitioa>
<preferred>
</preferred>
<notPreferred>
</notPreferred>
<possible>
;, <eachStateAgency>
<participat> .~
<inTheStatePKlI> <.
</participat>
.<andOtherEntities>
<determined>
'<byThePAJ:>< >'
'</detennined>
<appoint> . .'.. ..
<oneOrMoreLRAS/>
90
<include>
<statelimployees/> .
<individuals>
<requirement>
<conduct>
<electronicbusiness with="the State"/>
</condUct>
</requirement>
<lindividuals>
<hardwareDevices/>
<specificApplications/>
</include>
, <use>
<certificates issued="bythe CA to encrypt information" for=" other End-Entities within the State PKJ"/>
<,Ius~' -
<verifY> _
<tbeDigitalSignatutes of="other End-Entities within the State PKJ"/>
</verify>
<lpossible>
<lendEntities>
<subscribers> ,
,<1--.The Subscriber agreement may be view,ed at .hup:l/www;iUinois.goy/pkilpki subscriber.cfm-«>
<~equirement>. . - -_ . . . . -
<SOfIllinois':CP>
'<bind> "
. <onEachSubscriber that=Jlapplies forand/or obtains Certificates" byVirtue="oftlle Subscriber
- - Asreement"(>
<govern> ,: " ' ..? , .. _
.c:eachApplicantPerfonnane:;e with="respect to their application for,use of, and reliance bn, ' ' _
Certificates" issuedBy:=;"the CA"/>
<repositories>
<requirement>
</requirement> .
<prohibition>
</prohibition> .
<preferred>.:
<lprefetred> .
i'-'. <ilotPrefelTed>
.</notP,refeJ;Ted>
<possible>
, </possible>
.</repositories> .
,<sponso~ '_,
<requirement>
-<lrequiremen~
-.<prohibit jon>
</prohibition>
.<preferred>
':<;/preferred>
-, <notP-referred>
<lnotPreferred> .
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</requirement>
<prohibition>
.</prohibition>
<preferred>
:::::/preferred>
<notPteferred>
<possible>
</possible>
<zsubscribers> "
.. <lRelyingParties>
<zrcleldentification>
</SOtlUinois~CP>,
SwUPKI's CP:
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<communityAndApplicability>
'SPolicyManagementAuthoti,ty> ,
<requirement>
<zrequirement>
':>'<prohibition>,:
</prohibition>
<preferred>
</preferred>
<notPreferred>
<lnotFereferred> ,
<possible>
<zpossible>
,<lPolicyManageQ1e~tAuiliOrity>
<Certificetionauthority>
<requirement>' ',' ,
<creat>
<certificates/>
</creat>
<sign>' " ,',
<certificates/>
</sign>
<bUut> . ,
<Subscribers to="the public signature verification keys attributable to them"/>
<PKIpersoJUlel to=vthe public signature verification keys attributable to them"!>
<otherCAs to="the public signature verification keys attributable to them"l>
,.<!bind>
<provide>
<CertificateRepository AndCertificateStatusService/>
<lprovide>
<publish> . e
<CPS>
<requirement>
, <include>
<reference to="SwUPKI-CP"f>
</include>
'<I:tequirement> '
<lCPS>
Iii. </puhlish>
<assign>
<;:duties to;=:"itsRAs"/>
<!~- .and.for the compliance with this CP by the CA itself, its RAs and any subordinate CAs -->
<lassign> >
</requirement>
<prohibition>
</prohibition>" ,
<prefetred>
</preferred>. ,~
<notl'referred>
" </notPreferred>
<possible>
, <notAssign> ,
, <duty otlssuiiigCertificatesTo="RA'?>'
</notAssign> ,,' " , ,.
<use>. " '
<!~-While an Or anisation in the Pl\.lma
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<contfactortO="Pt'C?vide CA services"!>
<requirement>
<responsible>.
<fortheOperationOf=;"its CA" I>
</responSibl~
<accountable> "
<for theOperationOf.="its CA"/>
<zaccountable>
<cross-certificatjonJhrough:;:"tpe Policy CA"with="C~ exterrud to SwUPKI"/> .
<requirement>
<after decision="bythe PMN'/>
<eomply with::;"SwUPKI-CP"/>
"<anyAdditionaJRequirements decidedBy="the PMA"/>
</requirement>
<zdo>
<zpossible>
</CertificationAuthority>
<registrationAuthorities>
<requirement>
. <responsible> ,<t
<forAllDuties assignedroltBy=~'C4"/>
<requirement>
<operate> ,
<inCompliance:w:ith=="SwUPKl-CP" />
<ioperate>
<rrequirement>
<rresponsible>
<zrequirement>
<prohibition>
<prohibitioa>
<preferred>
<zpreferred>
<notl'referred>
</notPteferred>
<endEntities>
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<requirement>
</requirement>
<prohibition>
</prQhibition>
<preferred>
</preferred>
...<notPrefer:red>
</notPreferred>
" <possible>
<lpossible>
<lendEntities>
<repositories>
<requirement>
<CA>' "
<ensure>
<there is=?"Certificate repository and a Certificate Status Service (CSS}"I>
<requirement>
<CSS>
<associated>
<withlt/>
<!associated>
<consistsOf>
<CRLrepositoryl>
</consistsOf>
<less>
<comply> .
<with currentStanrultdsAsStatedfu='''the CPS" />
</coroply>
</requirement>
. <possible>
<CSS.>
<COtlststsOf>
<OnlineGertificate$tatusServicef>
</consistsOf>
<ICSS>
*/possible>
. <fensure> .
.</eA> -
.<rrequirement>
<prohibition>
<lprohibition>
-.<preferred>
</preferred>
. <notPreferred>
<lnotPrefer:red>
. <possible>
-</possible>"
> </repositories>
". ,>:
<issuing>
.<certificates> .
i</issuing>
. :</eachOrganisation>
. <su 1 rConflIll1>
95
<authenticatioti1\ndCertificateAttributeDetails to::::"tbeCA or RA"I>
</~upplyOrConf1flll>' - '"
<inform>
<theCAorRA>
<ifTheSponsorRelationship with="the 'Subscribe~ terminates Or changes"/>
<requirement>
<revok>
<certificates/>
</revok>
<zrequirement>
<ltheCAorRA>
<Iin£onn>
<requirement>
<prohibition>
<zprohibition>
<preferred>
</preferred>
<notl'referred>
</notPreferred>
<possible>
<suggest>
<appropriateDistingUishedNames .for=" Subjects" 1>-
<zsuggest>
<rpossible>
</sponsors>
, <subjects>
<requirement>
</requirement>
<prohibition>
<lprohibition>
<preferred>
<zpreferred>
<notPreferred>
<subscribers>
<requirement>
<zrequirement>
<prohibition>
<zprohibition>
<preferred>
</preferred>
<notPreferred>
</notPreferred>
<possible>
<CA>
<issue>
<certificates to'Subscribers=="etnployees, students; guests and others"7>
<requirement>,
<having>
<sponsor within="the Organisation ofCA"/>
</having>
</requirement>
'</issue>
<lCA>
</possible>
<l=Eligibility for a certificate is at the sole discretion of the CA. -*>
</subscribers>
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</notPJ!efetred>
'~possible> "
<CA>
<issue>
<certificates whereTheSubjectIs="the Subscriber, an organisational role or an ITsystem"/>
<requirement>
<tesponsibilityAndAccounta:bility?
<attributable> '
<toTheSubscriber/>
</attributable>
</responsibility AndAccountability>
</requirernent>
</issue>.· '
-ac)»
.</possible>
</subjects>
<applicability>
,"<requirement>
</requirement>
<prohibition>
" <zprohibition> -,
<preferred> .
~prefen'ed>
<notl'referred>
<lnotPreferred>
_<possible>
<rpossible>
<iapplicability>
</community AndApplicability>
</SwUPKI~CP> '
Finally, VeriSign's ep:
<?xml version=" 1.0"?>
<VeriSign-CP>
, <P>KI~Participants>;:
<Certificationauthorities> .
"<requirement> '
'<issue> '
<publicKeyCertificates witbin="the VTN"/>
</issue>
<encompass>
> <aSubcategoryOtlssuers ca!led="Primary Certification Authorities (PCA)"/>
'<lencompass>
<PCAs>
<!- Each PCA is a VeriSigil entity-->
<requirement>
<act> , ,_
<asRoots of="four .domains'">
</act>
<contain> ss
<Certificationauthoriries>
<requirement>
<issue>
<certificates to="end-user Subscribers or other As"I>'
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.'
</issue>
<rrequirement>
</CertificationAuthorities>
</contain>
</requirement>
</PCAs>
<!-- One VTN CA technically outside the three hierarchies under each' of thePCAs is the Secure Server
Certification Authority. This CA does not have a superior CA, such as a root or a PCA: Rather=>
<SecureServerCertificationAuthority>
<acts>
<asItsOwnRoot andHas="a self-signed root certificate'">
<facts>
<issue>
<certificates to=t'end-user Subscnbers"/>
</issue>
<!-- Server Hierarchy consists only ofthe Secure Server CA-->
<issues>
<SecureServerIDS/>
<!-- which are deemed to be Class 3 Organizational Certificates and arefunctionally equivalent to
Certificates issued by a Class 3CA--> .. .
<lissues>
<approved>
<byVeriSignAndDesignated As="a Class 3 CA within the VTNj,/>
<requirement>
<SecureServerCA>
<employs>
<lifecyclePractices that="are substantially similar with those of other Class 3 CAs within the
. VTN"I>
<!-- The Certificatesit issues are considered to provide assurances ortruatworthiness
comparable to other Class 3 organizational Certificates .->
</employs> .
</SecureServerCA>
.. 't
<irequirement>
</approved>
</SecureServerCertificationAuthority>
</requirement>
<prohibition>
</prohibition>
<preferred>
</preferred>
<notPreferred>
</notPreferred>
<possible>
<VeriSignEnterpriseCustomers>
<operate>
<theirOwnCAs as="a subordinate CA to a VeriSignPCA"1>
</operate>
. <requirement>
<!-- Such a customer enters into a contractual relationship with VeriSign .:»
<abide> " .
<byAllTheRequirements of.;:::"theVTN CP and,th~ VeriSignCPS1t/>
<labide>
<rrequirement>
<subordinateCAs>
<implement>
<aMoreRestrictivePractices basedOn="tbeif internal requirements"l> .
</implement>
</subordinateCAs>
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<allEndUsers of.="certificates issued by a VTN CA"I>
</include>
•<!--A subscriber is the entity named as the end-user Subscriber of a certificate. End-user Subscribers may be
individuals, organizations or, infrastructure components such as firewalls, routers, trusted servers or other
devices used to secure communications within 'an Organization-> "
<zrequirement> '
<prohibition>
</ptohibition>
<preferred>
</preferred>
<notPreferred>
</notPreferred>
<possible>
</possible>
<zsubscribers>
<relyingParties>
<requirement>
<!--A Relying Party is an individual or entity->
<acts>
<inReliance Of.=I'a certificate and/or a digita! signature issued under the VTN"/>,
</acts> "
</requirement>
<prohibition>
</prohibition>
<preferred>
<lpreferred>
<notPreferred>
</notPreferred>
<possible>
<be>'
<aSubscriber within="the VTN"/>
<zbe>
</possible>
</relyingParties>
<otherl'articipants>"
<requirement>
<Anaffiliate>
<operate>
<CertificationAuthority under-"the VTN within a specific territory"l>
</operate>
</AnAffiliate>
<ProcessingCenters>
<create>
<aSecureFacilityHousing/>
</create>
'<use>
<theCryptographicModules for-"the issuance of Certificates" />
<zuse>
<act>
<asCAs within="the VTN"/>
<fact>
<issu>
<Certificates/>
</issu>
<manag>
<Certificates/>
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<lmanag>
<revok>
<Certificates/>
</revok>
<renew>
<Certificates!>
<lrenew>
<!--Affiliates who outsource the backend functionality to Veri Sign but retain the RA responsibilities are
called Service Centers-->
<lProcessingCenters>
</requirement>
<prohibition>
</prohibition>
<preferred>
</preferred>
<notl'referred>
</notPreferred>
4.3.6 Testing the formalisation
Natural language is ambiguous, imprecise and vague [56], a CP is not a structured
document and there is no consistency in CPs because some CAs introduce new
entities, which are not defined in RFC 2527 nor found in other CPs, to perform
specific tasks. For example, SwuPKI's CP introduces the "Policy Management
Authority" entity which is not found in the other CPs. All these factors lead to
different representations for the CPs that we formalised, making the comparison
process inefficient, so we need a new version of formalisation to overcome this.
4.4 Final version of the formalisation
We observed that identical representations could be obtained by defining certain
criteria that have same name in all the formalisation of CPs but differ in their values.
The process of defining these criteria is explained in the following sections.
4.4.1 Defining criteria for the comparison process
The process for defining the criteria was started by constructing a table with three
columns. Each column contained one of the three CA's CPs, EuroPKl, SwUPKI or
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DutchGrid. The aim behind this was to perform a manual comparison between the
three CPs to find the criteria that they have emphasised, and those that play a
significant role in defining the obligations. The first page of the table is showing in
the Figure 4-4. Each row of the table contains one numbered section of each
participating CP such as "1.3 Community and applicability" and the following
numbered section "1.3.1 Policy Management Authority" is in a different row. We had
106 pages of double-sided A4 landscape-size pages after filling up the table's rows
with the content of the three CPs. In the case where a CP has a numbered section that
is not found in other CPs then its row cell was filled and the other cells left empty (see
Appendix B).
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Figure 4-4 First Page of the Table Used To Do Manual Comparison Process
4.4.2 Comparison criteria for the formalisation
When the process of manual comparison was finished, we came up with 43 criteria
represented in table 4.1:
Number Section Criterion
number
1 1.3 Does the CA issue certificate to entities outside its community?
Does the CA issue certificate for application that have not been carefully evaluated?
2 1.3.1 Could the CA have the role of RA?
Does the CA allow for subordinate CA?
3 1.3.2 Is the RA allowed to issue certificates?
4 13.4 Is there any limitation on the use of the certificates?
5 1.3.5 Does the policy allow for sponsors or introducers?
6 2.1.1 Does the CA ensure that subscribers and Relying Parties are aware of their respective rights and
obligations with respect to the operation and management of any keys, certificates or End Entity
hardware and software used in connection with the PKI?
Does the CA manage the certificates in accordance with its CP?
7 2.3 Does the CA provide any financial responsibility?
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8 2.4.1 Does national law govern any agreements?
9 2.4.3 Does the CP agree to let an arbitrator to resolve a dispute?
10 2.7 Does the CP allow for external audit or compliance inspection?
11 2.7.1 Is there a frequency for entity compliance inspection?
12 2.7.3 Is there a relationship between the auditor and the auditedparty?
13 2.7.5 Is there an action taken as a result of deficiency?
14 2.8 Does the CA disclose subscribers' information or certificate-related information to any third
parties without explicit subscriber's authorization?
15 2.8.3 Does the CRL entry for action include the reason code?
16 2.8.7 Does a compliance auditor have access to the CA's cryptographic keys?
17 3.1.5 Who judges name claim disputes?
18 3.1.7 Is there a method to prove possession of private ke_y?
19 3.1.8 Does authentication of an organization identity include its popularity in the community?
20 3.1.9 Does authentication of individual identities require that individuals present themselves
personally to the authenticating party?
Does the authentication process of the individual is recorded?
21 3.2 Does the CP allow for recertification of an existing public key?
Is the key re-authentication accomplished by the same procedure as for the initial registration?
22 3.3 Does the CP allow for re-certification of a revoked public key?
23 4.1.1 Does the CP support cross-certification?
24 4.3 Does the CP request for subscriber acknowledge acceptance of certificate and its obligations?
25 4.4 How long does a CRL need to be updated since any revocation of a certificate?
26 4.4.9 Does a CRL have a validation period, and does it last for more than 30 days?
27 4.5.1 Do securityaudit_procedures include all events?
28 4.5.2 Are audit logs periodically reviewed?
29 4.5.8 Does the CP request for the vulnerability assessments?
30 4.6 Does the archival procedure record all events?
31 4.8.4 Is there a disaster recovery plan?
32 5.1.2 Is there physical security controls to control access to the CA site?
33 5.2.1 Does the CP define the trusted roles?
34 5.2.3 Does the CP request for identification and authentication for each role?
35 5.3 Does the CP ask for personnel controls?
36 6.1.1 Does the CA generate the end-entities' cryptographic keys?
37 6.1.5 What is the minimum length for the private key?
Does the CA's key length longer than the end entity's key length?
38 6.1.9 Does the CP request for flagging the KeyUsage extension as critical?
39 6.3.2 Does the CP define a usage periods for the public and private keys?
40 6.5.1 Are there specific computer security technical requirements for CA machine?
41 6.6.2 Is there any security management controls?
42 6.6.3 Is there any life cycle securityrating?
43 6.7 Does the CP define the network security controls?
Table 4-1 the Criteria That Were Produced By the Manual Comparison Process
These criteria need to be evaluated and analysed to:
1. Filter them, so we consider only the criteria that will satisfy the requirements
laid down in the following section.
2. Represent crucial information that is required during authentication which
will assist the relying party to make his/her decision to accept or reject a
subject's certificate.
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4.4.3 Requirements for certification service providers
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has outlined the requirements on
certification service providers for issuing qualified certificates in its directive [57] in
Annex II. As stated in the Annex, the certification service providers must meet these
requirements in order to issue qualified certificates. The requirements cover the
following:
Requirement 1: Demonstrate the reliability necessary for providing
certification services.
Requirement 2: Ensure the operation of a prompt and secure directory and
a secure and immediate revocation service.
Requirement 3: Ensure that the date and time when a certificate is issued
or revoked can be determined precisely.
Requirement 4: Verify, by appropriate means in accordance with national
law, the identity and, if applicable, any specific attributes of the person
to which a qualified certificate is issued.
Requirement S: Employ personnel who possess the expert knowledge,
experience, and qualifications necessary for the services provided, in
particular competence at managerial level, expertise in electronic
signature technology and familiarity with proper security procedures;
they must also apply administrative and management procedures which
are adequate and correspond to recognised standards.
Requirement 6: Use trustworthy systems and products which are protected
against modification and ensure the technical and cryptographic
security of the process supported by them.
Requirement 7: Take measures againstforgery of certificates, and, in cases
where the certification service-provider generates signature creation
data, guarantee confidentiality during the process of generating such
data.
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Requirement 8: Maintain sufficient financial resources to operate in
conformity with the requirements laid down in the Directive, in
particular to bear the risk of liability for damages, for example, by
obtaining appropriate insurance.
Requirement 9: Record all relevant information concerning a qualified
certificate for an appropriate period of time, in particular for the
purpose of providing evidence of certification for the purposes of legal
proceedings. Such recording may be done electronically.
Requirement 10: Not store or copy signature-creation data of the person to
whom the certification-service-provider provided key management
services.
Requirement 11: Before entering into a contractual relationship with a
person seeking a certificate to support his electronic signature inform
that person by a durable means of communication of the precise terms
and conditions regarding the use of the certificate, including any
limitations on its use, the existence of a voluntary accreditation scheme
and procedures for complaints and dispute settlement. Such information,
which may be transmitted electronically, must be in writing and in
readily (in the directive written as redily) understandable language.
Relevant parts of this information must also be made available on
request to third-parties relying on the certificate.
Requirement 12: Use trustworthy systems to store certificates in a
verifiable form so that:
• only authorised persons can make entries and changes,
• information can be checkedfor authenticity,
• certificates are publicly available for retrieval in only those
cases for which the certificate-holder's consent has been
obtained, and
• any technical changes compromising these security
requirements are apparent to the operator.
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We use the DTI requirements to evaluate the criteria, and, moreover, to eliminate
unnecessary criteria. Table 4-2 will be used to link the criteria to their corresponding
requirements (in correspondence to their numbers, listing only the number that
indicates the requirement or criterion):
Requirements Corresponding criteria
1
2 25,26,31
3 39
4 19,20
5 35
6 37,41,42
7 3,27,28,29,33,40,43,
8 7
9 30
10 14,36
11 6,24
12
Table 4-2 Showing the Relation between Requirements and Criteria
On examining the above table, we found that most requirements are associated with
related criteria; and some of them with more than one. On the other hand, there are
some requirements not associated with any criteria, as happened with requirements 1
and 12. However, there is one thing we need to note: these 12 requirements were laid
down to guide CAs when issuing qualified certificates which means that the CA's
services will be considered as trusted services if it followed these requirements. In this
sense, these requirements could be used to evaluate an established CA. The main
point here is that the subject which will be evaluated is known to the evaluator, but in
our case we are evaluating the subject through the policy that manages the subject's
certificate where the subjects are unknown to us. This leads to two requirements
without related criteria and there are also necessary criteria that do not have
requirements. We are going to consider requirements 1 and 12 in our criteria. Thawte
is a well known company providing certification services and states in [9]
A digital signature is only as reliable as the CA is trustworthy in
performing itsfunctions
As Thawte declares this fact about known CAs, this requires us to define three
requirements to cover the following issues:
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1. The role of national law
2. Dispute resolution procedures
3. Audit service
To tackle these issues, we have defined the following requirements (continuing the
consecutive numbering already assigned to the above requirements):
Requirement 13: Consider national law as the superior law for any
agreement.
Requirement 14: Allow for arbitration as an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism.
Requirement 15: Perform frequent audits of a CA's performance for
compliance with the requirements of its CP, carried out by an external
auditor, and take action in the case of failure to comply with the CP.
Table 4-3 shows the new relationships. Criteria represented in Table 4-2, are
listed using their numbers in the "corresponding criteria" column, but for the
criteria that were not represented in table 4-2 we will refer to their section
number in the CP:
Requirements Corresponding criteria
1 1.3.1
12
13 8
14 9
15 10,11,13
Table 4- 3 Showing the New Relation between Requirements and Criteria
Table 4-3 shows that requirement 12 is still without a related criteria. Looking closely
at this requirement, we found that its obligations were covered by other requirements.
Requirement 12's obligations talk about:
• Authenticating all access to stored data: covered by requirement 7.
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• Authorization in disclosing any confidential information: covered by
requirement 10.
• Auditing suspicious activities: covered by requirement 6.
Finally, we have defined the criteria that we will use in our XML formalisation in
order to perform the comparison with the subject's CP to define the level of trust that
a relying party can place on a subject's CP. The comparison will be accomplished by
comparing the pre-defined values for the criteria with the value in the subject's CP.
We include 27 criteria in our XML formalisation, and these cover the following issues
when we perform the comparison process:
• Capability of a new certification service provider (subordinate CA).
• Quality of the revocation process and continuity after disaster.
• Validity Periods for Public and Private Keys.
• Authenticity procedures.
• Quality of personnel.
• Main security procedures.
• Operational security procedures.
• Financial responsibility.
• Archiving process and its keeping period.
• Privacy protection.
• Obligations and rights of subscriber.
• Subscriber's rights, obligations and liabilities.
• Acceptance of government law.
• Dispute reference.
• Auditing procedures.
The above issues will help us to come to a final decision on a subject's identity and
therefore will be able to answer the question about the level of trustworthiness that
can be concluded from its CP. In the next chapter we will place the criteria in the
formalisation and examine them further.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter is the core chapter where we carried out the process of formalising the
CP. The process ran in 3 stages, each is explained, tested and the reason for initiating
the next stage is given. The first phase of the formalisation was an exact
interpretation of the textual form of the EuroPKI CP. With five different CPs, the
formalisations in the second phase were non-identical which definitely did not assist
the comparison process. In the final phase, a manual comparison was carried out
between three different CPs, and this resulted in defining 27 criteria. Before we
started formalisation process, we defined a number of conventions on which to base
our formalisation so as to produce identical formalisations. In the final formalisation
stage, a filtering process was applied to the 43 criteria to remove unrelated criteria,
and to represent crucial information required for the comparison process. We added
essential requirements to cover the case of authentication of unknown certification
service providers.
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CHAPTERS
REPRESENTING THE CRITERIA IN THE XML FORMALISATION
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we first explain the semantics behind each of the defined criteria, and
then specify their XML representations. In addition, we define a numerical evaluation
system that will be used as a rating system for each subject criterion. Finally as an end
to the comparison process, we define the comparison results which fall into one of the
following cases: no overlap, absolute overlap, partial.
5.2 The Semantics behind the Criteria
The overall objective of the criteria is to provide an extra level of assurance about the
subject's certificate as well as the assurance of the CA that vouches for the identity of
the subject to whom it issues a certificate. On the other hand, to know the detailed
objectives of these criteria, we need to deal with each criterion separately and state
what we need from it in order to evaluate the subject's identity. In the following we
list all 27 criteria and explain their objectives. Because most of these criteria will be
applied to the issuer's CP of the subject certificate, we will call the issuer the issuer
CA.
5.2.1 Liability and Capability of the Subject (criterion 1)
In the case that the subject for whom we need to evaluate trustworthiness is a
subordinate CA, this criterion assists us in determining whether the issuer CA had
made sure that the subject is liable and capable as a certification provider. If this
criterion is covered by the issuer of the subject's certificate then this will be recorded
as a positive point in the evaluation of a subject's trustworthiness.
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5.2.2 Allowance For RA to Issue Certificate (criterion 2)
The X.509 Internet draft [58] states that the RA has a number of functions to perform,
. but none are to do with issuing certificates. This criterion investigates the issuer CA's
CP to check if it allows the RA to issue certificates, and if this is the case, the result
will be a negative contribution to the subject's trustworthiness.
5.2.3 Financial Cover (criterion 3)
A business that offers any sort of financial cover will make a consumer more
confident of its services. The Internet payment service "PayPal" offers financial
insurance, called "Buyer Protection", of up to £500 [59]. If an issuer CA's CP permits
financial responsibility for its certificates then the subject's certificate will also be
covered. This criterion shows this in the formalisation and thus helps develop a
positive image of the subject's trustworthiness.
5.2.4 National Law Enforcement (criterion 4)
A consumer will be more confident if national law covers any transactions. This has
been adopted by many businesses, for instance Visa Inc., the world leader in
electronic payments. It declares on its website that [60]:
The Rules will be governed by and construed under the laws of the State of
California, excluding only its conflict of law provisions. Each party to the
Visa site Rules hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts
within the State of California, and waives any jurisdictional, venue, or
inconvenient forum objections to such courts.
Criterion 4 examines whether or not national law covers any agreement; and if so, the
subject's trust rating will be affected positively.
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5.2.5 Dispute Reference (criterion 5)
Allowing for dispute referral or arbitration to settle any dispute arising between the
issuer CA and the subject indicates that the issuer CA is honest and is confident of its
service; accordingly, this shows that the issuer CA is trustworthy and its subjects.
inherit trustworthiness from it. The online marketplace, eBay, has affirmed this
concern in its website thus [61]:
If a dispute arises between you and eBay, our goal is to provide you with a
neutral and cost effective means of resolving the dispute quickly.
Accordingly, you and eBay agree that we will resolve any claim or
controversy at law or equity that arises out of this Agreement or our
services (a "Claim") in accordance with one of the subsections below or as
we and you otherwise agree in writing. Before resorting to these
alternatives, we strongly encourage you tofirst contact us directly to seek a
resolution by going to http://pages.ebay.com/helplnew/customer-
support.html. We will consider reasonable requests to resolve the dispute
through alternative dispute resolution procedures, such as mediation or
arbitration, as alternatives to litigation
Dispute reference will be represented in the formalisation by criterion S.
5.2.6 Service Assessment (criterion 6)
Service assessment of the issuer CA is to see whether or not it is in compliance with
what has been stated in the CP. This assessment is important for evaluating the
organization's performance and it highlights areas of opportunity for improving its
performance and complying with what is in the CP. This assessment is accomplished
by doing a "compliance audit". The criterion checks if the compliance audit is carried
out by an external auditor, and if so, this will suggest that the issuer CA is confident
of its performance and that it has the desire to adopt recommendations regarding its
performance. The subject whose identity we authenticate will gain positive reputation
and its trustworthiness will be increased.
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5.2.7 Frequency of Service Assessment (criterion 7)
If the issuer CA has outlined a periodical compliance audit, this will increase its
trustworthiness adding to what has already been said in criterion 6; and it will have
positive impact on the subject that we are authenticating. As an example, VeriSign
Inc. conducts compliance audits at least annually [55].
5.2.8 Action on Deficiency (criterion 8)
To show the seriousness of the issuer CA in applying the two previous criteria,
criterion 8 tests if there is any action taken as a result of irregularities in complying
with the CP. If the issuer CA's CP contains this request then this will show that the
issuer CA is keen to provide a quality service, and implies that its certificates are
qualified. Consequently, the subscribers or subjects who have their certificates issued
by such an issuer CA have gained trustworthy certificates which assists in making
their trustworthiness positive. For example, VeriSign Inc. proposes the following
action in the case of deficiencies [55]:
After receiving a report based on the Compliance Audit under CP § 2. 7.6,
the audited entity's Superior Entity shall contact the audited party to discuss
any exceptions or deficiencies shown by the Compliance Audit. VeriSign
shall also be entitled to discuss such exceptions or deficiencies with the
audited party. The audited entity and the Superior Entity shall, in good faith,
use commercially reasonable efforts to agree on a corrective action plan for
correcting the problems causing the exceptions or deficiencies and to
implement the plan. The audited entity's failure to develop such a corrective
action plan or implement it, or if the report reveals exceptions or
deficiencies that VeriSign and the audited entity's Superior Entity
reasonably believe pose an immediate threat to the security or integrity of
the VTN, (a) VeriSign and/or the Superior Entity shall determine whether
revocation and Compromise reporting are necessary under CP §§ 4.4.1.1,
4.4.15, (b) VeriSign and the Superior Entity shall be entitled to suspend
services to the audited entity, and (c) if necessary, VeriSign and the
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Superior Entity may terminate such services subject to CP § 4.9 and the
terms of the audited entity's contract with its Superior Entity
5.2.9 Confidentiality of Personal Information (criterion 9)
Data protection law requests that companies process subscribers' personal
information in a way that ensures privacy protection and that information mustnot be
released without the prior consent of the subscribers, except when required by law.
The UK Data Protection Act states this in the following paragraphs [62]:
Where a data controller cannot comply with the request without disclosing
information relating to another individual who can be identified from that
information, he is not obliged to comply with the request unless- (a) the
other individual has consented to the disclosure of the information to the
person making the request
When the issuer CA complies with its national data protection rules, subscriber
confidence will increase, as stated in [57]:
In order to increase user confidence in electronic communication and
electronic commerce, certification service-providers must observe data
protection legislation and individual privacy;
Criterion 9 examines this requirement from the issuer CA's CP and based on that its
trustworthiness will be evaluated.
5.2.10 Authentication of Organization Identity (criterion 10)
This criterion requests that the issuer CA authenticate the identity of an organization
based on its publicity and popularity in the community where its issuer CA is located
(evaluation of public reputation). One of the principles in "Principles of Client
Identification and Beneficial Ownership for the Securities Industry" is called "Know
Your Client (KYC) and requests Securities Service Providers (SSPs) to obtain
information about their clients, such as their circumstances and investment objectives,
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in order to know them and to develop a profile of the client. The accumulated results
for this process determine the client's risk profile (trustworthiness) [63]. Therefore, if
the issuer CA has adopted this request, the authentication process for the subject (the
organization) will show this through this criterion. As a result the confidence of the
relying party will be increased and the organization's trustworthiness will be positive.
5.2.11 Authentication of Individual Identity (criterion 11)
In providing adequate proof of identification, criterion 11 requests that individuals
present themselves personally to the authenticating authority, or possibly using other
methods such as by videoconference [48] or a stamp from a licensed notary [64].
Appearing in person for the identification process will assist the authenticating
authority to:
1. Know the subscriber well.
2. Making sure that the subscriber is the original requester for the certificate.
3. Ask for more proof in order to boost confidence.
As a solution to preventing identity theft, iSecuritas Inc. (iSI), a leading Internet
security company, and Mail Boxes Etc. (MBE), the world's largest retail business,
communications and postal service franchisor, have asked individuals to appear in the
physical presence of official notaries public at MBE locations for proof of identity
[65]. The subject's trustworthiness will be increased if its issuer CA asks for this type
of identity authentication.
5.2.12 Informed Subject (criterion 12)
In the publication titled "Principles of Consumer Protection for Electronic
Commerce ", two out of eight principles relate to making consumers aware of their
rights and obligations [66]:
Principle 1: Consumers should be provided with clear and sufficient
information to make an informed choice about whether and how to make a
purchase.
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Principle 2: "Vendors" should take reasonable steps to ensure that the
consumer's agreement to contract isfully informed and intentional.
The subject is a consumer when requesting a certificate from an issuer CA. If subjects
know their rights and obligations, this will lead to smooth operation without
discontinuity, furthermore, it will make the issuer CA's CP more effective at
preventing any systemic deficiency. If the issuer CA's CP requests this action, the
criterion will show this, and the subject's trustworthiness will be increased positively.
5.2.13 CRL Update Interval Time (criterion 13)
Issuing a CRL immediately after any certificate revocation will grant real-time
certificate-status information and make the CRL mechanism more effective in
stopping an attacker who has compromised a private key [67]. This criterion examines
the interval time that is needed for an issuer CA to upload an updated CRL. With
prompt CRL update, the trustworthiness of the issuer CA is likely to be positive and
this will extend to cover the subject's trustworthiness.
5.2.14 Validity Period of a CRL (criterion 14)
Periodic publishing of CRLs contributes to the level of trust of the CA because it
assists a verifier in checking the validity of the subject's certificate with a valid CRL,
and to the reliability of the issuer CA's services. The CA issues a new CRL on a
regular periodic basis (e.g., hourly, daily, or weekly) [68], and the validity period of a
CRL is specified by the administrator of the CA [69]. An issuer CA who complies
with this request adds reliability to its certificates' subject which increases their
perceived trustworthiness.
5.2.15 Comprehensive Security Audit (criterion 15)
Security audit is a crucial tool for any organization because it enables the organization
to retain its assets. Applying security audit will assist in accomplishing the following
[70]:
• Investigating if there are any attacks from outside the organization.
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• Preventing threats from inside the organization.
• Identifying areas that need more attention
Workplace violence (insider attack) has held first place for the last five years in a
survey conducted by Pinkerton Inc. in 2003 [5]. Insider attackers will most likely
succeed in extracting critical information because they know their organization's
systems well [71]. The majority of these attackers are disgruntled employees [72]. By
complying with this request, the issuer CA will be accredited positively and increase
the relying party's confidence in its certificates' subject.
5.2.16 Security Audit Log Examination (criterion 16)
Through periodical review and analysis of audit logs, attacks will be discovered. As
we stated in the previous section, attacks frequently come from inside an organization,
and this type of attack is harder to discover; usually the only evidence for this type of
crime is through the examination of audit logs [73]. Therefore, the trust assurance of
the issuer CA will rise with compliance to this criterion, and consequently its
certificates' subject will be affected positively.
5.2.17 Vulnerability Assessment (criterion 17)
We have discussed finding threats in the previous criteria (15 and 16) but examining
the organization's systems for discovering vulnerabilities is considered a crucial
assessment which must be accomplished by any organization. Identifying threats and
vulnerabilities is a step toward making the organization's systems safer and more
secure [74]. Vulnerability assessment is used to identify weaknesses in systems and
assist the organization in correcting vulnerabilities so as not to leave vital
organizational data exposed to malicious attacks. This criterion examines the issuer
CA's CP to make sure this assessment is requested and if so, will increase its subject
certificate's trustworthiness.
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S.2.18 Archiving Procedure (criterion 18)
Criterion 18 asks that the archiving procedure include all events. An issuer CA who
complies with this request demonstrates its accountability; moreover, this issuer CA
will boost users' confidence and they will trust its certificates. Requirement 9
(Chapter 4) states the ultimate goal of archiving information which is for it to be used
as evidence in legal proceedings. Therefore, a complete archive of events may be
helpful in such a case.
S.2.19 Disaster Recovery Plan (criterion 19)
Resumption of operations quickly after a disaster will be based on a plan developed
earlier, and if such a plan exists, demonstrates the reliability of the issuer CA.
Preparation for disaster is not fully addressed by many companies: a survey of
Fortune 1000 companies regarding disaster preparation shows that 22 percent did not
meet the requirements for business continuity [6].
S.2.20 Trusted Roles (criterion 20)
To prevent any malicious behaviour, criterion 20 supports the assignment of separate
duties for performing CA functions, known as trusted roles. Each person is assigned a
specific task based on its functions such as day-to-day operation, administration of the
CA, and management and audit of these tasks [54]. The basis of trust in the entire
PKI comes from the fact that the functions performed are trusted; therefore, there
should be a careful process when selecting who should get these roles. [75] states the
process for selecting personnel who will serve in trusted roles:
Issuing CAs will conduct an appropriate investigation of all personnel who
serve in Trusted Roles (prior to their employment and periodically
thereafter as necessary), to verify their trustworthiness and competence in
accordance with the requirements of this Policy and the Issuing CA's
personnel practices or equivalent. All personnel who fail an initial or
periodic investigation will not serve or continue to serve in a Trusted Role.
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5.2.21 Personnel Controls (criterion 21)
An organisation has to identify staff that will accomplish the entire procurement
process and watch the subsequent steps to satisfy the need for continuity of its
business and possible future procurement processes [20]. The most critical staff
positions are the personnel who perform duties as CA or RA and they must be under
control and should be assigned in writing or be bound by contract. Moreover, they
must adhere to the terms and conditions of the position they are to fill [54]. When
relying parties know how the issuer CA is managed, and knows what type of security
controls that audit personnel functions, this will assist them to know the level of trust
that they can place on the certificates issued by this issuer CA [20].
5.2.22 Subject Keys (criterion 22)
Criterion 22 does not allow an issuer CA to generate a subject's cryptographic
keys so as to prevent the private key being compromised [76]. The private key
should only be known to the key holder; therefore, this criterion requests that
subjects generate their own key pairs.
5.2.23 Private Key Length (criterion 23)
Strong encryption is achieved with larger encryption keys; therefore, this
criterion requires that any encryption key be at least 1024 bits; this key length
has been specified as the minimum length for CAs [76].
5.2.24 Keys validity period (criterion 24)
Private and public keys for both CAs and subjects have to be renewed
periodically because using keys for long periods makes them more susceptible
to compromise and loss [77]. Therefore, the CP should set a defined period of
validity for private and public keys.
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5.2.25 CA Machine Security (criterion 25)
This criterion asks for strong security protection to be adopted to protect the CA
system. Such protection includes:
• Not connecting CA systems to any data network.
• Prohibiting unauthorized access to CA systems.
These protections assist in guaranteeing the continuity of CA operations and in
protecting the CA's private key which is the heart of CA trust. Comprise of this key
results in loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability [78].
5.2.26 Maintaining Hardware and Software Integrity (criterion 26)
Checking the operation of hardware and software helps in discovering any deficiency
and violation of security procedures; therefore, discovering these problems and fixing
them increases the integrity of operation of the hardware and software; moreover, it is
important for securing the systems [79].
5.2.27 Network Security (criterion 27)
A CP should define procedures for securing networks such as installation of devices
to prevent network attacks, tampering, unauthorized access, and denial-of-service
attacks.
5.3 Representing the Criteria in the Formalisation
We have defined the criteria and their meaning, and as we stated, we will use these
criteria in the XML formalisation in order to perform comparisons with a subject's CP
to define the level of trust that a relying party can place on the CP. This comparison
will be accomplished by comparing the pre-defined value for the criteria with the
subject's CP value. In this section we will mainly consider the process of representing
the criteria in the XML formalisation and defining their values. Each criterion will be
listed separately and its syntax in the representation will be developed.
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5.3.1 Testing Liability and Capability of the Subject
The XML representation will present criterion 1 depending on the following
.. parameters:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Making sure that subject is able to manage the
subordinate CA.
• Constraint: In compliance with agreed CP.
The XML representation for criterion 1 in the terms of the specified parameters is
given in the following:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<checking>
. <capability of.="-subjecttl toManage=tlsubordinate CA">
<requirement>
<withCompliancewith="agreed CP"/>
<zrequirement> '.
</capability> .
<zchecking>
</requirement>,
</CertificationAuthori >
5.3.2 Prohibiting RA from Issuing Certificates
We have the following parameters that need to be presented 10 the XML
formalisation:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Prohibiting RA from issuing certificates.
The following is the XML representation for criterion 2:
<RegistrationAuthority>
<prohibition> '
<issue>
<certificates to="subject"1>
</issue>
<zprohibition>
<IRe istrationAuthori >
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5.3.3 Providing Financial Insurance
In criterion 3, we deal with the financial responsibility for any error, omission or
inaccuracy whilst offering any PKI services. PKI services are offered by different
participants, such as the CA, RA or subscriber. Under the section "Indemnification by
Subscribers" in [80], issues that required financial responsibility have been listed:
• Falsehood or misrepresentation of fact by the Subscriber on the
Subscriber's Certificate Application,
• Failure by the Subscriber to disclose a material fact on the
Certificate Application, if the misrepresentation or omission was
made negligently or with intent to deceive any party,
• The Subscriber's failure to protect the Subscriber's private key, to
use a Trustworthy System, or to otherwise take the precautions
necessary to prevent the compromise, loss, disclosure, modification,
or unauthorized use of the Subscriber's private key, or
• The Subscriber's use of a name (including without limitation within a
common name, domain name, or e-mail address) that infringes upon
the Intellectual Property Rights of a thirdparty.
We distinguish the following parameters to be encoded in XML:
• Responsible participant: Participant.
• Action to be accomplished: as stated in [42], the XML formalisation should
contain the following parameters,
1. Declaring that it maintains an amount of insurance coverage for its
liabilities to other participants.
2. Declaring that it has resources to support operations and pay
damages for potential liability.
The following lines illustrate our XML representation for the above:
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<participant>
<requirement>
<declare>
<financialResponsibility for="its liabilities" to="other participants"/>
<assets to=vsupport its operations and liabilities'">
</declare>
</requirement>
</ artici ant>
5.3.4 Enforcing National Law Superiority
A Certification Authority is responsible for making sure that its operation meets what
has been defined in the CP [81]; therefore, the certification Authority should ensure
that its national's law will govern any agreements. The parameters that describe
criterion 4 are:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Ensure that national law governs any
agreements.
• Constraint: Country law where CA is established; here we adopt the ISO
standard country code as given in ISO 3166-1 [82].
Criterion 4 syntax in XML formalisation will be represented as:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement> .
<ensure>
<law ofCountry="ISO country name" govemsAnyAgreemeht="true">
<requirement>
<samef'ountry wbere="CA" isEstablisbed="true"/>
</requirement> .
<flaw>
</ensure>
</requirement>
</CertificationAutbori >
5.3.5 Allowing For Arbitration in Cases of Dispute
Parameters for criterion 5 are:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Allow for arbitration to resolve disputes arising
out of the CA's CP.
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TIle XML representation of the above is:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<allow>
<arbitration to="resolve disputes arising out of its CP"!>
<fallow>
<!requirement>
<!CertificationAuthority>
5.3.6 Performing Compliance Audit
The parameters involved in criterion 6 are:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Performing compliance audit.
• Constraint: Compliance audit should be carried out by an external auditor.
And the XML syntax for the above parameters is:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<perform>
<process of="compliance Audit">
<requirement>
<carryOut by="extemal auditor"!>
</requirement>
</process>
<!perfonn>
<!requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
5.3.7 Performing Frequent Compliance Audit
Criterion 7 is a completion of criterion 6 and it sets a value for the number of times
compliance the audit process is to be repeated. We require that the audit compliance
process is performed at least annually whether there is a need or not; this requirement
was identified in [83]:
The audit committee should monitor and review the internal audit
activities. Where there is no internal audit function, the audit committee
should consider annually whether there is a need for an internal audit
function and make a recommendation to the board, and the reasons for
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the absence of such a function should be explained in the relevant
section of the annual report.
Criterion 7 XML representation:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<run>
<complianceAudit>
<requirement>
<annually atl.east=" 1"I>
</requirement>
</complianceAudit>
<Iron>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
5.3.8 Taking Action on Deficiency
Criterion 8 is the conclusion of the process that was started in criterion 6; we demand
that action be taken against any non-compliance with the policy; [48] states that one
of the reasons for the revocation of a subject's certificate is when the subject violates
its obligations. Therefore, the parameters for criterion 8 are:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Revoking the subject certificate.
• Constraint: Compliance audit showing that the subject operation does not
comply with the CP.
The following is the XML used to represent criterion 8:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<revoke>
<subjectCertificate to="certificate revocation list">
<requirement>
<subjectOperation complyWithCP="false"l>
</requirement>
. </subjectCertificate>
</revoke>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
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5.3.9 Prohibiting A CA from Ever Disclosing Any Subject
Confidential Information
To insure that criterion 9 is handled correctly, the following parameters need to be
considered in the XML representation:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: No disclosure of a subject's confidential
information.
• Constraint: Except with prior consent of the subject or when required by
law.
The following is the XML representation of the criterion 9:
<CertificationAuthority>
<prohibition>
<discloseTo>
<thirdParties any="confidential information" of=rsubject">
<requirement>
<except>
<whenRequestedByLaw>true</whenRequestedByLaw>
<whenConsentBySubject>true</whenConsentBySubject>
<zexcept>
</requirement>
</thirdParties>
</discloseTo>
</prohibition>
</CertificationAuthority>
5.3.10 Organization Authentication Should Include Organization's
Reputation
Parameters for criterion 10 are covered in the following:
• Responsible participant: Registration Authority .
• Action to be accomplished: An authenticating organization must include its
reputation.
The XML representation for the above parameters:
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<Registrationauthority>
<requirement>
<authenticate>
<organization include="its reputation"!>
<!authenticate>
</requirement>
<IRe istrationAuthorit >
5.3.11 Authenticating the Identity of an Individual in Person
We have to represent in XML the following parameters:
• Responsible participant: Registration Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: RA must authenticate an individual's identity in
person.
The syntax of criterion 11 in XML will be as follows:
<Registrationauthority>
<requirement>
<authenticate>
<individual basedOn="its physical presence"/>
<zauthenticate>
</requirement>
<IRe istrationAuthorit >
5.3.12 Informing the Subject of Rights and Obligations
We have the following parameters:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Ensure that subjects are aware of their rights
and obligations.
And here is the XML representation for criterion 12's parameters:
<Certificationauthority> .
<requirement>
<insure>
<subject isAwareOf-="its respective rights and obligations"/>
</insure>
<rrequirement>
</CertificationAuthorit >
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5.3.13 Updating the CRL Immediately on Certificate Revocation
We assign criterion 13's parameter the value of "within one hour"; which indicates
that we ask for an update of the CRL within one hour of every certificate revocation.
Immediate updating of the CRL will provide more assurance [84]. This value has
been selected in the DutchGrid CP [52]:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Updating CRL after every certificate revocation.
• Constraint: Interval time must be within one hour since revocation.
Criterion 13's XML representation is:
<CertificatiorrAuthority>
<requirement>
<update>
<CRL after="every certificate revocation">
<requirement>
<updatelnterval'I'ime withIn=" 1 hour"!>
</requirement>
</CRL>
<!update>
<zrequiremenr>
<lCertificationAuthority>
5.3.14 Issuing Frequent CRLs
Publishing complete base CRLs frequently would lead to high network traffic due to
the frequent downloading of the updated CRL by clients. On the other hand, if the
CRL is published after a long interval, this will affect the validity of the CRL as a
result of it containing out-of-date information. Using delta CRLs, produces a smaller
file, and solves these problems by showing revoked certificates until the next update
of the base CRL. Delta CRLs can be published at short intervals such as once an hour
(this is covered in criterion 13) [34]; and the base CRL can be published at long
intervals. In this criterion we define the value of the interval time for frequent base
CRL update; and we have assigned the value "30 days" for criterion 14. The
following are the parameters for this criterion:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
128
• Action to be accomplished: Updating CRL frequently.
• Constraint: Interval time must be equal to 30 days .
.. Criterion 14's XML representation is:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<publish>
<CRI>
<requirement>
<interval'I'ime withIn="JO days" />
<zrequirement>
<ICRI>
</publish>
<zrequirement>
</CertificationAuthori >
5.3.15 Performing Comprehensive Security Audit
With regards to the following documents:
• Security Requirements for Trustworthy Systems Managing Certificates for
Electronic Signatures - Part 1: System Security Requirements [85].
• Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate Policy and Certification
Practices Framework [42].
• DOE Grids Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement [86].
• VeriSign Certification Practice Statement [80].
• CESNET CA Certificate Practice Statement [87].
• Certificate Practice Statement for The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection [88].
• DutchGrid and NIKHEF - Medium-security X.509 Certification Authority -
Certification Policy and Practice Statement [52].
We have extracted a list of events that must be recorded during the security audit
process:
All boots of the PKI system.
All access attempts to PKI system.
All PKI system failures.
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CA key generation.
CA key storage.
CA key backup.
CA key archival.
CA key recovery.
CA key destruction.
CA and subject certificate generation requests.
CA and subject certificate renewal requests.
CA and subject certificate re-key requests.
CA and subject certificate revocation requests.
Issuance of certificates.
Other certificate requests made to the PKI system which include:
o Status change requests
o Status requests
o Responses
PKI and security system actions performed by CA personnel.
Identity verification procedures.
Therefore, the parameters of the criterion 15 are the following:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Doing comprehensive security audit.
The XML representation will be as the following:
<Certification.Authority>
<requirement>
<do>
<secuirty Audit>
<requirement>
<aJlBootsOfThePKIsystem>true</allBootsOfThePKlsystem>
<aJlAccessAttemptsToPKIsystem>true<lallAccessAttempts!oPKIsystem>
<allPKIsystemFailures>true</allPKIsystemFailures>
<CAkeyGeneration>true</CAkeyGeneration>
<CAkeyStorage>true</CAkeyStorage>
<CAkeyBackup>true</CAkeyBackup>
<CAkeyArchivaJ>true<ICAkey Archival>
<CAkeyRecovery>true<lCAkeyRecovery>
<CAkeyDestruction>true</CAkeyDestruction>
<CAandSubjectCertificate>
< enerationRe uests>true</ enerationRe uests>
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<renewaIRequests>true</renewaIRequests>
<re-keyRequests>true</re-keyRequests>
<revocationRequests>true</revocationRequests>
</CAandSubjectCertificate>
<issuanceOfCertificates>true</issuanceOfCertificates>
<certificateRequests>
<ofStatusChange>true</ofStatusChange>
<ofStatus>true</ ofS tatus>
<responses>true</responses>
<IcertificateRequests>
<PKlandSecuritySystemActions>
<performedByCApersonnel>true</performedByCApersonnel>
</PKlandSecuritySystemActions>
<identityVerificationProcedures>true</identityVerificationProcedures>
</requirement>
</secuirty Audit>
</do>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
5.3.16 Examining Audit Logs Frequently
System security audit should not be done only once but be a regular task because the
system changes every day and thus its security structures and requirements also
change [89]. We have assigned the value "at least weekly" for criterion 16; and the
parameters are:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Examine security audit logs.
• Constraint: Examination of audit logs should be performed at least weekly.
The XML representation for the above parameters is:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<examine>
<auditLogs>
<requirement>
<frequent atLeast="weekly"l>
</requirement>
</auditLogs>
</examine>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
5.3.17 Performing Vulnerability Assessment
Parameters which represent criterion 17 are:
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o Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
o Action to be accomplished: Perform vulnerability assessment.
And the XML syntax is:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<execute>
<process of="vulnerability assessments"!>
<!execute>
<!requirement>
<!CertificationAuthority>
5.3.18 Providing Extensive Archiving
With regard to the following CPs:
• National Computational Science Alliance Certificate Policy [90J.
• Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement [91].
• Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement CNRS/CNRS-
Projets/Datagrid-fr [92].
• Model Certificate Policy [93].
• Veri Sign Trust Network, Certificate Policies [55]
We get the following events that need to be archived:
Certificate request application
Documentation supporting certificate applications
All computer security audit data
Certificate revocation application
Certificate re-key application
Certificate renewal application data
Issued Certificates
Issued CRLs or certificate status records
All correspondence between the CA and subcontractors and subscribers.
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The archive that contains the above events needs to be retained for a certain time after
the expiration of the key material. We ask that data be retained for five years [94].
Thus, according to the above events, the following are the parameters:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Provide an extensive Archiving.
• Constraint: Archived data should be retained for at least five years.
The XML syntax for criterion 18 is:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<provide>
<archiving>
<requirement>
<certificateRequestApplication>true</certificateRequestApplication>
<documentationSupponingCertificateApplications>true</documentationSupportingCertificateApplications>
<allComputerSecurity AuditData>true</ allComputerSecuri tyAuditData>
<certificateRevocationApplication>true</certificateRevocationApplication>
<certificateRe~keyApplication>true</certificateRe-keyApplication>
<certificateRenewalApplication>true</certificateRenewalApplication>
<issuedCertificates>true</issuedCertificates>
<issuedCRLsORcertificateStatusRecords>true</issuedCRLsORcertificateStatusRecords>
<allcorrespondence>
<betweenTheCAandSubcontractors>true<lbetweenTheCAandSubcontractors>
<betweenTheCAandSubscribers>true<lbetweenTheCAandSubscribers>
</ allcorrespondence>
<retentionPeriod>
<atLeast InYears="5"/>
</retentionPeriod>
</requirement>
</archiving>
</provide>
</requirement>
</CertificationAutbority>
5.3.19 Establishing a Disaster Recovery Plan
The parameters that represent criterion 19 are:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Establish a disaster recovery plan for resuming
operations immediately after a disaster.
The following is its XML syntax:
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<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<establish>
<plan of="surviving after the disaster"/>
</establish>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
5.3.20 Supporting Trusted Roles
The trusted roles that we ask a CA to support are the same as the ones identified in
[85] which are:
• Security Officers
• Registration Officers
• System Administrators
• System Operators
• System Auditors
Therefore, parameters will present the above data as in the following:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Support at least the following trusted roles:
0 Security Officers
0 Registration Officers
0 System Administrators
0 System Operators
0 System Auditors
The XML representation is:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<support>
<trustedRoles>
<requirement>
<securityOfficers>true</securityOfficers>
<registrationOfficers>true</registrationOfficerS>
<syemAdministrators>true<lsyemAdministratorS>
<systemOperators>true<!systemOpemtors>
<systemAuditors>true</systemAuditorS>
</requirement>
<ltrustedRoles>
</support>
<lrequirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
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5.3.21 Personnel Controls
We use the following CPs to identify the controls that we ask to be applied:
• Certificate Policy for the State of Washington Public Key Infrastructure
[64].
• X.509 Certificate Policy for the U.S. Federal PKI Common Policy
Framework [95].
• Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate Policy and Certification
Practices Framework, RFC 3647 [42].
And in the following the parameters for criterion 21 :
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Ensure that all personnel performing duties
with respect to the operation of a CA or RA are controlled by:
o Checking personnel background:
o Qualifications
o Experience
o Government clearances
o Providing personnel with the requisite training
o Providing personnel with refresher training and updates
[] Sanctioning personnel for unauthorized actions
o Providing personnel with documentation relevant to their job
functions
These parameters will be represented in XML as:
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<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<assure>
<allPersonneIControlled>
<requirement>
<background Checked>
<qualifications>true</qualifications>
<experience>true<1 experience>
<govemmentClearances>true</governmentClearances>
</backgroundChecked>
<providingWthTaining>true</providingWthTaining>
<povidingWthRefresherTaining>true</povidingWthRefresherTaining>
<sanctioningForUnauthorizedActions>true</sanctioningForUnauthorizedActions>
<providingWithDocumentation>true</providingWithDocumentation>
</requirement>
<IallPersonnel Contro Iled>
</assure>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
5.3.22 Subject Generates Its Own Key Pairs
Parameters of criterion 22 are shown in the following:
• Responsible participant: Subject.
• Action to be accomplished: Generating its public and private key pair.
And the XML representation is:
<subject>
<requirement>
<generate>
<i tsKeys>true</itsKeys>
</generate>
</requirement>
<zsubject>
5.3.23 Minimum Length of the Private Key
Parameters that describe criterion 23 are:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Ensure that the minimum length of the private
key must not be less than 1024 bits.
The XML representation of the above parameters is:
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<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<make Sure>
<minimuml.ength Qf="private key" islnBits=" 1024"1>
</makeSure>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
5.3.24 Key Validity Periods
We will follow what has been defined in [76] which states that CA key usage periods
should not exceed twenty years and subject keys will last one year maximum. The
parameters that carry out these standards will be in the following:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Should not issue certificates to
o CA: with validity periods more than 20 years
o Subject: with validity periods more than 1 year
Criterion 24's syntax in XML will be:
<CertificationAuthority>
<prohibition>
<create>
<CAcertificate ValidityPeriods moreThaneIn Years="20" />
<subjectCertificate ValidityPeriods moreThanIn Year=" 1"I>
<Icreate>
</prohibition> .
</CertificationAuthority>
5.3.25 Protection of the CA Machine against Unauthorized Access
After we studied the following CPs:
• UK e-Science Certification Authority Certificate Policy and
Certification Practices Statement [96].
• VeriSign Trust Network, Certificate Policies [55].
• DOE Grids Certificate Policy And Certification Practice Statement [86].
We identified the following parameters for criterion 25:
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• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Secure CA machine by applying the following
actions:
o CA system separated from any network
o Unauthorized access to CA system prohibited
o Operating systems are maintained at a high level of security by
applying all recommended and applicable security patches
o Limiting access to CA system by reducing services to the bare
minimum
The XML representation of the above parameters is:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<secure>
<Camachine>
<requirement>
<disconnectFromNetwork>true</disconnectFromNetwork>
<prombitUnauthorizedAccess>true</prohibitUnauthorizedAccess>
<updatingOSwithSecurityPatches>true</updatingOSwithSecurityPatches>
<limitAccess>true</limitAccess>
</requirement>
<lCAmachine>
</secure>
</requirement>
<lCertificationAuthori >
5.3.26 Checking the Integrity of the Hardware and Software
The following CPs were used to identified the parameters:
• X.S09 Certificate Policy For The Federal Bridge Certification Authority
(FBCA) [97].
• VeriSign Trust Network, Certificate Policies [55].
• Certificate Policy, Digital Signature Medium Strength Soft Certificates [54].
We need to represent the following parameters in XML:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
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• Action to be accomplished: Examine the integrity of the hardware and
software by performing the following:
o Monitoring the CA system by documenting and controlling any:
o Configuration
o Modifications
o Upgrades
o Detecting unauthorized modification to the CA software or
configuration
o Checking the integrity of the CA software at least weekly
And the following is the XML representation:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<examining>
<integrityOfHardwareAndSoftwareBy>
<requirement>
<documentedAndControlledAny>
<configuration>true</ configuration> '
<modifications>true</modifications>
<upgrades>true</upgrades>
</documentedAndControUedAny>
<detecting UnauthorizedModification>true</ detecting UnauthorizedModification>
<checkingSoftwareIntegrity>
<atLeast inDays="7"/>
</cbeckingSoftwareIntegrity>
«requirement>
</integrityOfHardwareAndSoftwareBy>
</examining>
</requirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
5.3.27 Securing Networks
In the following documents, network security controls issues are discussed
highlighting controls to be used to secure a network:
• BT Certification Practice Statement [98]
• Certificate Practice Statement for The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection [88].
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• NIIF Certification Authority, Certification Practice Statement (CPS) [99].
• Implementing Network Security Controls for Intrusion Prevention [100].
These controls include the following:
• Installing firewalls.
• Protecting communications through the use of encryption and -digital
signatures.
• Placing Access Control Lists (ACLs) on all network devices.
Therefore, parameters that represent criterion 27 are:
• Responsible participant: Certification Authority.
• Action to be accomplished: Securing networks by using:
o Firewalls
o Encryption and digital signatures
o Access Control Lists (ACLs)
The XML syntax for above parameters is:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<securing>
<networks>
<requirement>
<firewalls>true</firewalls>
<encryptionAndDigitaISignatures>true</encryptionAndDigitalSignatures>
<ACLs>true</ ACLs>
</requirement>
</networks>
<zsecuring>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
5.4 Measurable Criteria
We suggest using a numerical evaluation system to make the final decision about the
suitability of a subject's CP with the defined criteria. We could base our decision
upon the defined criteria without using a numerical evaluation system, but we will end
up with a decision that shows the number of similar criteria and the number those that
are dissimilar. Using a numerical rating assists us to give a value showing the overall
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relevance of the compared criteria. First we need to develop a scoring system to be
used as quantitative weighting of the criteria.
5.4.1 Scoring System
Table 5-1 shows all criteria and their weighting. In the weighting column, there are
four sub-weighting columns. The "Obligation Title" assigns equivalent weight to the
subject obligation title if the subject's criterion has the same obligation title as the
criterion, such as "requirement". The "Action" column specifies the weight for the
action part of the criterion, and the "Constraint" column does the same for the
constraint part (see the examples later in this chapter).
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We use a simple additive module using weights that are assigned in Table 5-1 to
produce the final numeric result. The final numeric result equals the sum of the
criterion weights. The following equation illustrates this point:
ND=
27
L (1)CWi,
i=1
Where ND represents the Numeric Decision value, Cw is the criterion weight which is
the sum of the weights of "Obligation Title" "Action" and "Constraint" columns. The
value of i represents the number of the criteria.
To illustrate equation (1) consider the following example:
Criterion 7 deals with the issue of compliance audit and the following is its syntax:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<run>
<complianceAudit>
<requirement>
<annually atLeast=" 1"1>
</requirement>
</complianceAudit>
<Iron>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
And let us assume that the subject that we evaluate has its certificate is managed by
the following CP:
Citizen & Commerce Certificate Policy [101],
The subject CP states the following regarding the compliance audit procedure:
This policy requires successful compliance audit prior to applying for provisional
or approved status. The compliance auditor must be organizationally independent
from the owner of the CA and qualified to audit CA processes. To maintain
approved status, a CA must repeat the compliance audit process at least every three
years.
The XML representation for the above subject CP passage is:
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<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<run>
<complianceAudit>
<requirement>
<annuallyatLeast="O"/>
</requirement>
</complianceAudit>
</run>
<zrequirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
When we compare the two representations we find that the subject CP requires the
compliance audit to be repeated at least every three years but in criterion 7 this
process must be accomplished at least once every year. Therefore, according to Table
5-1 the weight for the subject criterion is 2 because it has not dealt with this issue
properly according to identified criterion. The subject criterion value will be added
with other criteria values to form the ND value.
The State of Illinois has specified that the frequency time for CRL updates is at least
24 hours [53], but in the relevant criterion (number 14) we assign the value of 30
days. The following is an XML representation of the State of Illinois' CP:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<publish>
<CRL>
<requirement>
<intervalTime withln="24 hours"/>
"
</requirement>
</CRL>
</publish>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
And this is criterion 14's XML representation:
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<publish>
<CRL>
<requirement>
<interval Time withln="30 days"/>
</requirement>
</CRL>
</publish>
</requirement>
<!CertificationAutbority>
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In this case, the weight that will be assigned for subject criterion is 3 because its
interval time for frequency update is smaller than the interval time of criterion 14; this
means that recently updated CRLs are available to the relying party. Although the
smaller interval time causes more network traffic as we stated above, here we just
compare the two values and their results.
5.5 Comparison Result
After assigning all the subject criteria weights, we can use equation 1 to get the value
of the ND. This value is used to measure the trustworthiness of the target based upon
what has been defined in the criteria. We have to bear in mind that "trusts" can only
be interpreted in the context of the particular task or service which the relying party is
expecting the subject to provide. In that sense, the result of the comparison will
depend upon a part of each policy only. Taking account of this, we may consider the
value ofND as yielding one of three situations:
1. No overlap.
2. Absolute overlap.
3. Partial overlap.
5.5.1 No Overlap
In this case the value of ND is 0 and this means that the subject's CP and the
identified criteria are disjoint. This leads us to conclude that no trust path exists. This
situation is shown by the Figure 5-1:
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Figure 5-1 No Overlap Case
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5.5.2 Absolute Overlap
The relevant sections of the criteria and the subject's CP impose the same constraints
on the certificates within the two domains. Thus, every obligation, prohibition, etc. in
criteria is matched by a corresponding obligation, prohibition in the subject's CP,
therefore, the value of the ND is 120 (the result of adding the weights in the columns:
"Obligation Title", "Action" and "Constraint"). In this case, the relying party should
trust certificates in the subject domain. This is represented in Figure 5-2, where
criteria are represented by the solid line and subject by the dashed line:
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Figure 5-2 Absolute Overlap Case
5.5.3 Partial Overlap
Partial overlap means that the criteria and subject's CP have an intersection between
them. Figure 5-3 shows this case:
Subject CP
Figure 5-3 Partial Overlap Case
Here the subject's CP intersects with the criteria, indicating that the two policies have
some aspects in common, but each has constraints which do not apply to the other
policy. The subject's criteria have not covered all aspects adequately which cause the
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value of ND to be less than 120; therefore, relying parties can trust certain activities
but not others.
5.6 Acceptable Case
The cases above are decisions about the compatibility of a subject's CP with the
criteria. The case that complies with the requirement of compatibility: absolute
overlap. As we are trying to authenticate a certificate issued by an unknown CA, we
accept only the absolute overlap case to be the authenticator for the subject's
certificate. Our decision is based on all the criteria being covered by the subject's CP
for the following reasons:
1. The criteria were developed by assessing several certification authorities' CPs,
and the assessment process considered the making of a good balance between
technical and legal requirements.
2. The assessment process extracted the criteria from the participating CPs as
they have a significant role in defining the obligations.
3. The DTI requirements for issuing qualified certificates were applied to the
candidate criteria on completion of the assessment process which produced the
27 criteria.
Based on these reasons, the 27 criteria are crucial for stating the trustworthiness of a
subject's certificate and therefore the absolute overlap case is the only acceptable
cases.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we worked further to shape the criteria we developed in the previous
chapter. First, we stressed the importance of these in making a decision about a
subject's trustworthiness by presenting the semantic of these criteria. As we had
defined the overall objectives of the criteria, this process showed the underlying
objectives of each criterion. Then, we described the XML representation of each
criterion with the defined values which will assist us in doing the comparison. Finally,
we presented our system for weighting each criterion according to the results of the
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comparison process and introduced the four cases that describe the trustworthiness of
a subject and defined the acceptable cases.
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CHAPTER6
COMPARISON OF CRITERIA WITH REQUIREMENTS
6.1 Introduction
The criteria worked out in Chapter 5 must be examined, in order to determine if they
are in conformity with requirements imposed by the international community. An
example of such a requirement is the Commission of the United Nations' law of
international trade (UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures). In this
chapter, we examine the criteria, demonstrating how they handle the articles identified
by this law.
6.2 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures[102], hereafter referred to as
UNCITRAL law, was created by the United Nations to further the progressive
harmonization and the unification of international trade law and in this respect
considers the interests of everyone, in particular those in developing countries so as to
guarantee extensive development of international trade. In addition, it aims to ensure
legal security in the context of the broadest possible use of automated data processing
in international trade [102].
By using the UNCITRAL law to examine the criteria we have developed, we aim to
see the convergence of the criteria and the degree of their effectiveness with respect to
what it has been defined in the UNCITRAL law. The UNCITRAL law contains 12
articles:
Article 1. Sphere of application
Article 2. Definitions
Article 3. Equal treatment of signature technologies
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Article 4. Interpretation
Article 5. Variation by agreement
Article 6. Compliance with a requirement for a signature
Article 7. Satisfaction of article 6
Article 8. Conduct of the signatory
Article 9. Conduct of the certification service provider
Article 10. Trustworthiness
Article 11. Conduct of the relying party
Article 12. Recognition of foreign certificates and electronic signatures
All UNCITRAL's articles are listed in Appendix C.
It is important to mention the following points:
1. Digital signature has as one of its functions validation of the identity of a
user [103], which is the same as the scope of our criteria; therefore, we use
the UNCITRAL law to examine the criteria. Moreover, UNCITRAL law in
Article 2 states the function of digital signature as follows:
"Electronic signature" means data in electronic form in, affixed to or
logically associated with, a data message, which may be used to identify
the signatory in relation to the data message and to indicate the
signatory's approval of the information contained in the data message;
2. Some of the articles could not be used to test the criteria because they
are articles which provide an interpretation and a description of the
UNCITRAL law. The articles that will be used for examining our
criteria are:
Article 6. Compliance with a requirement for a signature
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Article 8. Conduct of the signatory
Article 9. Conduct of the certification service provider
Article 10. Trustworthiness
3. There are a number of paragraphs or factors in the articles that are
either considered as fundamental functions or are out of the scope of
the criteria. In this case we will define their relation to the criteria or
their pre-implementation in the CP.
4. There are a number of criteria applicable to more than one article; we
will relate the criteria to the most relevant article.
6.2.1 Article 6. Compliance with a Requirement for a Signature
1. Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met
in relation to a data message if an electronic signature is used that is as
reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data message
was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances,
including any relevant agreement.
Paragraph 1 specifies the condition under which a digital signature has the same
legitimacy as a handwritten signature which leads us to consider whether a digital
signature is as reliable as a handwritten signature. This case is a special rule applied
only in the case of digital signature; it is not applicable in the case of certificates; so is
out of the scope of our criteria.
2. Paragraph 1applies whether the requirement referred to therein is in
the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides
consequences for the absence of a signature.
Paragraph 2 applies only in the case of a digital signature, and therefore it is irrelevant
to the criteria's scope.
3. An electronic signature is considered to be reliable for the purpose of
satisfying the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 if: (a) The
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signature creation data are, within the context in which they are used,
linked to the signatory and to no other person;
Paragraph 1 (a) is relevant when a subject requests a certificate, the RA validates
documents presented by subject and makes sure that they belong to the subject. The
paragraph refers to a fundamental task that is an early stage of the certificate issuing
process, thus paragraph 1 (a) is not covered by our criteria.
(b) The signature creation data were, at the time of signing, under the
control of the signatory and of no other person;
What has been said about factor (a) is also true for this.
(c) Any alteration to the electronic signature, made after the time of signing,
is detectable; and
In the case of the certificate, the CA public key and the CP assists in detecting any
alteration, in other words, they work as a validator for the certificate. This technique
is considered an essential function of PKI, and the criteria therefore do not cover this
factor.
(d) Where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide
assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any
alteration made to that information after the time of signing is detectable.
A certificate validates a subject's identity, and in the case where there is any
suspicious behaviour the owner of the certificate will easily discover it and revoke the
certificate [104]. Our criteria concern the repository of the revoked certificates, CRL,
and defined the interval time that is needed for an updated CRL and the validity
period of the CRL.
4. Paragraph 3 does not limit the ability of any person: (a) To establish in any
other way, for the purpose of satisfying the requirement referred to in
paragraph 1, the reliability of an electronic signature; or
Increasing reliability of the certificate is the main goal of a CA and this is achieved
through compliance with the CP. There is no requirement on a CA to define or use
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anything that leads to an increase in the reliability of a certificate [105]. Our criteria
in total examine a number of issues that are defined in the subject CP which yield an
evaluation of the reliability of the subject certificate.
(b) To adduce evidence of the non-reliability of an electronic signature.
This mechanism is guaranteed by the CP and allows for revocation or suspension of a
certificate if there is any doubt regarding its validity.
6.2.2 Article 8. Conduct of the Signatory
1. Where signature creation data can be used to create a signature that has
legal effect, each signatory shall: (a) Exercise reasonable care to avoid
unauthorized use of its signature creation data;
Two criteria examine the subject CP practices for avoiding unauthorized use.
Criterion 9 obliges a CA not to disclose subject certificate-related data to any third
party, and criterion 22 requests a subject to generate its own key pair to avoid key
compromise and unauthorized use.
(b) Without undue delay, utilize means made available by the certification
service provider pursuant to article 9 of this Law, or otherwise use
reasonable efforts, to notify any person that may reasonably be expected by
the signatory to rely on or to provide services in support of the electronic
signature if: (i) The signatory knows that the signature creation data have
been compromised; or
Factor (b) is considered one of the core functions of PKI [106], and it is an obligation
on a subject to notify the CA immediately there is any compromise. The CA provides
more information about carrying out this function in the CP in the section "Certificate
Suspension and Revocation". If the CA's private key is compromised or suspected of
being compromised, the CA shall inform subjects and relying parties, and terminate
the certificates and produce a CRL.
(ii) The circumstances known to the signatory give rise to a substantial risk
that the signature creation data may have been compromised;
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The CP contains different security practices that help discover any violation in using
certificates and that will result in revocation or suspension of the violated certificate.
(c) Where a certificate is used to support the electronic signature, exercise
reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and completeness of all material
representations made by the signatory that are relevant to the certificate
throughout its life cycle or that are to be included in the certificate.
Certificates are issued by the CA after it validates the subject data, and this remains
true through the lifecycle of the certificate. In other words, if the data related to the
certificate becomes inaccurate, the CA immediately suspends the subject certificate.
2. A signatory shall bear the legal consequences of its failure to satisfy the
requirements of paragraph 1.
In the case of a certificate, this request is satisfied when the subject accepts the
provisions of the contract before the issue of the certificate [107]; criterion 12 request
that subjects should be fully informed of their rights and obligations.
6.2.3 Article 9. Conduct of the Certification Service Provider
1. Where a certification service provider provides services to support an
electronic signature that may be usedfor legal effect as a signature, that
certification service provider shall: (a) Act in accordance with
representations made by it with respect to its policies and practices;
Criterion 6 shows if the CA is in compliance with what has been stated in the CP
through performing an assessment called a "compliance audit".
(b) Exercise reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and completeness of all
material representations made by it that are relevant to the certificate
throughout its life cycle or that are included in the certificate;
Our criteria meet the contents of paragraph 1 (b) with a number of criteria that
examine the CA's policies and practices which it operates throughout the life cycle of
its certificates to ensure accuracy and reliability. These criteria are:
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• Criterion 1 checks the liability and capability of the future CA, known as a
subordinate CA, in performing all the controls and checks detailed in the
CP.
• Criterion 2 restricts the issuing of the certificate only to the CA and
prohibits an RA from doing this.
• Criterion 15 requests a comprehensive security audit.
• Criterion 16 asks for periodical review and analysis of audit logs.
• Criterion 17 requires vulnerability assessment.
• Criterion 19 asks for a disaster recovery plan.
• Criterion 22 restricts the issuing of subject keys to the subject.
• Criterion 23 defines a minimum length for the subject's private key.
• Criterion 24 specifies the validity period for private and public keys.
• Criterion 25 sets rules for protecting the CA system.
• Criterion 27 defines procedures for securing networks.
(c) Provide reasonably accessible means that enable a relying party to
ascertain from the certificate: (i) The identity of the certification service
provider;
The identity of the CA is readily determined from the certificates that it issues and
from its CP.
(ii) That the signatory that is identified in the certificate had control of the
signature creation data at the time when the certificate was issued;
Basically, a certificate will not be issued if the RA came across any deficiency related
to the subject data.
(iii) That signature creation data were valid at or before the time when the
certificate was issued;
The previous sub-paragraph clarification is also applicable here.
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(d) Provide reasonably accessible means that enable a relying party to
ascertain, where relevant, from the certificate or otherwise: (i) The method
used to identify the signatory;
This request is specified in the CA's CP, and our criteria accept two identification
methods. First to identify the organization, is covered by criterion 10 and the second
specifies the identification method for the individual subject and is covered in
criterion 11.
(ii) Any limitation on the purpose or value for which the signature creation
data or the certificate may be used;
Any limitation on the use of the subject certificate is easily worked out from the
certificate. The criteria will apply if the certificate is not restricted to purposes which
the CA has specified.
(iii) That the signature creation data are valid and have not been
compromised;
The RA function is one of the trusted roles, and it checks the subject's data to make
sure of its validity before a CA issues the subject's certificate.
(iv) Any limitation on the scope or extent of liability stipulated by the
certification service provider;
The CA's CP declares explicitly any limitation or the extent of the CA's liability.
(v) Whether means exist for the signatory to give notice pursuant to article
8, paragraph 1(b), of this Law;
As we stated in paragraph 6.2.2 1 (b) above, this mechanism is essential to prevent
malicious attacks; thus all CPs explain in details how a subject carries this out.
(vi) Whether a timely revocation service is offered;
A timely revocation service is offered by the PKI, and it is easy to check if this
mechanism is offered by a CA by looking at its CP.
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(e) Where services under subparagraph (d) (v) are offered, provide a means
for a signatory to give notice pursuant to article 8, paragraph 1 (b), of this
Law and, where services under subparagraph (d) (vi) are offered, ensure the
availability of a timely revocation service;
Our criteria examine the availability of a timely revocation service using two aspects
of the CRL. The first is the interval time needed for a CA to revoke a certificate and
upload an updated version of the CRL (Criterion 13). Second, criterion 14 examines
the validity period of the CRL.
(/) Utilize trustworthy systems, procedures and human resources in
performing its services.
The most important part of a CA is the personnel who perform the duties of CA or
RA. Our criteria ensure the trustworthiness of a CA's personnel by examining two
constraints; first, if the subject CP provides a separation of duties for critical CA
functions known as "trusted roles"; this constraint is covered by criterion 20. Second,
to check if personnel controls are adopted in the subject's CP and this constraint is
met by criterion 21.
2. A certification service provider shall bear the legal consequences of its
failure to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1.
Criterion 4 considers National law as covering any agreement, and this means if the
CA's CP does not cover this requirement, our criteria guarantee that National law
complies at least with paragraph 2.
6.2.4 Article 10. Trustworthiness
For the purposes of article 9, paragraph 1 (f), of this Law in determining
whether, or to what extent, any systems, procedures and human resources
utilized by a certification service provider are trustworthy, regard may be
had to the following factors: (a) Financial and human resources, including
existence of assets;
The criteria meet this requirement through 3 which requests financial cover.
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(b) Quality of hardware and software systems;
This requirement is satisfied by criterion 26 with the aim of maintaining hardware and
software integrity.
(c) Procedures for processing of certificates and applications for certificates
and retention of records;
Procedures relating to certificates are fully described in the CA's CP, and these
procedures are tested and audited by the CA to grantee their integrity. Our criteria are
concerned with evidence in the case of legal disputes i.e. data archiving. Criterion 18
deals with this requirement.
(d) Availability of information to signatories identified in certificates and to
potential relying parties;
Information that addresses issues related to certificates is available to subjects and
relying parties; this is outlined in the CP under the section titled "Publication and
Repository" .
(e) Regularity and extent of audit by an independent body;
Criterion 7 defines the frequency of compliance audit carried out by an external body,
and this constraint is specified in criterion 6 which is covered under article 9,
paragraph 1 (a).
(f) The existence of a declaration by the State, an accreditation body or the
certification service provider regarding compliance with or existence of the
foregoing; or
The result of the compliance test conducted by an external body will be declared
according to the CP section titled "Communication of results". Our criteria require
that when there are irregularities in complying with the CP an action should be taken:
criterion 8.
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We have used the UNCITRAL law to examine the developed criteria and to
summarize this assessment, table 6-1 shows the correspondence between the
developed criteria and the UNCITRAL law articles:
Developed criteria UNCITRAL law articles
Criterion 1 Article 9, paragraph 1 (b)
Criterion 2 Article 9, paragraph 1 (b)
Criterion 3 Article 10 (a)
Criterion 4 Article 9, paragraph 2
Criterion 5
Criterion 6 Article 9, paragraph 1
Criterion 7 Article 10 (e)
Criterion 8 Article 10 (t)
Criterion 9 Article 8, paragraph 1
Criterion 10 Article 9, paragraph 1 (d)
Criterion 11 Article 9, paragraph 1 (d)
Criterion 12 Article 8, paragraph 2
Criterion 13 Article 9, paragraph 1 (e)
Criterion 14 Article 9, paragraph 1 (e)
Criterion 15 Article 9, paragraph 1 (b)
Criterion 16 Article 9, paragraph 1 (b)
Criterion 17 Article 9, paragraph 1 (b)
Criterion 18 Article 10 (c)
Criterion 19 Article 9, paragraph 1 (b)
Criterion 20 Article 9, paragraph 1 (t)
Criterion 21 Article 9, paragraph 1 (f)
Criterion 22 Article 8, paragraph 1
Criterion 23 Article 9, paragraph 1 (b)
Criterion 24 Article 9, paragraph 1 (b)
Criterion 25 Article 9, paragraph 1 (b)
Criterion 26 Article 10 (b)
Criterion 27 Article 9, paragraph 1 (b)
Table 6-1 Correspondence between tbe Developed Criteria and tbe UNCITRAL Law Articles
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Table 6-1 shows that criterion 5 does not link to any of the UNCITRAL law articles,
and criterion 5 requires that there should be a dispute referee or arbitrator if there is
any dispute arising between a CA and a subject. This requirement integrates with the
role and mission of the United Nations because one of the purposes of the United
Nations is to play the role of arbitrator in solving international economic, social,
cultural and humanitarian problems [108].
6.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined the criteria we developed to show, first, their extent
in complying with requirements stated in international law and second, to measure
their degree of effectiveness when comparing practices embedded in international
law. As an example international law, we used the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) which defines a legal framework for using
electronic signatures. We conclude that the criteria have been defined adequately
based on the fact that they handled all the relevant UNCITRAL law articles, and this
implies that they have a basis in the law of international trade which can be
considered as strong supportive evidence for the accuracy of the decisions made using
the criteria when used for comparison. This also implies that the semantic analysis has
led us to define adequate criteria for estimating a subject's trustworthiness.
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CHAPTER7
CASE STUDY
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter a case study is used to illustrate that the criteria adequately fulfill our
requirements and cover a real CA's CP. We are sure that the criteria will survive this
testing; this feeling comes from the realisation that the criteria were extracted from
CPs adopted by organizations well recognized in their communities. In addition, these
criteria have shown their compliance with the UNCITRAL law articles that regulate
the use of digital signatures amongst the 192 members of the United Nations [109]
which almost makes it an international law.
For the case study, we consider a scenario wherein Alice receives a certificate from
Bob signed by the private key of GlobalSign CA. Alice does not know or trust Bob's
certificate issuer; therefore, Alice uses the criteria to determine if Bob's certificate is
trustworthy or not. The case study will illustrate the authentication process step by
step by comparing the criteria with the GlobalSign CP. At the end of this process the
level trustworthiness of the GlobalSign CP will be decided upon to assist in accepting
or rejecting the subject's certificate. This chapter will help in explaining the
techniques introduced in Chapter 5: the XML representation and the numerical
evaluation system. First, we start with criteria formalisation.
7.2 Criteria Formalisation
In Chapter 5 we introduced the formalisation for each criterion, but in order to use
them to perform the comparison process we need to unite them in single XML file.
Appendix D shows the complete formalisation of the developed criteria.
Under the section "Applying the formalisation process" in Chapter 4, we mentioned
that our target of using XML schema was to build a framework and the idea behind
that is shown in figure 4-1. We have accomplished this aim and have built the schema
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upon the developed criteria. For reasons of size (2035 lines), we have included the
schema "criteria-schema.xsd" on the attached CD. The schema developed has the
ability to handle the following functions:
• Validating the XML representation of the developed criteria or the subject CP.
• Easing the creation of the XML representation of the subject CP.
• Handling choices available for performing any of the acts.
For the purpose of the comparison process we need to add a new obligation title to the
previous ones already defined in Chapter 4 which is "notDefined". This new
obligation title will be the value of the subject CP when the subject CP does not cover
what has been requested in the corresponding criterion.
The result of applying the developed criteria to a real case is described in the
following section.
7.3 GlobalSign Certification Authority CP
GlobalSign Certification Authority (hereinafter, GlobalSign CA) issues top level
certificates, which are also known as root or anchor certificates (OmniRoot), to third
party CAs that seek to enter GlobalSign's certificate hierarchy. The GlobalSign CP
can be found on its CA repository at https:llwww.globalsign.netlrepository. The
company is located in Belgium [110] .
7.4 Authenticating the GlobalSign CP
In this section we use the following steps to authenticate the GlobalSign CP based on
the developed criteria:
1. First, we quote passages from the GlobalSign CP which deal with the issues
that have been dealt with by corresponding criterion.
2. We discuss to what extent the quoted passages of the GlobalSign CP meet
what is articulated in the corresponding criterion.
3. We show the XML representation of the quoted passages.
4. Finally, we state the weight for the quoted passages.
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7.4.1 Compliance with Criterion 1
Passage:
Subscribers of GlobalSign Omniroot are third party CAs that seek to be
issued with certificates within a hierarchy managed by GlobalSign..
Subscribers of GlobalSign services are also natural or legal persons that
successfully apply for a CA certificates.
Legal persons must be duly represented by an authorised agent (e.g. an
authorised Director).
Subscribers legal persons which are natural persons, are conditionally
accepted as subscribers for CA chaining services. The relationship of these
persons with the CA to be chained to has to be duly explained and
justification must beprovided to GlobalSign.
Justification:
The quoted passages do not meet what has been stated in criterion 1 exactly, but there
is indirect assurance which can be inferred from the above passages, thus:
1. The certified subject is a third party CA which means that it is reliable
enough to manage CA tasks and has gained the required knowledge of
adhering to the GlobalSign CP.
2. Constraints applied when non-authorised agents are to be certified.
Taking the implicit meaning of the quoted passages with the absence of explicit
declaration of what should satisfy criterion 1, we classify the above as <possible>.
The reason behind this is because the above justification could be satisfied by one
subscriber but not by others.
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XML representation:
<Criterionl>
<CertificationAuthority>
<possible>
<checking>
<capability of.="subject" toManage="subordinate CA">
<requirement>
<withCompliance with="agreed CP"/>
</requirement>
</capability>
</checking>
</possible>
</CertificationAuthority>
</Criterion'1 >
Weight:
According to table 5-1, we assign the following weights for the quoted passages:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
0 1 1 2
7.4.2 Compliance with Criterion 2
Passage:
The definition section, Registration Authority reads:
An entity that has the responsibility to identify and authenticate subscribers.
The RA does not issue certificates. It merely requests the issuance of a
certificate on behalf of applicants whose identity it has verified.
Justification:
The quoted passage complies exactly with criterion 2.
XML representation:
<criterion2>
<RegistrationAuthority>
<prohibition>
<issue>
<certificates to=" subject" />
<lissue>
</prohibition>
</RegistrationAuthority>
</criterion2> .
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Weight:
According to table 5-1, the weight for the quoted passage:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 0 2
7.4.3 Compliance with Criterion 3
Passage:
GlobalSign maintains sufficient resources to meet its perceived obligations
under this CPo
Justification:
The quoted passage complies exactly with criterion 3.
XML representation:
<criterion3>
<participant>
<requirement>
<declare>
<financialkesponsibility for=tits liabilities" to=vother participants"l>
<assets to=Psupport its operations and liabilities'">
</declare>
</requirement>
</participant>
</criterion3>
Weight:
Due to the similarity, the weight for the quoted passage is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 2 0 3
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7.4.4 Compliance with Criterion 4
Passage:
This CP is governed, construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws
of Belgium.
The laws of Belgium apply also to all GlobalSign commercial or contractual
relationships in which this CP may apply or quoted implicitly or explicitly in
relation to GlobalSign products and services where the GlobalSign acts as a
provider, supplier, beneficiary receiver or otherwise.
Justification:
The quoted passages comply exactly with criterion 4.
XML representation:
<Criterion4>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<ensure>
<law ofCountry="BE" govemsAnyAgreement="true">
<requirement>
<sameCountry where="CA" isEstablished="true"/>
</requirement>
<flaw>
</ensure>
</requirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
</Criterion4>
Weight:
The quoted passages weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 1 3
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7.4.5 Compliance with Criterion 5
Passage:
If the dispute is not resolved within (20) days after initial notice pursuant to
CPS, parties submit the dispute to arbitration, in accordance with art. 167
6-1723 of the Belgian Judicial Code.
Justification:
Criterion 5 stated exactly the same things as in the quoted passage.
XML representation:
<CriterionS>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<allow>
<arbitration to="resolve disputes arising out of its CP"/>
<tallow>
<trequirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
</CriterionS>
Weight:
According to table 5-1, the weight for the quoted passage is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 0 2
7.4.6 Compliance with Criteria 6
Passage:
To carry out the audits, there will be an independent auditor appointed who
will not be affiliated directly or indirectly in any way with GlobalSign nor
having any conflicting interests thereof.
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Justification:
GlobalSign CP has covered criterion 6 which requires an external auditor as the
quoted passage states.
XML representation:
<Criterion6>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<perform>
<process of.="compliance Audit">
<requirement>
<carryOut by="extemaI auditor"/>
<requirement>
</process>
</perform>
<rrequirement>
</CertificationAuthority> .
</Criterion6>
Weight:
Due to adequacy, the weight for the quoted passage is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 1 3
7.4.7 Compliance with Criteria 7
Passage:
GlobalSign does not provide further information about performing frequent audits.
Justification:
Frequency of audit (covered by criterion 7) has not been defined in the GlobalSign
CP. Therefore the XML statement that defines the frequency includes the obligation
title "notDefined".
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XML representation:
<Criterion7> .
<CertificationAuthority>
<notDefmed>
<lnotDefined>
<ICertificationAuthority>
<ICriterion7>
Weight:
Due to incomplete information, the weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
0 0 0 0
7.4.8 Compliance with Criterion 8
Passage:
The CA evaluates the results of such audits before further implementing them.
Justification:
The only action that is mentioned in the CP is the above passage, and this does not
comply with requirement defined in criterion 8.
XML representation:
<Criterion8>
<CertificationAuthority>
<notDefmed>
</notOefmed>
<ICertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion8>
Weight:
Due to non-compliance, the weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
0 0 0 0
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7.4.9 Compliance with Criterion 9
Passage:
GlobalSign does not release nor is it required to release any confidential
information without an authenticated andjustified request specifying either:
• The party to whom the GlobalSign owes a duty to keep
information confidential is the party requesting such
information.
• A court order.
Justification:
GlobalSign complies with criterion 9.
XML representation:
<Criterion9>
<CertificationAuthority>
<prohibition>
<disclose'I'o>
<thirdParties any="confidential information" of.="subject">
<requirement> .
<except>
<whenRequestedByLaw>true</whenRequestedByLaw>
<whenConsentBySubject>true</whenConsentBySubject>
</except>
<zrequirement>
</thirdParties>
</discioseTo>
</prohibition>
</CertificationAuthority>
</Criterion9>
Weight:
The quoted passage weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 2 4
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7.4.10 Compliance with Criterion 10
Passage:
GlobalSign accepts other CAs wishing to enter its own network and operate
under its own hierarchy. Following an initial assessment and the signing of
a specific agreement with GlobalSign the applicant CA has to provide
GlobalSign with certain identification documents including an authorisation
letter, articles of association. GlobalSign retains its right to consult third
party databases that identify organisations in this regard.
GlobalSign or an authorized GlobalSign RA verifies by appropriate means
and on the basis of a document procedure, the identity and, if applicable, all
attributes thereof of applicants of a certificate. In addition to the above, to
identify organizations GlobalSign typically request certified copies of by-
laws, and possibly additional identification elements such as proof of VAT
registration etc.
Justification:
The criterion requests that organization identity authentication should include
information about the organization's publicity and popularity, and the quoted
passages satisfy this with the following clauses:
• CA has to provide GlobalSign with certain identification documents
including an authorisation letter, articles of association
• GlobalSign retains its right to consult third party databases that
identify organisations in this regard.
• GlobalSign typically request certified copies of by-laws, and possibly
additional identification elements such as proof of VAT registration
etc.
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XML representation:
<Criterion I 0>
<RegistrationAuthori ty>
<requirement>
<authenticate>
<organization include="its reputation"/>
</ authenticate>
</requirement>
<lRegistrationAuthority>
</CriterionlO>
Weight:
The quoted passages weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 0 2
7.4.11 Compliance with Criterion 11
Passage:
CA chaining services do not require the physical appearance of the
customer as long as an agreement between the applicant organization and
GlobalSign has been executed.
Justification:
GlobalSign restricts certificate issue to subscribers, third party CAs, or to subjects
associated with a subscriber which called a "Certificate Applicant"; as stated in [110]
that certificate applicant can be any person acting on behalf of the subject. Therefore;
the quoted passage states clearly that because of the agreement between the applicant
organization and GlobalSign physical appearance is not required. We assume that a
certificate applicant will do the authentication by physical appearance, and also we
assume that this requirement could be omitted, and this case is covered under the
"possible" ob1igation title.
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XML representation:
<Criterion11>
<RegistrationAuthority>
<possible>
<authenticate>
<individual basedOn="its physical presence"/>
</authenticate>
</possible>
</RegistrationAuthority>
</Criterionll>
Weight:
Due to the assumption we made which is that it might or might not happen, the weight
for the quoted passage is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
0 1 0 1
7.4.12 Compliance with Criterion 12
Passage:
Before entering any contractual relationship with the subscriber,
GlobalSign makes available a CA chaining agreement, which the applicant
must approve prior toplacing a request with GlobalSign.
Justification:
The quoted passage complies with criterion 12.
XML representation:
<Criterion 12>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<insure>
<subject isAwareOf.="its respective rights and obligations"l>
</insure>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
</Criterion12>
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Weight:
The quoted passage weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 0 2
7.4.13 Compliance with Criterion 13
Passage:
Under section "CRL Profile", the table that shows the profile of the GlobalSign
Revocation List states in "Next Update" cell the following:
[Date of issuance + 3 hours}
Justification:
Criterion 13 requests the update of CRL must take place within an hour and the
quoted passage says after three hours.
XML representation:
<Criterion13>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<update>
<CRL after-"every certificate revocation">
<requirement>
<updateIntervalTime withln=B'">
</requirement>
</CRL>
</update>
<zrequirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
</Criterion 13>
Weight:
Criterion 13 reduces the interval time of updating CRL to one hour which is more
effective in blocking any specious behaviour after the compromise of a certificate.
Therefore; the quoted passage weight is:
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Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 0 2
7.4.14 Compliance with Criterion 14
Passage:
The interval time to update the CRL in the GlobalSign is 3 hours which is also the
validity period of the CRL.
[Date of issuance + 3 hours}
Justification:
Criterion 14 defines the validity period of the CRL as 30 days which is considered
longer than 3 hours.
XML representation:
<Criterion 14>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<publish>
<CRL>
<requirement>
<intervalTime witbln="3 hours"/>
</requirement>
</CRL>
</publish>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
</Criterion 14>
Weigh:
The short validity period of the CRL may cause high traffic but it provides relying
parties with almost real-time certificate-status information; therefore, the quoted
passage weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 1 3
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7.4.15 Compliance with Criterion 15
Passage:
GlobalSign CA audit records events that include but are not limited to
• Issuance of a certificate
• Revocation of a certificate
• Published CRLs
Justification:
The quoted passage covers some of the records defined by criterion 15.
XML representation:
<Criterion15>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<do>
<secuirty Audit>
<requirement>
<allBootsOIThePKIsystem>false<lallBootsOffhePKIsystem>
<allAccessAttemptsToPKlsystem>false</allAccessAttemptsToPKlsystem>
<allPKIsystemF ailures>false<1 allPKlsystemF ailures>
<CAkeyGeneration>faise</CAkeyGeneration>
<CAkeyStorage>false</CAkeyStorage>
<CAkeyBackup>false</CAkeyBackup>
<CAkey Archival>false</CAkeyArcbival>
<CAkeyRecovery>false</CAkeyRecovery>
<CAkeyDestruction>false</CAkeyDestruction>
<CAandSubjectCertificate>
<generationRequests>false</generationRequests>
<renewaIRequests>false</renewalRequests>
<re~keyRequests>false</re~keyRequests>
<revocationRequests>true</revocationRequests>
</CAandSubjectCertificate>
<issuanceOfCertificates>true</issuanceOfCertificates>
<certificatekequests>
<ofStatusChange>false</ofStatusChange>
<ofStatus>false</ofStatus>
<responses>false</responses>
</certificateRequests>
<PKIandSecuritySystemActions>
<performedByCApersonnel>false<lperformedByCApersonnel>
</PKIandSecuritySystemActions>
<identityVerificationProcedures>false</identityVerificationProcedures>
</requirement>
<lsecuirty Audit>
</do>
<rrequirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
</Criterion15>
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Weight:
The quoted passage omits a number of events that are not included in the ones shown
on above list, thus the weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 2 4
7.4.16 Compliance with Criterion 16
Passage:
GlobalSign CA ensures that designated personnel reviews log files at regular
intervals detects and reports anomalous events.
Justification:
The quoted passage states that log files are reviewed at regular intervals but there is
no defined interval we could compare to the value defined in criterion 16.
XML representation:
<Criterion16>
<Certification.Authority>
<requirement>
<examine>
<auditLogs>
<requirement>
<frequent atLeast="notDefined"/>
<zrequirement>
<lauditLogs>
</examine>
</requirement>
<ICertificationAuthority>
</Criterion16>
Weight:
According to the table 5-1, the weight for the quoted passage is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 0 2
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7.4.17 Compliance with Criterion 17
Passage:
GlobalSign CP does not cover this requirement.
Justification:
The requirement requested by criterion 17 is not covered by the GlobalSign CP.
XML representation:
<Criterion!7>
<CertificationAuthority'>
<notDefmed>
<!notDefmed>
</CertificationAuthority>
</Criterion17>
Weight:
The GlobalSign weight with respect to this requirement is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
0 0 0 0
7.4.18 Compliance with Criterion 18
Passage:
GlobalSign CA retains in a trustworthy manner records of GlobalSign CA
digital certificates. audit data, certificate application information, log files
and documentation supporting certificate applications.
GlobalSign CA keeps internal records of thefollowing items:
• CA certificates for a period of a maximum of 10 years after the
expiration of the certificate.
• Audit trails on the issuance of CA certificates for a period of 5 years
after issuance of a certificate.
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• Audit trail of the revocation of a CA certificates for a period of 5 years
after revocation of a certificate.
• Clil.s for a minimum of 5 years after expiration or revocation of a CA
certificate.
• Support documents on the issuance of CA certificates for a period of 5
years after expiration of a certificate.
Justification:
The quoted passages only meet a subset of the criterion 18 requests that records
should be archived, but it complies with the retention period.
XML representation:
<Criterion 18>
<CertificationAutbority>
<requirement>
<provide>
<archiving>
<requirement>
<certificateRequestApplication>true</certificateRequestApplication>
<documentationSupportingCertificateAppHcations>true</documentationSupportingCertificateApplications>
<allComputerSecurityAuditData>true</allComputerSecurityAuditData>
<certificateRevocationApplication>true</ce.rtificateRevocationApplication>
<certificateRe-keyApplication>false</certifi.cateRe~keyApplication>
<certificateRenewalApplication>false</certificateRenewalApplication>
<issuedCertificates>true<lissuedCertificates>
<issuedCRLsORcertificateStatusRecords>true</issuedCRLsORcertificateStatusRecords>
<all correspondence>
<betweenTheCAandSubcontractors>false<lbetweenTheCAandSubcolltractors>
<betweenTheCAandSubscribers>false<lbetweenTbeCAandSubscribers>
</ allcorrespondence>
<retentionPeriod>
<atLeast InYears="5"1>
</retentionPeriod>
</requirement>
</archiving>
</provide>
<:/requirement>
</CertificationAutbority> .
</Criterion 18>
Weight:
Due to the lack of archived records, the quoted passages weight is:
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Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 7 9
7.4.19 Compliance with Criterion 19
Passage:
GlobalSign CA documents the recovery procedures used if computing
resources, software, and/or data corrupted or suspected of being corrupted.
Justification:
The quoted passage complies exactly with criterion 19.
XML representation:
<Criterion19>
<CertificatiortAuthority>
<requirement>
<establish>
<plan of="surviving after the disaster"!>
<zestablish>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion19>
Weight:
The weight which is assigned for the quoted passage according to table 5-1 is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
I I 0 2
7.4.20 Compliance with Criterion 20
Passage:
GlobalSign CA reaches its subscribers through a designated Registration
Authorities. An RA requests the issuance, suspension and revocation of a
certificate under this CP.
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All members of the staff operating the key management operations
administrators, security officers, and system auditors or any other
operations that materially affect such operations are considered as serving
in a trusted position.
Justification:
All the trusted roles requested by criterion 20 are supported by the GlobalSign CP
except the "System Operators" role.
XML representation:
<Criterion20>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<support>
<trustedRoles>
<requirement>
<securityOfficers>true<lsecurityOfficers>
<registrationOfficers>true</registrationOfficers>
<syemAdministrators>true</syemAdministrators>
<systemOperators>false<!systemOperators>
<systemAuditors>true<!systemAuditors>
<zrequirement>
<ltrustedRoles>
<lsupport>
<zrequirement>
</CertificationAuthority> .
</Criterion20>
Weight:
Because the quoted passages has not fully met criterion 20, its weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 4 6
7.4.21 Compliance with Criterion 21
Passage:
The GlobalSign CA carries out checks to establish the background,
qualifications, and experience needed to perform within the competence
context of the specific job. Background checks include:
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• Misrepresentations by the candidate.
• Any other as it might be deemed necessary.
The GlobalSign CA makes available training fro their personnel to carry out
CA and RA functions.
Periodic training updates might also be performed to establish continuity
and updates in the knowledge of the personnel and procedures.
GlobalSign CA sanctions personnel for unauthorized actions, unauthorized
use of authority, and unauthorized use of systems for the purpose of
imposing accountability on a participant's personnel, as it might be
appropriate under the circumstances.
The GlobalSign CA, and RAs make available documentation to personnel,
during initial training, retraining, or otherwise.
Justification:
The quoted passages comply exactly with criterion 21.
XML representation:
<Criterion21>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<assure>
<allPersonnelControlled>
<requirement>
<backgroundChecked>
<qualifications>true</qualifications>
<experience>true</experience>
<governmentClearances>true</governmentClearances>
</backgroundChecked>
<providingWthTaining>true</providingWthTaining>
<povidingWthRefresherTaining>true</povidingWthRefresherTaining>
<sanctioningForUnauthorizedActions>true<lsanctioningForUnauthorizedActions>
<providingWithDocumentation>true</providingWithDocumentation>
<zrequirement>
</aIIPersonneIControlled>
</assure>
<zrequirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
</Criterion21 >
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Weight:
Weight for the quoted passages is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 7 9
7.4.22 Compliance with Criterion 22
Passage:
Under section "Subscriber Obligations" the following is stated:
Generating securely their private-public key pair, using a trustworthy
system.
Justification:
The quoted passage meets with what has been stated in criterion 22.
XML representation:
<Criterion22>
<subject>
<requirement>
<generate>
<itsKeys>true</itsKeys>
</generate>
</requirement>
</subject>
</Criterion22>
Weight:
Due to compliance with criterion 22, the weight for the quoted passage is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 0 2
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7.4.23 Compliance with Criterion 23
Passage:
For the CA Root key it uses, the GlobalSign CA makes use of the RSA
algorithm with a key length of either 1024 or 2048 bits and validity period
of at least 14years.
For the operational CA keys it uses the GlobalSign CA makes use of the
RSA algorithm with a key length of 1024 bits and a validity period of up to 7
years.
Justification:
The key length included in the quoted passages is consistent with the one defined in
criterion 23.
XML representation:
<Criterion23>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<make Sure>
<minimumLength of="private key" islnBits=" 1024" I>
</makeSure>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
. </Criterion23>
Weight:
The quoted passage weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 0 2
183
7.4.24 Compliance with Criterion 24
Passage:
The passage quoted above stated that the validity period of a CA Root key is at least
14 years and the validity period of operational CA keys is up to 7 years.
Justification:
GlobalSign CA issues top root certificates and criterion 24 limits the validity period
for CA certificate to be up 20 years. Thus, what has been stated in the quoted passage
complies with criterion 24. The second part of criterion 24 is not applicable here
because it defines a key validity period for non root certificate.
XML representation:
<Criterion24>
<CertificationAuthority>
<prohibition>
<create>
<CAcertificate ValidityPeriods moreThaneln Years="20" />
<subjectCertificate ValidityPeriods more'Ihanln'Year=vO'">
<Icreate>
</prohibition>
</CertificationAuthority>
</Criterion24>
Weight:
Due to compliance with criterion 24 of CA certificate's validity period, the weight for
the quoted passage is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 0 2
7.4.25 Compliance with Criterion 25
Passage:
The GlobalSign CA implements computer security controls.
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Justification:
No further clarification which could assist us to judge the compliance with criterion
25 of these security controls occurs in the GlobalSign CP, so will mark it accordingly
XML representation:
<Criterion25>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<secure>
<CAmachine>
<requirement>
<disconnectFromNetwork>false</disconnectFromNetwork>
<prohibitUnauthorizedAccess>false</probibitUnauthorizedAccess>
<updatingOSwithSecurityPatches>false</updatingOSwithSecurityPatches>
<limitAccess>false</limitAccess>
<irequirement>
</CAmachine>
</secure>
<zrequirement>
<!CertificationAuthority>
</Criterion25>
Weight:
The lack of clarity of what security controls are implemented leads us to conclude that
the quoted passage is not adequately defined; therefore; its weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 0 2
7.4.26 Compliance with Criterion 26
Passage:
The Global/Sign CA performs periodic development controls and security
management controls.
Justification:
The controls stated in the quoted passage are not listed in detail in the GlobalSign CP
which does not allow us to check for compliance with criterion 26. For this reason, we
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weight the obligation title and the action parts but the constraints are set to the value
false.
XML representation:
<Criterion26>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<examining>
<integrityOtHardwareAndSoftwareBy>
<requirement>
<documentedAndControUedAny>
<coofiguration>false<! configuration>
<modifications=falsec/modifications>
<upgrades>false</upgrades>
</documentedAndControlledAny>
<detectingUnauthorizedModification>faise<!detectingUnauthorizedModification>
<checkingSoftwareIntegrity> .
<atLeast inDays="O"/>
</checkingSoftwareIntegrity>
<zrequirement>
</integrityOtHardwareAndSoftwareBy>
<iexamining>
<zrequirernent>
<zCerti ficationAuthority>
</Criterion26>
Weight:
The quoted passage weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 0 2
7.4.27 Compliance with Criterion 27
Passage:
The GlobalSign CA maintains a high-level network of systems security including
jirewalls. Network intrusions are detected. In specific:
• The GlobalSign CA encrypts connections to the RA, using
dedicated administrative certificates.
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• The GlobalSign CA website provides certificate based Secure
Socket Layer connections and anti-virus protection.
• The GlobalSign CA network is protect by a managed firewall and
intrusion detection system.
• Internet sessions for request and delivery of information are
encrypted.
Justification:
The quoted passage complees exactly with criterion 27.
XML representation:
<Criterionz">
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<securing>
<networks>
<requirement>
<frrewalls>true<lfirewalls>
<encryptionAndDigitalSignatures>true</encryptionAndDigitalSignatures>
<ACLs>true<l ACLs>
</requirement>
</networks>
</securing>
</requirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion27
Weight:
All the actions defined by criterion 27 needed to be taken to secure the network are
implemented in the GlobalSign CP; therefore; the quoted passage weight is:
Obligation Title Action Constraint Total
1 1 3 5
7.5 Authentication Result
We have assigned all the correspondences to criteria in the GlobalSign CP their
values and can use equation (l) to calculate the ND value. After applying equation
(1), the ND value for GlobalSign CP is 76. The GlobalSign CP complies with the
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developed criteria at more than 63%. The ND value classifies the relation between the
developed criteria and the GlobalSign CP as a partial overlap. According to the
scenario given at the start of this chapter, Alice does not know GlobalSign; therefore,
the partial overlap between the criteria and GlobalSign CP is not acceptable. With this
attribute the answer to Alice is that GlobalSign is not a trusted CA. The result of the
comparison is not an abnormal result, because GlobalSign CP deals with top level
CAs and for this reason most of the issues targeting non-CA subjects are omitted.
This is because either some of the issues are not applicable in the case that the
subjects are CAs, or because these issues are already known to these types of subjects
and do not need to be mentioned in the CP.
Let us consider another scenario where Alice has received a certificate that has been
signed by VeriSign Inc. We selected this scenario as VeriSign issues certificates to
end entities as well to CAs; therefore, the Veri Sign CP must deal with related issues
more comprehensively than GlobalSign's CP. The authentication of VeriSign's CP
[55] is summarized in table 7-1 (the complete process is as explained for the previous
scenario).
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Table 7-1 VeriSign CP Authentication
The ND value for VeriSign CP is 107: partial overlap; thus the compatibility of the
VeriSign CP with the criteria is 89%. The ND value of the VeriSign CP is obviously
better than that of GlobalSign CP; however, the answer to Alice is that VeriSign is
also not a trusted CA.
7.5.1 Result Discussion
Despite the selected CAs, GlobalSign and VeriSign, being well-known and
considered to be leading organizations in offering PKI services, the two scenarios
show their failure to satisfy the criteria authentication process. These results appear to
contradict with the organizations' reality but we should recall that the criteria are
designed to be worked in the absence of trusted domain and they assist in evaluating
the level of trust that can be placed on a subject's certificate by examining the CP that
operates its certificate. This fact necessitates careful evaluation of the subject CP by
requiring it to have specific values which are considered optimal for untrusted
domains. We conclude by noting that the evaluated organizations are well-known
CAs but because their values under certain issues do not match the criteria, the result
in the two scenarios is partial overlap. Ultimately, there is no perfect scoring system
and we have included in the future work section, chapter 8, the issue of improving the
scoring system.
7.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to show the applicability of the criteria developed to a
real CP. The GlobalSign CA, a leader in public trust services, has been issuing public
certificates since 1996. We selected GlobalSign to show how the criteria coped with
its CP. The reason behind selecting GlobalSign was that, as a leading company, we
are sure that it will maintain its services robustly and this should lead to the writing of
a robust CP. Therefore, applying the developed criteria on this CP will give a clear
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view of their applicability and the coverage in their results. We then examined the
applicability of the criteria to the VeriSign CP due to the GlobalSign CP not
addressing some policy issues. These case studies showed that the criteria handled
the correspondence activities defined in GlobalSign and VeriSign CPs sufficiently
well.
190
CHAPTER8
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
8.1 Discussion
The main goal of this dissertation was to find a way to authenticate a subject
certificate in an untrusted domain. The first question that we investigated was how to
authenticate a certificate in a domain that we do not know much about. As we have to
authenticate a certificate that has been issued by an unknown CA, we are forced to
judge the procedures, controls, obligations, liabilities and indemnities used by the CA,
aU of which are stated in the CA's CP. Therefore, investigating the CA's CP is
offered as a way of producing a decision about a CA's trustworthiness. In order to use
the CP for authenticating a subject certificate we used a formalisation technique.
Chapter 4 began by applying our approach to comparing the CPs of an untrusted CA
and an already trusted CA, and it presented a description of the processes used to
develop a formalisation technique. The ultimate goal of chapter 4 was to build a
semantic representation of a CP.
The process was started by selecting the EuroPKI CP with the aim of capturing its
semantics using XML to build the formalisation. We realized that it was necessary to
produce identical representations of identical items that were expressed differently, so
we defined a number of conventions that the process used in order to achieve this.
After finishing the formalisation and examining the outcomes: 40 XML files and 37
schema files, we concluded that we could not achieve our target. The reason for this
being that the formalisation process was based on the exact interpretation of what had
been written in the EuroPKI CP. We decided to change our approach in order to
improve the way the formalisation was created, based on first finding out how we
could represent the semantics in the formalisation.
The second stage of the formalisation focused first on finding a way to incorporate
semantics into the CP formalisation. Throughout the first stage of the formalisation,
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which was accomplished by formalising the whole of the EuroPKI CP, we found that
there were certain words expressing the level of importance of the task described in
the CP. After we studied these words again, we realized that a CP is nothing but a set
of rules that regulate certificates and their applicability; therefore; these words do
indeed describe the semantics of the rules. The formalisation for this stage was carried
out through using these words after grouping all words that depict the same level of
importance together under varying titles (requirement, prohibition, preferred, not
preferred and possible). The policies we used in this stage were EuroPKI, DutchGrid,
State of Illinois, SwuPKI and VeriSign. Because there were 5 CPs, we decided to
formalise only the section "Community and applicability", so we can get this stage's
outcomes as quickly as possible. We evaluated the outcomes of the five
fonnalisations and found that these are almost the same which did not really help us
in achieving an efficient comparison technique for measuring the level of a subject's
trustworthiness.
From these stages of formalisation and analysis, we learned that to perform a
comparison based on semantics, we needed to develop specific criteria that have the
same names in the formalisation but that can differ in their values.
In the third stage, we knew our ultimate goal, and three CPs were selected for use:
EuroPKI, SwuPKI and DutchGrid. The formalisation process was initiated differently
from the two previous stages, and we started by comparing the textual content of the
CPs manually after entering them in a table with three columns covering 106 pages.
This time the comparison was performed by comparing each section separately in the
participating CPs. The method that we use to select the criteria was:
1. Find the criteria that have been emphasised in participating CPs.
2. Find the criteria that themselves playing significant roles in defining
obligations.
After finishing this manual comparison, we identified 43 criteria. As these criteria
were a result of a manual comparison process, they need to be studied and analysed to
satisfy the following conditions:
1. Filter out unrelated criteria.
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2. Represent crucial information required for the comparison process.
For the above conditions we chose Annex II of The European Directive
[Dir.1999/93/EC] [28] which is a regulation for certification service providers when
issuing qualified certificates. The results of this are summarized in the following:
1. The number of the criteria decreased to 22.
2. There are requirements in the Directive that do not match any criteria.
3. The Directive covers certification service providers who are known to relying
parties. We need to define more requirements to cover the case of unknown
certification service providers.
Considering point 3, we finally defined 27 criteria to be used when performing
authentication of a subject's identity by comparing our criteria to what has been
written in the relevant CA's CP.
Chapter 5 finishes the work started in the previous chapter. We mentioned
"semantics" often in previous chapters and said that the formalisation would be based
on them. In this chapter, we began by defining this concept for each criterion and
showed how it is related to the subject's trustworthiness. The overall objective for all
criteria is to provide an extra level of assurance about the subject's certificate in
addition to the assurance that is provided by the issuer CA.
All the 27 defined criteria are in textual form and, as we said earlier, XML was to be
used for formalisation. However, the formalisation by itself is not capable of
producing an efficient comparison approach; we need first to specify a defined value
for each criterion to assist us in doing the comparison. Therefore, we met this
requirement for each criterion, and afterwards the formalisation of each criterion with
its defined value was also done using XML.
Performing a comparison between the criteria and a subject's CP will result in a
number of similarities between them and a number of differences. Accordingly, it was
necessary to find a way to represent the result in a more formal way: we developed a
scoring system to assign a weight to each criterion according to the result of the
comparison that is defined in the system. Furthermore, we developed an equation to
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produce a numeric decision value (ND) as a result of comparing the developed criteria
to the subject's CP.
Finally, we studied in detail the ND value which allows us to make a more precise
interpretation based on it. The ND value for our criteria is 120 and by comparing the
ND value of the subject's CP, we observe three cases depicting the trustworthiness of
the subject. The first case is when there is no trust we could place on the subject's
certificate and we called this case "no overlap"; this happens when the subject ND
value is O.The second case is when the subject ND value is between 0 and 120, and
means that we can trust the subject for certain activities but not all. We call this case
"partial overlap". The third case occurs when-the subject ND value is exactly 120
which shows that the subject's trustworthiness is equal to that of the developed
criteria. We called this case "absolute overlap".
Chapter 6 was mainly an examination of the criteria developed and the examination
then focused on clarifying the following issues:
1. The extent that the developed criteria comply with requirements In
international law.
2. Degree of their effectiveness compared with practices embedded In
international law.
We used the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
[102] which defines a legal framework for using electronic signatures as a test for the
examination process for the criteria. The result of this showed that the criteria are
handled totally by UNCITRAL law articles, and this implies that they have been
adequately defined. Moreover, the examination process shows that the semantic
analysis has led us to define adequate criteria for estimating a subject's
trustworthiness.
Finally, after we demonstrated the robustness and coverage of the developed in the
previous chapter, we were obliged to prove this claim by implementing the criteria on
a real life case. GlobalSign CA was selected for implementation of the criteria on its
CP. In order to accomplish this task, we followed the following scenario:
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1. We quote a passage from the GlobalSign CP which deals with the same task
that the selected criterion deals with.
2. We discuss the suitability and incompatibility with the selected criterion.
3. We format the XML representation for the quoted passage.
4. We specify the weight for the quoted passage depending on what has stated
in point 2.
The above process continued until all the criteria had been processed; afterwards, we
applied the equation (1). The GlobalSign ND value is 76 which describes the
relationship between its CP and the developed criteria as a partial overlap. We
followed this case study with another one which examines the applicability of the
criteria against the VeriSign CP. For a more detailed explanation about the case
studies see Chapter 7. We conclude that the developed criteria adapted to the real life
cases without any deficiencies or shortages in coverage. The implication of this is that
the criteria can be applied in reality and do measure the trustworthiness of the subject
efficiently.
In summary, the work that has been done in this thesis is a contribution to help in
leveraging PKI technology on the Internet. We stated clearly in the beginning
chapters of this thesis that integrating PKI technology with the Internet required the
presence of a third party (a trusted CA) which vouches for the identity of the subject
and this vouching is accepted by relying parties because they trust the issuer of the
certificate. We raised the point that if the trusted CA or trust anchor is not available,
then we have an untrusted domain. What if there is a service that we would like to
have but which has a certificate issued by an unknown CA? Do we reject the service
for this reason or can we develop a technique that can help in authenticating the
subject's certificate even if it is in an untrusted domain? Authenticating or validating
certificate in PKI technology is based on the construction of a certification path
connecting the subject's certificate with the relying party's trusted anchor. In an
untrusted domain with no presence of a trusted anchor, the process of building the
certification path is considered unreasonable. However, with our criteria, a direct
certification path can be constructed by applying the criteria's results for the subject's
certificate CP and the result being "absolute overlap". The direct certification path
results from the fact that the authenticating process involves applying the criteria
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showing the validation of the subject certificate's CP as meeting the requirements that
they set.
In the case of a trusted domain where a relying party has a trusted point, the scenario
is different where there is a certification path that leads to the trusted point. The role
of the criteria in this case changes from validating only the subject certificate to
different role as illustrated in next. Let us emphasize that the criteria can work and be
applied in the case of trusted domain as they were developed based on the certificate
policy framework which is considered as a guideline for developing CP. Moreover,
they are extracted from real, operational CPs. If the criteria are applied to an issuer
that is trusted by the relying party, the result will boost the relying party's confidence
if it is "absolute overlap" and, in the terminology of certification paths, criteria with
the result of "absolute overlap" assure that the constructed certification path is the best
path by validating the CP or CPs that provide all the certificates on the constructed
path. This is almost equivalent to the process of constructing a path between the
criteria and the trusted issuer CP. If the result is "no overlap" or "partial overlap", the
result could be rejected by the relying party because the criteria represent the optimal
values and they include issues that are not of interest to the relying party. But in the
case that the relying party accepts the "no overlap" or "partial overlap" result, this
could help the relying party find another certification path to the subject certificate
that satisfies the criteria or by finding another trusted issuer whose CP meets the
requirements laid down by the criteria.
Cross-certification is a special case of certificate issuance where the subject of the
certificate is a CA. In cross-certification, each CA agrees to accept each other's CPs.
Therefore, the relying party in one domain trusts certificates in other domain. In this
case there is a path between the root CAs connecting the two domains and any
certification path constructed from one domain includes this path to complete the
certification path to the other domain. Here the criteria can play the following roles:
• The root CA could use the criteria to judge the certification path from another
domain, and in the case of "absolute overlap", as we stated above, the
confidence level is increased. On the contrary, if the result is one of the other
cases then the root CA has the option of finding another trusted point to do
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cross-certification or to ask other root CA to adopt changes in its CP to meet
the criteria.
• The issuer CA of either domain could use the criteria as a measurement for the
path that is initiated from the other end toward any subject in that domain. And
upon the result of applying the criteria on all the CP or CPs covering the
certificates included in the certification path to the subject's certificate, the root
CA's confidence about the constructed certificate path could be increased or it
can look for other path that satisfies the criteria's requirements for use as a
qualified path.
In a Bridge CA environment, the criteria could be used to guide the relying party to
compare different CAs participating in the Bridge CA to base its decision to join or
get services from a candidate CA. The relying party will be more likely to choose the
CA whose criteria result is "absolute" rather than "partial" or "no overlap" results.
8.2 Future Work
This dissertation describes how to authenticate an X.S09 certificate in an untrusted
domain. There are several directions in which this work can be extended. We list the
most important of them here and extend them with a few additional issues.
8.2.1 Representing CPs Context More Systematically
Even though CPs are structured according to RFC 2527 (and also with RFC 3647),
their specification supersedes that given in RFC 2527, which is considered as a
framework for building certificate CP, however current CPs are not fully helpful or
efficient when someone wants to extract data manually for the following reason:
• CPs are expressed in natural language and thus are more fully descriptive.
• Data related to specific tasks are scattered over the CP document.
• There are spelling mistakes, which result in meaning changing; for example
the following text is found in EuroPKI CP [48]:
CA. A relying party MUST check CRLs when validating the use of a
certificate. Moreover a relying party MUST ONLY use the certificate
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for the proscribed applications and MUST NOT use the certificates for
forbidden applications.
Here we see the word "prescribed" replaced with "proscribed" , changing
the meaning totally and introducing a contradiction between two
specifications.
• CPs are all copied from each other with only the titles changed to
identify organizations: as a small experiment do a search in Google with
the mistake that we mentioned in the previous point and see the result.
• CP sections contain repeated inform~tion which makes CP seem to be
long.
Because of this, rewriting CPs in a new structure is considered as a research topic
and we expect the result to be able to handle the following:
• Representing the CP in a more formal way.
• The new representation could facilitate embedding the CP in the certificate.
• Easy the process of extracting the criteria values.
• Avoid ambiguity and repetition.
8.2.2 Automating the Comparison
Due to the reasons explained in the previous section, automating the comparison
process would demand the introduction of different techniques. A CP is written in
natural language which leads there to be different written CPs that have the same
meaning. They are written using synonymous words (e.g. "issue", "create"). To
facilitate automated comparison requires either defining all the words used in CPs
after identifying all of them, or else using Artificial Intelligence (AI) to build a system
to identified these words gradually (i.e. build an expert system [111].) Implementing
automated comparison will be more practical and effective if the representation of the
CP context is created more systemically. Building the automated comparison will ease
the embedding it in web browsers as a plug-in. Moreover, it helps in creating more
services such as systems that score CAs' CPs and posts the results. By doing this we
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could provide a service that is known as OCSP for evaluating CPs instead certificates.
Investigating this topic will open the door for new authentication techniques.
8.2.3 The Criteria Developed
In this thesis we have applied our criteria to one real world case study, GlobalSign CP
[110]. With more time and different real world case studies, we would like to extend
the implementation phase. Moreover, we would like to study the possibility of
integrating the criteria with other models which have the same interest so as to
provide a more comprehensive authentication management technique.
8.2.4 Scoring System
We have developed a simple scoring system; we would like to study the possibility of
developing the scoring system in such a way that defines core criteria that playa main
role in the value of ND. In the sense that if any of these core criteria are missing this
implies that the subject's certificate will not be qualified to be trusted.
8.2.5 Acceptance of Our Contribution
Most of thesis's chapters have been published in refereed conference proceedings
which provide a some academic accreditation: see publications section. Next we
intend to seek industry acceptance for our solution. The most active working group is
the PKlX of the IETF which develops Internet standards needed to support an X.S09-
based PKI. The purpose of this is to have our contribution to be published as an IETF
standard and this will contribute to our solution through getting valuable comments
that will improve our contribution before it is accepted as a standard.
8.3 Closing Remarks
The problem of authenticating another party's identity on the Internet is a real one. In
this thesis we have shown how to authenticate the identity of the subject even in the
absence of a trust anchor. Today solutions are based on establishing a community of
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trust where there is only one root CA which leads to segregation between the users.
Indeed, it will lead to creating an environment where collaboration is difficult. Further
research in this area is therefore vital.
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Appendix A
KEY WORDS FOR USE IN RFCS TO INDICATE
REQUIREMENT LEVELS
MUST:
This word, or the terms "REQUIRED" or "SHALL", mean that the
Definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.
MUST NOT:
This phrase, or the phrase "SHALL NOT", mean that the
Definition is an absolute prohibition of the specification.
SHOULD:
This word, or the adjective "RECOMMENDED", mean that there
May exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a particular item,
but the full implications must be understood and carefully weighed before
choosing a different course.
SHOULD NOT:
This phrase, or the phrase "NOT RECOMMENDED" mean that
There may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances when the particular
behaviour is acceptable or even useful, but the full implications should be
understood and the case carefully weighed before implementing any behaviour
described with this label.
MAY:
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This word, or the adjective "OPTIONAL", mean that an item is
truly optional. One vendor may choose to include the item because a particular
marketplace requires it or because the vendor feels that it enhances the product
while another vendor may omit the same item. An implementation which does
not include a particular option MUST be prepared to interoperate with another
implementation which does include the option, though perhaps with reduced
functionality. In the same vein an implementation which does include a
particular option MUST be prepared to interoperate with another
implementation which does not include the option (except, of course, for the
feature the option provides.)
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~--~~~~~--~~~~--~--~~--~~~~~--~~~~~----r_--------------------------~~eA conforming CA can choose freely which are the This policy is designed for use in SwUPKI. Only 'n
community and applicability of their issued certificates Swedish universities or university colleges accredited a!la!
but it MUST clearly specify them in its own CPS. In by the Swedish government and related organisations olga
every case a conforming CA MUST NOT issue complying with this CP can be members ofSwUPKI. illUII
certificates to entities that don't belong to its "Organisation" is used to denote a member of i ci)'p
community or for applications that haven't been SwUPKI.
carefully evaluated (for instance high value B2B ' Bach
transactions). Moreover a conforming CA thee
SHALL respect all the limitations imposed by the
~fu~I~lo~w~in~ng~sec~ti~on~s~o~f~th~i~s~p,o~l~ic~y. -+~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~ --~
1~.1 Policy Management Authority (PMA)
Accordance to the big number of the table pages, we will list only the first seven
pages and the full table pages will be included in the attached CD.
~------------------------~--~~~~.-~~~--~~r-----------------------~One member of SwUPKI has the specific responsibility
of being the Policy Management Authority of the P~.
The PMA is responsible for:
registering, interpreting and maintaining this CP,
appointing a member of SwUPKI to serve as the Policy
CA for SwUPKI,
approving the CPSs of CAs in SwUPKI,
compliance inspections and general supervision of
SwUPKl, cross-certification with other P~s and with
CAs of other PKls. .-/ '0:::-~1~~~.I~C~e-rt~lfl=c-a-t~io-n-A~u~th-o-r~it-y------------------~1~.3~.~2~C~e~rt~l~fl~c~at~io=n~A-u~th~o-r7it~ie-s-(~C~A~s7)------------+-I~~=.~I~C=e-r~ti~fl~c-a~ti-on--a-u~th~o-r7it7ie-5-------------Oneo
liseol
_./ appiic
I-:An-"'i:-ss-u""in-g--co-n-:ti:-onn-"'i:-n-g-::C~A:-:-h-as-t~o-t""'ak~e-p-a-rt-:i-cu-:I-ar-c-a-r-e--+-:Ea::--c~h-::O~r-g-am-:'-sa-t""'io-n-:in-"'th:-e""'P::':K:-:-:-Is-:h-a-::II""'p-ro-v-:i-:d-e-::C'""A...,-------+-:Th= e-o-n~ly-e-nt..,.it-:-ie-s-t~ha-t-:i-ss-u-e-c-ert"""':"';·fi=-,c-at""'es--o"';:'f-:th-e---.~ ~ic~
when it has to decide if a certain organization or services operating in compliance with this CP. Such a DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authonl)' I~Un
individual can manage a subordinate CA performing CA is responsible for: persons, which means that no automated issuing « (tosee ,
all the controls and checks detailed in this policy. A the creation and signing of certificates, binding allowed. These persons are formally assigned sta till a o.n
conforming CA MA Y use as many RAs (registration Subscribers, PKI personnel and (where pemnitted) members responsible for the operational service of ~~)c:
authorities) as it wishes. A conforming CA other CAs to the public signature verification keys DutchGrid medium-security Cert~fIcation AuthO~~1 that ~
MAY also have the role ofRA if the entity attributable to them, The current list of persons cornpnsmg the operall~ n Iillli~h
authentication can be done by the CA itself. providing a Certificate Repository and a Certificate staff of the DutchGrid medium-security CertificaUO case't
Subordinate CAs MUST sign an agreement with the Status Service (CSS), see 1.3.4, publishing a CPS that Authority is published in an on-line accessible f Ptoh'~
certifying CA, stating the obligation to adhere to the includes reference to this CP, assigning duties to its repository. The location of this list is stated as pari 0 eft, ~
agreed procedures. RAs, and for the compliance with this CP by the CA the CPS in section 1.4. Certifj~
itself, its RAs and any subordinate CAs. bC-'t. cellain
The assigned staff operate the CA functions on a ~toViSi
effort basis only. The NIKHEF collaboration, the ot nders!
foundation FOM and/or the NIKHEF partners caPo
be held liable for any damages resulting from the '1JlI1'
operation or non-operation of the DutchGrid rnedl
security Certification Authority.
No subordinate certification authorities will be~1
A CA may not assign the duty of issuing certificates to
an RA.
While an Organisation in the P~ may use a contractor
to provide (some of its) CA services, it remains
responsible and accountable for the operation of its
CA.
Cross-certification under this CP, with CAs external to
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~-----------------------~~==~~~~~~~~~--~~~~-=~~-=~~~--~.~ SwUPKl, may only be done by the Policy CA after under this policy. Distributed validation will be
decision by the PMA, and shall comply with this CP implemented using a network of trusted registration
and any additional requirements decided by the PMA. authorities (RA's).
1.3.2 Registration authorities1.3.2Registration authorities 1.3.3 Registration Authorities
Individuals or groups of individuals can be recognised
by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification
Authority to act as trusted intermediaries in the identity
verification process between subscriber and
certification authority, Such trusted intermediaries are
formally assigned by the CA and their identities and
contact details published in an on-line accessible
repository, the location of which is stated in section
1.4.
, R.egistrationAuthorities (RA) are needed for physical
I Identification/authentication of entities. These
, authorities MUST not be permitted to issue certificates.
1\ registration authority (RA) is
Any Registration Authority (RA) operating in
compliance with this CP is responsible for all duties
assigned to it by the CA. An RA may perform duties
on behalf of more than one CA, provided that in doing
so it satisfies all the requirements of this CP. An RA
may not issue certificates.
• an individual or
• ?a group of people appointed by an
organization or an organizational unit
tl11stedby a CA, serving as a contact point for
registration of new end entities, i.e. end entities that
Wanto have a certificate issued. RAs have to check
thecertificates requester's identity in an appropriate
lVay.__.
The RA's are required to sign a document declaring
their understanding of and adherence to this CP/CPS.
~e RA MUST sign an agreement with the certifying
I n:: stating the obligation to adhere to the agreed
__.~edures.
I 1.3.3End entitIes 1.3.3 End entities
__'~~~~--~~~~~~~--~4----------------------------+~~~--~--~~~----~--~heend entities to be certified under this policy can be Certificates can be issues to natural persons and to
anatural person (individual or representing an computer entities. The entities that are eligible for
organization) or a computer entity (e.g. a computer, a certification by the DutchGrid medium-security
toUteror an application), capable ofperfonning Certification Authority are:
c'Yptographic operations.
: ~Ch conforming CA MUST detail in the CPS who are
e end entities that it is willing to certify.
• all those entities related to organisations,
formally based in and/or having offices
inside the Netherlands, that are involved in
the research or deployment of multi-
domain distributed computing
infrastructure, intended for cross-
organisational sharing of resources. The
focus of these organisations should also be
in research and/or education.
• all those entities associated to the
DutchGrid platform.
• all organisations located in the
"Wetenschappelijk Centrum
Watergraafsmeer" in Amsterdam, that are
t-, run entirelv on a non-for-profit basis.113I~~~~------------------~~~~~~~~--------------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---1.4 Applicability 1.3.8 Policy Applicability 1.3.4 Applicability
./?;...._
~~e:-:o::-;f<':'t;-he-p-lI-rp-o-s-es-o-!""t";'h""'iS-P-O-'.'''''ic-y-;-is-t-o-p-ro-.l-n-o-:"te-a-w";'id7e-f ;;T;:;h-e-c-e-:-rt::-ifi';:lc-a":'t":'es:-c":'o::-n=t":'ai"'n-:p-u"'b7Ii:-:'c-;k-e-y-s-c-orr-es-p-o-n-:d;7iJ-lg-::-to--+-;Th~e-c-e-rt:Cirfi"'c":'at:-:es-::-:-is::-s-u":'ed-;-;-b-y'7th;-e~D;-u::tc:;h:-;G:;-n7'd:;-:m::-ed::;::iu'::m=----I
a e of public-key certificates 111 many different private keys for digital signatures. Keys for digital security Certification Authority may not be used for
./ :.hcations. In order to promote interoperability this signatures are intended to be used in verification, financial transactions.
a~ le ICystrongly encourages CA to support SIMIME for authentication, data integrity and key agreement Other than that, these certificates may be used for any
ipCunnge-mail exchanges.ltisalsosuggestedthatmechanisms.applicationthatissuitableforX.S09 certificates.
(tsec (to offer network layer security) and SSUTLS The certificates are thus intended to be used for
Ihl a~offer transport layer security for protecting example for verifying the identity of electronic mail
~hcation protocols like HTTP, Telnet, correspondents or for remote access to a computer
~I thaP)SHOULD be supported. It's important to notice system, verifying the identity of persons or other legal
, Ii~ this policy in principle doesn't want to put a priori entities, or for protecting the integrity of software and
,n ca.tation to the use of the certificates except for the data.
I ~~~.inwhich certificates are used in a way that is The CP is relevant for authentication and the protection
o CI\ Ibited by the law of the countries where the is.suing of integrity of business transactions within the approval
Cc .areestablished. However in order to evaluate If limits of the organisations and such that the
c.rtlfkates issued under this policy are suitable for at 'rta falsification of the transaction would cause only minor~' ''''v In.application the chapter 2 about .GeneralP." I financial loss or require only administrative action for
~ndSlons. has to be read carefully and fully correction.
,ot erstood.
This limit is at the discretion of the Relying Party or
the organisation of the Relying Party.
The applicability of certificates issued in compliance
with this policy does not rely solely on this compliance
but is critically dependent on involved IT-systems as
indicated in section 2.1.2.3.
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- r-1.3.4 Repositories
-A CA must ensure that there is a Certificate repository
Iand a Certificate Status Service (CSS) associated with
it. A CSS consists of a CRL repository and an optional
,
.. Online Certificate Status Service (OCSS). 14These repositories and services shall comply with
current standards as stated in the CPS. __...
1.3.5 Sponsors
COl__... Ad,
Each Organisation in SwUPKI is solely responsible for
illissuing the certificates it finds reasons to use in its
business. The policy for delegating authority to
nominate persons to become Subscribers of certificates
will vary between members, but the delegations are I
given to what we can Sponsors. A Sponsor is an
Phoorganisational unit or officer with the authority to i ~axnominate a person to be a Subscriber of certificates. , UR]
The Sponsor may suggest appropriate distinguished e'mnames for Subjects and is responsible for either
supplying or confirming authentication and certificate
attribute details to the CA or RA. The Sponsor is also
~:responsible for informing the CA or RA if the sponsor
relationship with the Subscriber terminates or changes Poll,
such that certificates should be revoked. .'-..._
The PMA is the sponsor of the Policy CA. __.-'
1.3.6 Subscribers
---A CA may only issue certificates to Subscribers - Iindividuals (employees, students, guests and others)- I
having a Sponsor within the CA's Organisation. I
Eligibility for a certificate is at the sole discretion of
the CA. ----I1.3.7 Subjects
I
__"""',
A CA may only issue certificates where the Subject is I
the Subscriber, or is an organisational role or an IT- I
system provided that responsibility and accountability !
is attributable to the Subscriber. __"""'I
1.4 Contact Details 1.4 Contact Details 1.4 Contact Details
__./
1.4.1 Specification administration organization 1.4.1 Specification administration organisation
/
On behalf of EuroPKI this policy is fully managed by This Certificate Policy is registered by Stockholms The DutchGrid medium-security Certification
the Computer and Network Security Group (CNSG) of universitet, SE 10691 Stockholm, Sweden. Authority is administered by the Dutch "Nationaal
Politecnico di Torino, Italy (http://security.polito.itl). Stockholms universitet is the PMA of this SwUPKJ CP Instituut voor Kemfysica en Hoge-Energie Fysica
and is fully responsible for registration, maintenance, (NIKHEF)" as part of its DataGrid project effort bYtel
and interpretation of the policy. Questions concerning David Groep. It is operated by the NIKHEF ComPu
this policy should be addressed to: Teclmology Group (CT).
SwUPKI, Enheten for IT och Media, Stockholms
universitet, SE 10691 Stockholm, Sweden or The contact person for this CP/CPS is:
info@swupkisu.se. . os,
David Groep, DutchGrid and NIKHEF CA operaUo
As an alternative to the address above, potential PO. Box 41882, NL-I009 DB Amsterdam, The
members may address their inquiries and requests to Netherlands
request@swupki.su.se or access phone: +31 205922179, telefax: +31205925155,
http://www.swupki.su.seljoin.html. telex: 10262 hefnl
e-mail: ca@nikhef.nl.
_/
1.4.1.1 Online repositories
./
general web address http://certificate.nikhef.nV
policy documents
http;llcertificate.nikbef.nllmedium/policy/
certificate repository ,
http.z/certificate.rukhef.nl/medium/ I
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-_
Idap://certij'icate.nikhef.nllo=dutchgrid
- certificate revocation list
http://certificate.nikhef.nllmedium/cacrl.pem
root certificate
h ht!p_:/Icertificate.nikhef.nllmedium/cacert.pem
1.4.2Contact person 1.4.2 Contact person-.
~
Contact point for questions related to this policy is: The DutchGrid medium-security Certification
.- Address Prof. Antonio Lioy Authority is operated (as meant by section 1.3.1) by:
I EuroPKI Root Certification • David Groep, NIKHEF, phone + 31 20 592
Authority 2179
clo Politecnico di Torino • Djuhaeri Harapan, NIKHEF, phone +31 201 Dip. Automatica e Informatica 592 2139
corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 24 The Registration Authorities for the DutchGrid
Phone
10129 Torino (Italy) medium-security Certification Authority are:
Fax
+3901156470211 +390115647054 • David Groep, NIKHEF, phone +31 20592+390115647099
UR.I http://www.europki.org/calroot/ 2179Djuhaeri Harapan, NIKHEF. phone
e'lUail ca@europki.org +31205922139
• Zeger Hendrikse, University of Amsterdam
lnformatics Institute, phone: +31 20 525
i':- 7535
1.4.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the 1.4.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the
POlicy policy
./'-
./
1
i
,/
,er
[15,
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Appendix C
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC
SIGNATURES (2001)
Article 1. Sphere of application
This Law applies where electronic signatures are used in the context of commercial
activities. It does not override any rule of law intended for the protection of
consumers.
Article 2. Definitions
For the purposes of this Law:
(a) "Electronic signature" means data in electronic form in, affixed to or
logically associated with, a data message, which may be used to identify the
signatory in relation to the data message and to indicate the signatory's
approval of the information contained in the data message;
(b) "Certificate" means a data message or other record confirming the link
between a signatory and signature creation data;
(e) "Data message" means information generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic, optical or similar means including, but not limited to, electronic
data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy; and acts
either on its own behalf or on behalf of the person it represents;
(d) "Signatory" means a person that holds signature creation data and acts
either on its own behalf or on behalf of the person it represents;
(e) "Certification service provider" means a person that issues certificates and
may provide other services related to electronic signatures;
(f) "Relying party" means a person that may act on the basis of a certificate or
an electronic signature.
Article 3. Equal treatment of signature technologies
Nothing in this Law, except article 5, shall be applied so as to exclude, restrict or
deprive of legal effect any method of creating an electronic signature that satisfies the
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requirements referred to in article 6, paragraph 1, or otherwise meets the requirements
of applicable law.
Article 4. Interpretation
1. In the interpretation of this Law, regard is to be had to its international origin and to
the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith.
2. Questions concerning matters governed by this Law which are not expressly settled
in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which this Law is
based.
Article 5. Variation by agreement
The provisions of this Law may be derogated from or their effect may be varied by
agreement, unless that agreement would not be valid or effective under applicable
law.
Article 6. Compliance with a requirement for a signature
1. Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in relation
to a data message if an electronic signature is used that is as reliable as was
appropriate for the purpose for which the data message was generated or
communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement.
2. Paragraph 1 applies whether the requirement referred to therein is in the form of an
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the absence of a
signature.
3. An electronic signature is considered to be reliable for the purpose of satisfying the
requirement referred to in paragraph 1 if:
(a) The signature creation data are, within the context in which they are used,
linked to the signatory and to no other person;
(b) The signature creation data were, at the time of signing, under the control
of the signatory and of no other person;
(e) Any alteration to the electronic signature, made after the time of signing, is
detectable; and
(d) Where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide
assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any
alteration made to that information after the time of signing is detectable.
4. Paragraph 3 does not limit the ability of any person:
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(a) To establish in any other way, for the purpose of satisfying the requirement
referred to in paragraph 1, the reliability of an electronic signature; or
(b) To adduce evidence of the non-reliability of an electronic signature.
5. The provisions of this article do not apply to the following: [...].
Article 7. Satisfaction of article 6
1. [Any person, organ or authority, whether public or private, specified by the
enacting State as competent} may determine which electronic signatures satisfy the
provisions of article 6 of this Law.
2. Any determination made under paragraph 1 shall be consistent with recognized
international standards.
3. Nothing in this article affects the operation of the rules of private intemationallaw.
Article 8. Conduct of the signatory
1. Where signature creation data can be used to create a signature that has legal effect,
each signatory shall:
(a) Exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use of its signature
creation data;
(b) Without undue delay, utilize means made available by the certification
service provider pursuant to article 9 of this Law, or otherwise use reasonable
efforts, to notify any person that may reasonably be expected by the signatory
to rely on or to provide services in support of the electronic signature if:
(i) The signatory knows that the signature creation data have been
compromised; or
(ii) The circumstances known to the signatory give rise to a substantial
risk that the signature creation data may have been compromised;
(c) Where a certificate is used to support the electronic signature, exercise
reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and completeness of all material
representations made by the signatory that are relevant to the certificate
throughout its life cycle or that are to be included in the certificate.
2. A signatory shall bear the legal consequences of its failure to satisfy the
requirements of paragraph 1.
Article 9. Conduct of the certification service provider
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1. Where a certification service provider provides services to support an electronic
signature that may be used for legal effect as a signature, that certification service
provider shall:
(a) Act in accordance with representations made by it with respect to its
policies and practices;
(b) Exercise reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and completeness of all
material representations made by it that are relevant to the certificate
throughout its life cycle or that are included in the certificate;
(e) Provide reasonably accessible means that enable a relying party to
ascertain from the certificate:
(i) The identity of the certification service provider;
(ii) That the signatory that is identified in the certificate had control of the
signature creation data at the time when the certificate was issued;
(iii) That signature creation data were valid at or before the time when the
certificate
was issued;
(d) Provide reasonably accessible means that enable a relying party to
ascertain, where relevant, from the certificate or otherwise:
(i) The method used to identify the signatory;
(ii) Any limitation on the purpose or value for which the signature creation
data or the certificate may be used;
(iii) That the signature creation data are valid and have not been
compromised;
(iv) Any limitation on the scope or extent of liability stipulated by the
certification service provider;
(v) Whether means exist for the signatory to give notice pursuant to article
8, paragraph 1 (b), of this Law;
(vi) Whether a timely revocation service is offered;
(e) Where services under subparagraph (d) (v) are offered, provide a means
for a signatory to give notice pursuant to article 8, paragraph 1 (b), of this Law
and, where services under subparagraph (d) (vi) are offered, ensure the
availability of a timely revocation service;
(f) Utilize trustworthy systems, procedures and human resources in
performing its services.
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3. A certification service provider shall bear the legal consequences of its failure
to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1.
Article 10. Trustworthiness
For the purposes of article 9, paragraph 1 (f). of this Law in determining whether, or
to what extent, any systems, procedures and human resources utilized by a
certification service provider are trustworthy, regard may be had to the following
factors:
(a) Financial and human resources, including existence of assets;
(b) Quality of hardware and software systems;
(e) Procedures for processing of certificates and applications for certificates
and retention of records;
(d) Availability of information to signatories identified in certificates and to
potential relying parties;
(e) Regularity and extent of audit by an independent body;
(f) The existence of a declaration by the State, an accreditation body or the
certification service provider regarding compliance with or existence of the
foregoing; or
(g) Any other relevant factor.
Article 11. Conduct of the relying party
A relying party shall bear the legal consequences of its failure:
(a) To take reasonable steps to verify the reliability of an electronic signature;
or
(b) Where an electronic signature is supported by a certificate, to take
reasonable steps:
(ii) To verify the validity, suspension or revocation of the certificate; and
(ii) To observe any limitation with respect to the certificate.
Article 12. Recognition of foreign certificates and electronic
signatures
1. In determining whether, or to what extent, a certificate or an electronic signature is
legally effective, no regard shall be had:
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(a) To the geographic location where the certificate is issued or the electronic
signature created or used; or
(b) To the geographic location of the place of business of the issuer or
signatory.
2. A certificate issued outside [the enacting State] shall have the same legal effect in
[the enacting State] as a certificate issued in [the enacting State] if it offers a
substantially equivalent level of reliability.
3. An electronic signature created or used outside [the enacting State] shall have the
same legal effect in [the enacting State] as an electronic signature created or used in
[the enacting State] ifit offers a substantially equivalent level of reliability.
4. In determining whether a certificate or an electronic signature offers a substantially
equivalent level of reliability for the purposes of paragraph 2 or 3, regard shall be had
to recognized international standards and to any other relevant factors.
5. Where, notwithstanding paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, parties agree, as between hemselves,
to the use of certain types of electronic signatures or certificates, that agreement
shall be recognized as sufficient for the purposes of cross-border recognition, unless
that agreement would not be valid or effective under applicable law.
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Appendix D
CRITERIA XML FORMALISATION
<?xml version=" I.O"?>
<criteria xmlns:xsi=''http://www .w3 .orgl200 IIXMLSchema-instance" xsi :noN amespaceSchemaLocation="fiIe:/ Ild:1AcadimicIXM
lrCP/finallcriteria-schema.xsd">
<Criterionl>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<checking>
<capability of="subject" toManage="subordinate CA">
<requirement>
<withCompliance with="agreed CP"I>
<zrequirement>
</capability>
</checking>
<lrequirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion I>
<c.riterion2>
<RegistrationAuthority>
<prohibition>
<issue>
<certificates to="subject"/>
<tissue>
</proh ibi tion>
<lRegistrationAuthority>
</criterion2>
<criteri.on3>
<participant>
<requirement>
<declare>
<financialResponsibility for="its liabilities" to="other participants"/>
<assets to="support its operations and liabilities'">
</declare>
</requirement>
<lparticipant>
<lcriterion3>
<Criterion4>
<CertiticationAuthority>
<requirement>
<ensure>
<law ofCountry="ISO country name" governsAnyAgreement="true">
<requirement>
<sameCountry wbere="CA" isEstablished="true"l>
<lrequirement>
</law>
<lensure>
<rrequirernent>
<lCertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion4>
<Criterion5>
<Certifi.cationAuthority>
<requirement>
<allow>
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<arbitration to="resolve disputes arising out of its CP"/>
<fallow>
<lrequirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion5>
<Criterion6>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<perform>
<process of="complianceAudit">
<requirement>
<carryOut by="extemal auditor"/>
<lrequirement>
<lprocess>
<lperform>
<lrequirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion6>
<Criterion7>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<run>
<complianceAudit>
<requirement>
<annually atLeast=" I"/>
</req uirem en t>
<lcomplianceAudit>
</run>
<lrequirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion7>
<Cri terion 8>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<revoke>
<subjectCertificate to=="certiticate revocation list">
<requirement>
<subjectOperation complyWithCP="false"/>
<lrequirement>
<fsubjectCertificate>
<lrevoke>
<lrequirement>
<lCe.rtificationAuthority>
<lCri terion8>
<Criterion9>
<CertificationAuthority>
<prohibition>
<discloseTo>
<thirdParties any="contidential information" of="subject">
<requirement>
<except>
<when RequestedByLaw>true<!whenRequestedByLaw>
<whenConsentBySubject>true<!whenConsentBySubject>
</except>
<lrequirement>
<lthirdParties>
<ldiscloseTo>
<lprohibition>
<lCertificationAuthority>
<lCri terion9>
<Criterion I0>
<RegistrationAuthoritv>
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<requirement>
<authenticate>
<organization include=l'its reputation"/>
</authenticate>
</requirement>
.~<lRegistrationAuthority>
</Criterion) 0>
<Criterionl J>
<RegistrationAuthority>
<requirement>
<authenticate>
<individual basedOn="its physical presence"l>
<lauthenticate>
</requirement>
<lRegistrationAuthority>
<lCriterionl1>
<Criterion 12>
<Certification Authority>
<requirement>
<insure>
<subject isAwareOf="its respective rights and obligations"!>
</insure>
</requirement>
<1CertificationAuthority>
</Criterion 12>
<Criterion 13>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<update>
<CRL after="every certificate revocation">
<requirement>
<updatelntervalTime withln="l hour"!>
</requirement>
</CRL>
</update>
<lrequirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion 13>
<Criterion 14>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<publish>
<CRI>
<requirement>
<interval Time withtn="30 days"/>
<zrequirement>
<fCRL>
<fpublish>
</requirement>
<fCertificationAuthority>
</Criterion 14>
<Criterion 15>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement> .
<do>
<secuirty Audit>
<requirement>
<allBootsOfThePKIsystem>true</allBootsOfThePKIsystem>
<allAccessAttemptsToPKIsystem>true<lallAccessAttemptsToPKIsystern>
<aIIPKIsystemFai]ures>true<laIIPKIsystemFailures>
<CAkeyGeneration>true</CAkeyGeneration>
<CAke Stora e>true</CAk Stora e>
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<CAkeyBackup>true</CAkeyBackup>
<CAkey Archival>true<lCAkey Archival>
<CAkeyRecovery>true<lCAkeyRecovery>
<CAkeyDestruction>true<lCAkeyDestruction>
<CAandSubjectCertificate>
<gene.rationRequests>true<lgenerationRequests>
<renewal Requests>true</renewal Requests>
<re-keyRequests>true</re-keyRequests>
<revocationRequests>true<lrevocationRequests>
<lCAandSubjectCertificate>
<issuanceOfCertificates>true<lissuanceOfCertificates>
<certificateRequests>
<ofStatusChange>true</ofStatusChange>
<ofStatus>true<lofStatus>
<responses>true<lresponses>
<lcertificateRequcsts>
<PKlandSecuritySystemActions>
<performedByCApersonncl>true<lperformedByCApersonnel>
<!PKlandSecuritySystemActionS>
<identityVerificationProcedures>true<lidentityVerificationProcedures>
<lrequirement>
</secuirtyAudit>
<ldo>
<lrequirement>
<lCertiticationAuthority>
<lCriterionI5>
<Criterion 16>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<examine>
<auditLogs>
<requirement>
<frequent atLeast="weekly"/>
<lrequirement>
<lauditLogs>
<lexamine>
</requ.irement>
</CertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion 16>
<Criterion 17>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<execute>
<process of.="vulnerability assessments"/>
<lexecute>
- </requirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion 17>
<Criterion 18>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<provide>
<archiving>
<requirement>
<certificateRequestAppJication>true<lcertiticateRequestApplication>
<documentationSuPpoltingCertificateApplications>true<ldocumentationSupportingCert.ificateApplications>
<allComputerSecurity AuditData>true<lallComputerSecurity AuditData>
<certificateRevocationApplication>true</certificateRevocationApplication>
<certificateRe-key Application>true</certiticateRe-key Application>
<certificateRenewalApplication>true<lcertificateRenewaLApplication>
<issuedCertificates>true<lissuedCertificates>
<issuedCRLsORcertificateStatusRecords>true<lissuedCRLsORcertificateStatusRecords>
<allcorrespondence>
<betweenllleCAandSubcontractors>true<lbetweenTheCAandSubcontractorS> .:
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<betweenTheCAandSubscribers>true<lbetweenTheCAandSubscribers>
<lallcorrespondence>
<retentionPeriod>
<requi rement>
<atLeast InYears="5"/>
<lrequirement>
</retentionPeriod>
<rrequirement>
<larchiving>
<lprovide>
<lrequirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
<lCri terion 18>
<Criterion 19>
<Certification Authority>
<requirement>
<establish>
<plan of.="surviving after the disaster"/>
<lestablish>
<zrequirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion 19>
<Criterion20>
<Certification Authority>
<requirement>
<support>
<trustedRo1es>
<requirement>
<securityOfficers>true</securityOfficers>
<registrationOfficers>true</registrationOfficers>
<syemAdministrators>true<lsyemAdministrators>
.<systemOperators>true</systemOperatorS>
<systernAuditors>true<lsystemAuditors>
<zrequirement>
<ltrustedRoles>
<zsupport>
<rrequirement>
</CertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion20>
<Criterion21 >
<Certification.Authority>
<requirement>
<assure>
<alIPersonneControI1ed>
<requirement>
<backgroundChecked>
<qual ifications>true<lqual ifications>
<experience>true<lexperience>
<governmentClearances>true<lgovernmentClearances>
<lbackgroundChecked>
<providingWthTaining>true<lprovidingWthTaining>
<povidingWthRefresherTaining>true<lpovidingWtbRefresherTaining>
<sanctioningForUnauthorizedActions>true<lsanctioningForUnauthorizedActions>
<providingWithDocumentation>true<lprovidingWithDocumentation>
<zrequirement>
<laIlPersonneControlled>
<lassure>
</requirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
</Criterion21 >
<Criterion22>
<subject>
<r uirernent>
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<Criterion26>
<CertificationAuthority>
<requirement>
<examining>
<integrityOfHardwareAndSoftwareBy>
<requirement>
<documentedAndControlledAny>
<eonfiguration>true<leonfiguration>
<modifications>true<lmodifications>
<upgrades>true<lupgrades>
</documentedAndControlledAny>
<detectingUnauthorizedModification>true<ldetectingUnauthorizedModification>
<checkingSoftwarelntegrity>
<req uirement>
<atLeast inDays="7"1>
</requirement>
</checkingSoftwareJntegrity>
<lrequirement>
<lintegrityOffiardwareAndSoftwareBy>
</examining>
</requirement>
</Certifi cation Authority>
<generate>
<itsKeys>true<litsKeys>
</generate>
</requirement>
</subject>
<lCriterion22>
<Criterion23>
<Certification Authority>
<requirement>
<makeSure>
<minimum Length of="private key" islnBits=" I024"1>
<lmakeSure>
<lrequirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion23>
<Criterion24>
<CertificationAuthority>
<prohibition>
<create>
<CAcerti ficateValidityPeriods moreThaneln Years="20"/>
<subjectCertificateValidityPeriods moreThanlnYear="] "I>
</create>
</prohibition>
<lCertificationAuthority>
<lCriterion24>
<Criterion25>
<CertificationAuiliority>
<requirement>
<secure>
<CAmachine>
<requirement>
<diseonnectFromNetwork>true<ldisconnectFromNetwol'k>
<prohibitUnauthorizedAccess>true<lprohibitUnauthorizedAccess>
<updatingOSwithSecurityPatches>true<lupdatingOSwithSecurityPatches>
<limitAccess>true<llimitAccess>
<lrequirement>
</CAmachine>
<lsecure>
</requirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
</Criterion25>
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</Criterion26>
<Criterion27>
<CertiticationAuthority>
<requirement>
<securing>
<networks>
<requirement>
<tirewalls>true</firewalls>
<encryptionAndDigitaISignatures>true</encryptionAndDigitaISignatures>
<ACLs>true<1 ACLs> ..
</requirernent>
</networks>
</securing>
<rrequirement>
<lCertificationAuthority>
</Criterion27>
</criteria>
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